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This dissertation adopts a multi-scalar and mixed methods approach to interrogate the 
widely observed but underdefined relationship between natural resources and civil 
conflict. The results of three largely independent analyses are presented, 
corresponding to three distinct but overlapping epistemological scales and applying 
analytical methods appropriate to each scale. Cross-country spatial econometric 
analysis concluded that interstate variation in the incidence of conflict events is 
explained, in part, by a resource curse mechanism, whereby economic dependence on 
petroleum rents undermines state capacity and democratic governance, making a state 
more vulnerable to conflict. The results of a subnational quantitative study of the New 
People’s Army insurgency in the Philippines suggest that the spatial distribution of 
conflict risk within countries affected by civil war can be shaped by the 
environmental and socioeconomic impacts of resource extraction. And, a case study 
of a conflict over magnetite mining in the northern Philippines found that 
  
controversial resource extraction projects can create opportunities for non-state actors 
to develop alliances with civilian networks, discursively rescale localized disputes 
over resource governance to align with broader patterns of civil violence, and 
propagate narrative frames justifying violent collective action. From these results, a 
political ecology of scale in resource-related conflicts is set forth, arguing that the 
scalar properties of conflict vulnerability, conflict risk, and conflict opportunity have 
both epistemological and ontological implications; in particular, it is proposed that 
extractive enclaves, by fostering overlapping and intersecting scalar configurations of 
economic, socio-cultural, governance, and biophysical processes, constitute ‘natural 
habitats’ for civil conflict in which various actors can renegotiate their relative scalar 
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Several years ago, while on an extended visit to the rural town in the 
Philippines where I once served as a U.S. Peace Corps Volunteer, I found myself in 
discussion with a close friend, the owner of a small restaurant in the town center. The 
topic of the conversation was an incident that had recently occurred at a nearby 
quarry, during which members of the New People’s Army (NPA), the armed wing of 
the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), had attacked workers and destroyed 
equipment as ‘punishment’ for the environmental impacts of the mine. Such attacks 
are not infrequent in the Philippines and my friend and I were speculating on why 
extractive industry in his country results so frequently in violence, relative to mine. 
He suggested that the difference was geographical, that the United States simply has 
more space for resource exploitation that does not displace or otherwise adversely 
affect people’s land and livelihoods. I countered that there are numerous high-density 
countries where resource-related violence is not commonplace and many examples of 
low-density countries where it is.  
My friend then argued that extractive industry in the U.S. primarily benefits 
Americans, rather than international corporations and foreign investors, as is the case 
in the Philippines. Again, I disagreed, explaining that I was, as part of my job at the 
time, reviewing a proposal to transport coal from Montana for export to China, one of 
countless such internationally-financed extractive projects in the U.S. Finally, he 
proposed an institutional explanation, reasoning that the lack of a transparent 





assessment in the Philippines leave communities affected by mining feeling 
disenfranchised and aggrieved. Although, as an environmental impact assessment 
practitioner, I found this last explanation appealing—it was encouraging to think of 
my profession as critical to the prevention of civil violence—I remained unconvinced. 
We eventually agreed that the answer must be a multifaceted one and that all of my 
friend’s explanations likely played a role.  
This dissertation is, in essence, an extension of that conversation. In the 
following, I adopt a mixed methods approach—combining spatial econometrics, 
remote sensing and GIS, and qualitative analysis—to interrogate the relationship 
between extractive industry and conflict from multiple angles simultaneously. In 
reviewing the vast literature on this topic, I have often been struck by the extent to 
which the choice of methods, and the scale at which analyses are conducted, appear to 
correlate with the conclusions drawn by researchers. In the broadest sense, qualitative 
studies, interested in scales ranging generally from the body, to the household, to the 
locality, have tended to support a grievance-based understanding of the resource-
conflict linkage, whereas large-N quantitative research, in which data are aggregated 
to the urban, regional, or state scale, most often conclude that economic motivations, 
including the practical desire of belligerents to exploit resources as a source of 
financing, are the primary drivers of civil violence (see Le Billon 2012; Ross 2004; 
Van Der Ploeg & Poelhekke 2016). I wondered if that dichotomy represented an 
example of what Marston et al. (2005) describe as “a classic case of form determining 





into the scalar apparatus at hand” (422) and undertook to conduct a research program 
that was explicitly inter-scalar in design in order to evaluate that possibility. 
The results of the analyses presented below illustrate these epistemological 
problems of observational scale. Although the cross-country regression results 
presented in Chapter 2 are suggestive of an intermediate resource curse effect linking 
economic dependence on resources to civil conflict, the qualitative study in Chapter 4 
concludes that resource extraction can, by exacerbating social grievances, create 
opportunities for non-state actors to form alliances with civilian networks. The 
quantitative subnational analysis of Chapter 3, meanwhile, suggests that resource 
extraction can shape the spatial patterns of violence in civil war by exacerbating 
social inequalities, environmental scarcity, and relative deprivation in communities 
affected by it. Such findings underscore the importance of explicit consideration of 
scale in the study of natural resource conflicts and of policy interventions for 
preventing and mitigating such conflicts. 
In conducting this research, however, I have become convinced that scale is 
not only interesting in the narrow methodological sense that I initially set out to 
investigate, but also has ontological implications that are critical for understanding 
how natural resources interact with and contribute to outbreaks of violence. I will 
argue, in the course of this dissertation, that extractive enclaves represent a ‘natural 
habitat’ for conflict, spatial and temporal nodes at which scalar configurations of 
economic, political, cultural, and biophysical processes intersect and are contested 





between actors operating at different levels of spatial organization, and the 
application of violence.   
1.1 Natural Resources and Civil Conflict 
1.1.1 Wars of Plunder 
The chapters to follow engage with two broad scholarly literatures, the first of 
which comprises the vast body of work, including research by economists, political 
scientists, anthropologists, and geographers, examining the relationship between 
natural resources and armed conflict. It has long been recognized that natural 
resources can contribute to political violence—the earliest geographies, of Strabo and 
Ptolemy, were preoccupied with the political and military implications of the 
geographic distribution of resources and environmental conditions. Military 
strategists, from Thucydides to Machiavelli, have similarly stressed the importance of 
resources in shaping the onset and outcomes of conflicts. Throughout history, ‘wars 
of plunder’ have been waged repeatedly and on every continent, from the conquest of 
the Mexica empire by Hernán Cortés in search of gold and silver, to the annexation of 
the gold-rich Black Hills by the United States from the Sioux beginning in 1876, the 
decimation of Congo tribes by King Leopold of Belgium’s mercenary forces in the 
1880s and 1890s to facilitate the extraction and exportation of ivory and rubber, the 
invasion of nickel-rich Petsamo in Nazi-occupied Finland by the Red Army in 1944, 
the cooptation of Kuwaiti oil fields by Iraqi forces in 1990, and the ongoing civil war 
in South Sudan, during which control of oil-producing regions has been a major point 





resources, it is difficult to identify a conflict in which resources were not a 
contributing factor.  
The strategic importance of petroleum in modern warfare, and to modern 
economies, is so apparent that the popular term ‘oil wars’ has become a common 
descriptor of many conflicts, especially in the Middle East (Le Billon 2012; Klare 
2007). There has been increasing scholarly and public interest as well in the potential 
for future ‘water wars,’ as expanding populations and industrialization in water-
stressed regions contributes to scarcity (Freeman 2001). The association between 
resources and conflict is not limited, however, to militarily or economically critical 
resources. The widespread use of alluvial diamonds to finance armed militia groups 
and national militaries in the civil wars of Angola, Sierra Leona, Côte d’Ivoire, and 
Liberia, for example, has led to the adoption in the popular lexicon of ‘conflict 
diamonds’ and, even more evocatively, ‘blood diamonds’ (Le Billon 2001a, 2012). 
Philippe Le Billon, perhaps the foremost modern geographer of resource conflicts, 
comments upon the popularity of the 2009 film Avatar, in which a greedy mining 
company goes to war against a peaceful tribe of extraterrestrials for control over 
valuable minerals as illustrating a widespread recognition of and popular fascination 
with the resource-conflict relationship (Le Billon 2012).  
Yet, despite this interest, the specific mechanisms by which that relationship 
is operationalized remain underspecified; thus, although the causal chain linking 
resources and conflict appears straightforward in many specific instances, such as the 
direct selling of diamonds by warlords or the plundering of oil by invading armies, a 





this dissertation is to begin to address this gap by bringing to bear theories of scale in 
human geography and a multi-scalar, mixed methods approach that combines 
qualitative field research with cross-country and subnational regression analysis. The 
dissertation focuses, as does much of the existing literature, on the relationship 
between resources and intrastate conflict, rather than wars between states, in large 
part because these comprise the vast majority of conflicts, and a growing share of 
conflict-related violence, in the post-World War II period, and especially since the 
end of the Cold War, trends that seem likely to continue. I discuss in detail the long-
standing war between the Philippine government and the NPA, owing to my personal 
experience living and working in the context of that conflict. However, although the 
antecedents and evolution of each conflict is unique, I believe that many of the 
conclusions made herein may be generalizable to other cases of civil violence, as well 
as some interstate wars. 
1.1.2 Greed Versus Grievance 
The main point of departure for civil conflict studies from conventional 
geopolitical theories of war is the introduction of non-state actors, whose motivations, 
strategies, objectives, and actions are often the primary subjects of inquiry. 
Historically, most research on civil conflict engaged, directly or implicitly, with the 
Durkheimian notion of relative deprivation, first articulated by Stouffler et al. (1949) 
and applied most notably to the issue of civil violence by Gurr (1970). Broadly, 
relative deprivation theory holds that the experience of grievance at the individual or 
group level is a function of a perceived incommensurability between a level of 





experienced; numerous studies by political scientists, sociologists, geographers, and 
psychologists have suggested a link between the experience of relative deprivation, 
often in terms of unequal or declining access to economic and political opportunities 
and both organized political violence and social deviance. Homer-Dixon (1994, 
1999), engaging with the then largely geopolitical and theoretically underdeveloped 
environmental security literature (see Myers 1989), applied relative deprivation to 
link environmental scarcity and resource overuse to violent conflict; in the 
Philippines, for example, he argued that large-scale land purchases for agricultural 
consolidation and extractive industry drove small-holder farmers onto increasingly 
marginalized lands, reducing their production levels and incomes, and thus causing an 
experience of deprivation that was conceptualized relative to increasing profitability 
of large businesses and landowners. Much of such early work on the resource-conflict 
nexus was criticized, in particular by Gleditsh (1998), for failing to conceptually 
disentangle environmental conflicts—involving degradation of environmental quality 
and depletion of renewable resources, such as clean water—from conflicts over 
valuable extractable resources like oil and minerals; Gleditsh was also among the first 
to identify several key challenges in the study of the relationship between resources 
and political violence, including the potentially confounding effects of political and 
economic variables and the issue of reverse causality with which contemporary 
studies continue to grapple. 
The importance of grievances as the predominant motivational driver of 
belligerents in civil wars was, however, directly challenged by a series of influential 





statistically significant relationship between economic dependence on the export of 
primary commodities—especially petroleum—and the risk of experiencing a civil 
war, which they contrast with the lack of an observable correlation between conflict 
and either economic inequality or political marginalization of minority ethnic groups, 
proxies for social grievance. The provocative conclusion that belligerents in intrastate 
conflicts are motivated primarily by the desire to control valuable resources and that 
“the true cause of much civil war is not the loud discourse of grievance but the silent 
force of greed” (Collier 2000, 101) reinvigorated a greed versus grievance debate that 
dominated much of the quantitative work during the early 2000s (see Ross 2004). 
1.1.3 Beyond Greed and Grievance 
Collier & Hoeffler’s work can also be credited with inspiring, in large part, a 
set of alternative theories seeking to link economic dependence on natural resources 
to civil war through an intermediate effect on state-level economies and institutions 
(Humphreys 2005; Dube & Vargas 2013, Ross 2004; Elbadawi & Soto 2015; 
Basedau & Lay 2009). Engaging with the broader resource curse literature, 
proponents of this mechanism have argued that economic dependence on the export 
of natural resources leave an economy exposed to economic shocks resulting from 
volatility in the global primary commodities markets or from currency devaluation 
via ‘Dutch disease’ (Fjelde 2015; Janus & Riera-Crichton 2015; Ross 2015). 
Alternatively, reliance on extractive industry may undermine state capacity and 
decrease institutional quality by incentivizing renterism in the public sector, causing 
governments of resource-dependent states to become more corrupt and less 





up authoritarian regimes and forestall the transition to democracy by supplying 
financing for military and police forces (Ross 2001a). 
A corollary to the greedy rebels hypothesis, sometimes referred to as the 
‘opportunity’ or ‘feasibility’ mechanism and developed in part by Collier & Hoeffler 
(2006) as well as Collier et al. (2009), deemphasizes motivational drivers of conflict 
entirely and instead focuses on the role played by natural resources as potential 
sources of financing for rebel groups. In addition to the canonical example of blood 
diamonds, examples in practice of the opportunity mechanism include the harvesting 
of timber by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia (Le Billon 2002), involvement of FARC 
rebels in illegal gold mining in Colombia (Massé & Le Billon 2017), trade in 
narcotics by the Taliban in Afghanistan (Cornell 2007), and the extortion of mining 
operations by the NPA in the Philippines (Santos 2010). The aggregate effect of the 
opportunity mechanism has been interrogated by Lujala (2010), who finds that the 
presence of oil, natural gas, and gemstones within combat zones is correlated with the 
duration of civil wars and Lujala et al. (2005), who find a positive relationship 
between ‘lootable’ alluvial diamonds and the start of civil wars, but a negative 
association between conflict onset and large-scale production of primary diamond 
deposits. 
1.1.4 Political Ecologies of Resource Conflicts 
Research in political ecology and related traditions has examined the resource-
conflict nexus from a different methodological standpoint. Numerous case studies of 
extractive projects, particularly in the developing world, have found evidence that 





and territoriality to produce or reproduce discourses justifying mobilization and 
violent collective action. Filer (1990) documents how landowner grievances related to 
gold and copper mining on the island of Bougainville spiraled into a secessionist 
rebellion in which several local tribes fought against the Papua New Guinean state 
and one another (see also Thompson 1991, Hilson 2006). Ikelegbe (2005, 2006), 
Omeje (2005), and Oyefusi (2008) describe how ethnic identity in the Niger delta 
intersected with mismanaged impacts mitigation and revenue sharing programs to 
create an ‘economy of conflict’ around oil extraction in which militant youth 
organizations perpetrate kidnappings for ransom and direct theft of oil, while state 
and private security forces have responded with extrajudicial violence against 
activists and communities. In the Philippines, Holden (2014) argues that grievances 
related to the militarization of mines and the targeting of anti-mining activists has 
increased popular support for the Maoist NPA, a process that has been mediated by 
the historical experience of colonialism and U.S. interventionism (Holden 2012a), as 
well as discourses of liberation theology (Holden 2012b). 
While such case studies invariably invoke social grievances as a major driver 
of violence, they differ with respect to the role they ascribe to the manipulation of 
grievance narratives by political actors. At the extreme, Aspinall (2007) argues that 
grievances related to natural gas extraction in Aceh, Indonesia were largely 
constructed by leaders of the separatist movement to legitimize violence. Elsewhere, 
such as in the conflict between the Indian state and Maoist insurgents and between the 
Philippine government and the NPA, there is evidence that non-state actors actively 





environmental impacts of mining on soil and water quality and the militarization of 
mining areas (Miklian 2012; Holden et al. 2011). Horowitz (2010), Urkidi (2011), 
Kuecker (2007), and others highlight the importance of less quantifiable grievances, 
such as the perceived threat to traditional lifeways and local cultures that may be the 
result of extractive-driven economic development; similarly, Escobar (2006) argues 
that the ultimate driver of resource-related conflict stems from the 
incommensurability of economic, ecological, political, and cultural valuation of 
natural resources, ecosystems and ‘nature’ in general. Ballard & Banks (2003), noting 
the preoccupation in the literature on the communities and people affected by 
extractive industry, observe that the behavior and discourses of the multinational 
corporations involved in the sector are also important considerations.  
Whether mediated by social grievances, systemic institutional effects, or the 
opportunity mechanism, the linkage between extractive industry and civil conflict is 
likely to be shaped, at least in part, by the material characteristics of the resources 
involved. The spatial footprint of extractive activity, for example, which varies from 
several acres in the case of oil wells to many thousands of hectares in the case of 
timber concessions, affects the potential for environmental harm and, therefore, the 
experience of grievance in affected populations; the accessibility, from the 
perspective of non-state actors seeking to profit from resource extraction, of the 
resource commodity chain is, meanwhile, the major condition defining spaces of 
opportunity. Le Billon has gone furthest with respect to considering these 
implications for explaining how conflicts arise and evolve. In his analysis of the 





exploitable alluvial diamonds by the insurgent Union for the Total Independence of 
Angola (or UNITA) with that of centralized oil resources by the national government 
(Le Billon 2001a) and shows how these distinct approaches influenced the course of 
the war. In several other papers, he proposes a general typology wherein specific 
forms of conflict are associated with certain resource categories. Distinguishing 
between proximate and distant (relative to power centers) resources and between 
point and diffuse resources, he observes that proximate point resources, such as oil 
wells in Chad, tend to be a factor in wars of state control and coup d’etats; proximate 
distant resources, such as copper in Bougainville, are more often linked with 
separatist movements; proximate diffuse resources, such as freshwater in the 
Palestinian territories, tend to lead to rebellion and rioting; and distant diffuse 
resources, such as diamonds and gold in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, are 
most often associated with warlordism (Le Billon 2001b, 2005a). Although this 
specific typology is open to criticism as overly deterministic, it set the stage for a 
renewed research effort, to which Le Billon has continued to be a preeminent 
contributor, that explicitly considers the ecological conditions and the political 
economies within which extractive industry occurs as critical to understanding its 
relationship to violence.  
1.1.5 Overlapping Causal Chains 
There is growing recognition in both the quantitative and qualitative 
literatures that unidirectional theories of greed, grievance, and opportunity are neither 
necessarily mutually exclusive nor sufficiently nuanced. In many conflicts, it appears 





78) and may indeed, when resources are considered in the contexts of the economic 
and social structures in which they are embedded, “coexist as two sides of the same 
coin” (Le Billon 2005a, 220). Nevertheless, mapping the specific causal paths that 
connect resources and the use of violence remains a critical step in the development 
of policy interventions to avoid or mitigate conflict. While it has been proposed, for 
instance, that resource-rich governments can utilize rents to prevent insurgency 
through repression or militarization of resource extraction (Ross 2004), it is also 
possible that such actions can exacerbate grievances and facilitate mobilization by 
non-state actors (Holden 2014). While high quality institutions may allow some 
resource-rich states to overcome the resource curse and utilize rents effectively for 
development (Ross 2012; Bodea & Higashijima 2016), economic dependence on 
resources may, by promoting rentierism and corruption, undermine the quality of 
those same institutions, with implications for both grievances and state capacity (Ross 
2015). And, though decentralization of resource governance may have potential to 
alleviate grievances associated with the externalities of resource extraction (Larson 
2002), it may also increase opportunities for non-state actors to exploit resource rents 
(O’Lear & Diehl 2007). Thus, there is a pressing need for research that, while 
recognizing the multi-dimensional, context contingent, and inter-scalar relationship 
between natural resources and civil conflict, seeks to interrogate specific causal 
mechanisms and their interactive effects (Koubi et al. 2014; Ross 2015). 
This study contributes to that effort, using as a starting point the framework 
proposed by Le Billon (2008, 2012), who, by reframing the various proposed 





the relationship—the ‘resource curse’ argument, which relates armed conflict to 
economic underperformance and state weakness resulting from dependence on 
extractive industry; the ‘resource conflicts’ argument, which focuses on the 
motivational effect of resources, including their effects on both grievances and the 
incentive structures of would-be insurgents; and the ‘conflict resources’ argument, 
which emphasizes the role of resources in shaping opportunity structures for 
combatants by providing financing for military activities. The proposed resource 
curse, resource conflict, and conflict resources mechanisms correspond, in Le 
Billon’s view, to vulnerability to, risk of, and opportunity for conflict, respectively, a 
formulation that I adopt throughout this dissertation. 
In the empirical chapters that follow, I apply methods appropriate for analyses 
at the cross-country, subnational, and ‘local’ observational scales to test the 
applicability of those proposed mechanisms. As hypothesized, however, those 
analyses lead to markedly different results. Whereas the findings of the cross-country 
analysis support a vulnerability mechanism whereby economic dependence on 
resources (especially petroleum) undermines democracy and state capacity, the results 
of the subnational investigation suggest that resource extraction contributes to conflict 
risk by exacerbating relative deprivation in affected communities. In a local scale 
case study of a conflict over mining in the Philippines, on the other hand, while both 
the vulnerability and risk mechanisms were found to be important contributors to the 
broad context in which the conflict evolved, the proximate cause of non-state actor 





grassroots civilian activists. These divergent conclusions can be reconciled, I argue, 
by applying theories of scale to the study of natural resource conflict. 
1.2 Scale and Political Ecology 
1.2.1 The Great Scale Debate 
The second body of literature to which this dissertation contributes examines 
the implications of scale in political ecology. In the broader discipline of human 
geography, scale has long been recognized as among the ‘foundational concepts’ 
(Howitt 1998) and its definition and ontological status has, especially since the early 
1980s, been the subject of intense debate (see Herod 2010). On the one side, an 
essentially Kantian view of scale was adopted by idealists like Hart (1982), who 
dismissed scales as “subjective artistic devices” (21-22) unrelated to physical 
phenomena and Haggett (1972), who, in his multi-scalar analyses of geographical 
processes, adopted a scalar scheme based on purely mathematical principles.  
This view was challenged by materialist interpretations, including, especially, 
theories informed by Marxist traditions. At the extreme, Taylor (1981) argued that 
specific scales—especially notions of the ‘global’ and ‘national’—play specific and 
even ‘natural’ roles under capitalism and that the incommensurability between the 
scales at which socio-economic classes organize and those at which they perceive 
themselves to exist contributes to the maintenance of world systems. Examining the 
emergence, rather than function, of scale, Smith (1981) identified a fundamental 
tension between the need for capital to be fixed in place, in order for accumulation to 





investment. The production of scales, he proposed, can be traced to the material 
requirements of production, including the spatial organization of labor, which he 
argued to be critical to the definition of urban and regional scales, in particular, thus 
extending Harvey’s (1981) notion of the ‘spatial fix’ to spatial and temporal scales. 
At the same time, Giddens (1984), while not explicitly engaging with the production 
of scale, described the ‘regionalization’ of space into zones of specific types of social 
interaction as central to the structuration of society; by emphasizing the role of 
everyday social practice in the production of space, Giddens’ work highlights the 
potential for ongoing renegotiations of concepts of spatial and, by extension, scalar 
organization, ideas that were later refined by Brenner (2001). 
The debate between materialist and idealist conceptualizations of scale, 
although impassioned, remained grounded in certain commonalities. Both groups 
recognized that scale is socially constructed—the question at issue was not whether 
scales are produced, but how, by whom, and to what end. The early 1990s saw a 
proliferation of papers proposing and commenting upon the use of spatial metaphors 
to address these issues, of which Howitt’s (1998) use of musical scales to explicate 
his framework of scale as relation is perhaps the most relevant to this dissertation. 
Howitt proposed that, much as the relationships between and meanings of individual 
notes change depending on the musical scale, geographical scales can alter the 
relationships between sites, persons, events, and processes. Using as an example the 
case of an aluminum mine operated by CRA-RTZ Ltd. at Weipa on Australia’s Cape 
York Peninsula, Howitt observes that the relationship of this site to the various social 





analysis, in the same way that the role of the C note is different in the major scale in 
the key of C than in the minor scale in the key of A-minor. As he explains: 
What is ‘significant’ about the Weipa mine depends on the scale context 
in which it is placed—it has a different significance if one is considering 
its role in producing social, cultural and environmental change within 
the Weipa locality, than if one is considering its role within the corporate 
strategies of CRA-RTZ Ltd., or the international geopolitics of either 
bauxite or aluminum production. None of the possible representations 
of this mine in these various scale contexts can be treated as more ‘real’ 
than the others (56). 
The early 2000s saw a number of papers seeking to more precisely define the 
various terms arising in the scale literature—such as ‘politics of scale’ (Brenner 2001) 
and ‘scale-jumping’ (Sayre 2005)—and challenging the practices by which scale was 
interrogated (Collinge 2005). Marston et al. (2005) went further than most in this 
regard, calling for a complete expurgation of scale from the geographer’s vocabulary. 
This proposal was based on the authors’ view that scalar descriptions and metaphors 
generally reinforce a vertically hierarchical epistemology in which ‘higher’ scales 
occupy a necessarily privileged position; processes and phenomena that are 
understood to be ‘global’ in scale therefore receive more attention and are treated 
more seriously than those that are ‘national,’ ‘regional,’ or ‘local.’ Thus, they write 
that: 
Over the past 20 years, political and economic geographers have tended 
toward macro pronouncements that assigned the global more causal 
force, assumed it to be more orderly (if not law-like) and less contingent, 





This is why, we believe, localities researchers more often look ‘up’ to 
‘broader restructuring’ than ‘sideways’ to those proximate or even 
distant localities from which those events arguably emerged (421).  
As an alternative, Marston et al. propose a flat, as distinct from both vertical 
and horizontal, geographical ontology, emphasizing spatial ‘sites’ and temporal 
‘events’ positioned within a milieu of flows and interactions. Unsurprisingly, their 
paper generated a wide range of criticisms. Collinge (2006) and Jonas (2006) 
suggested, respectively, that their proposal essentially repackages Act-Network 
Theory and Kantian arguments. Others maintained that Marston et al.’s conclusions, 
rather than equalizing the position of scales, simply served to privilege the ‘local’ 
over the ‘global’ (Jonas 2006). Kaiser & Nikiforova (2008) go further, suggesting that 
“writing scale out of human geography will help to hide the social constructedness of 
scales…scales will more easily return to the naturalized, taken-for-granted categories 
of analysis that they were perceived to be in the past” (537-538) and recommending a 
post-structural alternative to scale research. Along similar lines, Moore (2008) argued 
“it is not necessary to retain a commitment to the existence of scale in order to 
analyse the politics of scale” (213) and that “denying the ontological reality of scales 
implies that they are merely inconsequential heuristics in the minds of geographers 
that ‘do no work,’ or have no effect in themselves” (213), a potentially dangerous 
misconception that could lead geographers to leave scale uninterrogated entirely (see 





1.2.2 Political Ecology of Scale 
For many years, political ecologists, within geography and elsewhere, did not 
directly participate in the debate over scale’s ontological status, leading to criticisms 
from, among others, Brown & Purcell (2005) and Manson (2008). As Neumann 
(2009) observes, however, political ecology has, from its earliest days, implicitly 
engaged with scalar theories. In what is largely viewed as the foundational works of 
the political ecology framework, both Blaikie (1985) and Blaikie & Brookfield (1987) 
distinguish between geographical scale as spatial extent and hierarchies of human 
organization and emphasize the interactions—though often conceptualized as 
unidirectional—between political and economic processes at ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ 
levels. Karl Zimmerer’s work in the early 2000s represented an important step in 
political ecology toward more formal engagement with scale theory. In one 2000 
paper, he discusses the production of scale in the context of conservation areas and 
the role of mismatched scales of management and traditional practice in creating land 
disputes (Zimmerer 2000a). In another, he traces the historical roots and modern 
transformation of the scales of traditional irrigation in Latin America, emphasizing 
the joint effects of environmental constraints and political agendas in shaping scales 
of water governance (Zimmerer 2000b). Recognizing the potential of the field to 
contribute to scale theory through its relationship with ecology and the environmental 
sciences, Zimmerer & Bassett (2003) write that “the challenge of political ecology is 
to integrate the scales of biophysical dynamics into our research frameworks and 





Sayre (2005), engaging directly with work by both Kantian idealists and 
Marxist materialists, seeks to address this challenge by applying scalar theories to 
ecology, arguing that the problem of scale can serve as a point of unification between 
physical and human geographies. Distinguishing between the ‘epistemological 
moment’ and ‘ontological moment’ of scale, such that the former refers to the 
practice of scale-making by observers and the latter to the apparent emergent scalar 
properties of the observed, Sayre argues that ecology, like human geography, has 
insufficiently grappled with either component. Following Howitt, he deconstructs 
ontological scale into component dimensions corresponding to size (denoting spatial 
extent), level (referring to hierarchically nested units of organization), and relation 
(describing the structural characteristics of particular scales) and illustrates their use 
in ecological processes. Thus, just as Singapore and Russia, as states, could be said to 
occupy the same hierarchical level while filling incommensurable geopolitical roles, 
so too do an elephant and a pond skater, though inhabiting the same level as 
individual members of a species, exhibit fundamentally different relationships with 
the surface of a pond, or with any number of other ecological processes. For Sayre, 
the conflation of the distinct meanings of scale, aggravated by their interchangeability 
in everyday conversation, lies at the heart of disagreements over scale and the 
incongruity between scales of environmental processes and of environmental 
management (see also Turner 2006, Manson 2008, Sayre 2009). 
McCarthy (2005), by contrast, views the production of scale as inseparable 
from the social production of nature; examining the discourses and practices of 





society and other non-state and non-corporate actors in the production and 
contestation of scale. Similarly, Swyngedouw (2003, 2004, 2007) and Swyngedouw 
& Heynen (2003) discuss how unequal distributions of power along dimensions of 
ethnicity, class, and gender can intersect with ecological processes to produce 
politically relevant scales. Throughout their work on the political ecology of scale, 
both McCarthy and Swyngedouw argue that political struggles over scalar 
relationships offer the most promising context in which to observe and interrogate the 
production and ontological status of scale. Conflicts over natural resource extraction, 
for instance, often involve the reframing of environmental and socioeconomic 
impacts to forge connections between scales for the purposes of mobilization 
(McCarthy & Prudham 2004). Although the scales at which resources are politically 
and economically relevant can be discursively reshaped in the context of such 
conflicts, however, there are limits to the malleability of the biophysical scales at 
which resources are produced (Bakker & Bridge 2006; Görg 2007; Bolin et al. 2008). 
Thus, Bolin et al. (2008) write that “environmental disputes necessarily involve an 
often complex relationship between socially constructed scales and the 
spatiotemporal scales at which natural material processes are understood to occur” 
(1497). 
Extending these arguments to the extreme case of civil war, the recursive 
relationship between natural resources and the production of scale may provide a 
partial answer to what Kalyvas (2000) describes as the “oft-noted but poorly 
understood puzzle: conflicts and violence ‘on the ground’ often seem more related to 





level” (364). To the extent that such ‘local’ issues often involve disputes over access 
to, control over, or exploitation of natural resources, extractive industry may facilitate 
the production and renegotiation of political scales through the use of violence. 
1.3 Structure of the Dissertation 
Because I am interested in exploring both the epistemological and ontological 
implications of scale, as well as in empirically testing some of the broad claims 
regarding the relationship between natural resources and civil conflict through multi-
scalar analysis, the structure of this dissertation is unusual and warrants some 
explanation. The following three chapters comprise three largely independent studies 
conducted using three different methodological approaches at three different 
analytical scales. Two of these are largely quantitative, relying on the interpretation of 
the results of spatial econometric analyses of large datasets; the other is a qualitative 
investigation based on field interviews and case study. The final chapter attempts to 
explain the divergent findings of the three studies in the context of a generalizable 
political ecology of scale in natural resource conflicts. 
 In Chapter 2, I present a cross-country regression analysis of the relationship 
between the abundance of, economic dependence on, and access to different 
categories of natural resources. Although adopting a largely conventional approach to 
quantitative investigation of natural resources and conflict, that study does 
incorporate some original features, including the use of a spatial panel data model to 
control for potential spatial autocorrelation, the use of georeferenced conflict events 
data to account for instances of low-level violence in some conflict-affected 





investigate the specific causal chains by which the vulnerability, risk, and opportunity 
mechanisms are manifest. Results suggest that, at the state scale, the clearest pathway 
from natural resources to civil violence follows that predicted by the vulnerability 
mechanism and, consistent with previous empirical investigations at this scale, is 
clearest with respect to petroleum resources.  
Chapter 3 describes a quantitative analysis of subnational variation in the use 
of terroristic violence by the NPA in the Philippines. A spatial probit model was 
estimated to interrogate the relationship between permitted, unpermitted, and 
proposed surface mines and the probability of experiencing an NPA-related terrorist 
attack, across the 1628 municipalities and cities that comprise the country. Again, 
intervening variable and two-stage regression analyses were used to assess the 
validity of proposed causal pathways. The results are supportive of a conflict risk 
mechanism, whereby mining contributes the use of terroristic violence by the NPA 
through an intervening effect on environmental scarcity and relative deprivation. 
 Chapter 4 presents a case study of a conflict over resource extraction that 
occurred in the Municipality of Gonzaga in the northeastern Philippines during and 
immediately following my tenure there as a Peace Corps Volunteer. Data sources for 
that study include public statements by activists, officials, businesses, and NPA 
militants; government documents, NPA propaganda, and social media; and a series of 
in-depth semi-structured interviews with key informants. In that chapter, I describe 
how scalar politics were employed by actors on all sides of the conflict, with an 
emphasis on the development of alliances between anti-mining activists and the NPA 





Finally, Chapter 5 concludes by comparing the results of the three 
independent analyses and setting forth a political ecology of scale in resource-related 
conflicts. I first discuss the epistemological implications of scale from the perspective 
of the observer, offering some conclusions regarding the appropriateness of widely-
used analysis scales for studying specific aspects of the resource-conflict nexus. In 
particular, I argue that the operative scales of the vulnerability, risk, and opportunity 
mechanisms are largely distinct, although overlapping, and correspond roughly to 
scales describing states, subnational regions, and localities, respectively. Secondly, I 
discuss the ontological implications of scale in natural resource conflicts, mapping 
production of scales of resource extraction, governance, and resistance, as well as 
their intersections. I propose that extractive enclaves can be conceptualized as nodes 
of inter-scalar interaction that create opportunities for political actors to renegotiate 
scalar configurations through violent and non-violent means, making sites of natural 










2. Vulnerability, Risk, or Opportunity? Cross-Country 
Analysis of Natural Resources and Civil Conflict 
 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, although the relationship between natural resources 
and armed conflict—particularly intrastate conflict—has been of scholarly interest for 
decades, the specific causal mechanisms by which this relationship operates remain 
underdefined (see Ross 2004, 2015; Van Der Ploeg & Poelhekke 2016). Past cross-
country quantitative analyses have suggested that, though natural resources are 
generally not the sole cause of armed conflict, their exploitation may, under certain 
circumstances, facilitate the emergence or increase the intensity of civil violence by 
altering incentive structures for belligerents (Collier & Hoeffler 1998, 2004; Fearon 
2005), by serving as sources of financing for rebel groups and national governments 
(Collier et al. 2009; Lujala 2010), or through systemic effects on institutions and 
economies (Østby et al. 2009; Humphreys 2005). 
This chapter contributes to that literature by investigating, at the cross-country 
scale, the three broad mechanisms through which the effect of natural resources on 
civil conflict has been proposed to operate. It presents the results of a series of spatial 
panel regressions predicting the incidence of conflict events across a dataset 
comprising 154 countries at five-year intervals from 1995 through 2010, compiled 
from state-level statistics, remotely-sensed nighttime lights, and georeferenced events 
data. Two-stage regression analysis was applied to directly interrogate the 
applicability of causal chains linking several sectors of natural resources with the 





resource-conflict nexus, results suggest that economic dependence on oil rents 
increases conflict vulnerability by decreasing institutional quality and undermining 
democratic governance. The hypotheses that resource wealth increases conflict risk 
by exacerbating horizontal economic inequality or that resource availability creates 
opportunities for non-state actors are unsupported by the results. 
The original contributions of the study are threefold. First, it employs a spatial 
regression framework that controls for autocorrelation in the dependent variable 
between neighboring countries, a consideration that proves to be important, if often 
overlooked, in the quantitative study of civil war. Second, the analysis utilizes 
conflict events data as the dependent variable, rather than the more commonly-used 
binary conflict indicator; although this choice is driven largely by the limitations of 
the spatial regression framework, it also offers an informative counterpoint to a 
literature that is dominated by dichotomous variable approaches. Finally, by adopting 
a two-stage regression approach, the specific causal chains that have been proposed in 
the natural resource conflict literature are directly examined. 
2.1 Background 
2.1.1 Vulnerability, Risk, and Opportunity 
This study responds to recent calls for more explicit quantitative 
investigations of the causal pathways linking natural resources and civil conflict and 
the interactive effects of motivational and opportunity structures (see Koubi et al. 
2014). It takes as a starting point Le Billon’s (2012) categorization of prevailing 





respectively, to conflict vulnerability, risk, and opportunity. The first of these, which 
Le Billon also labels the ‘resource curse’ mechanism, engages closely with the 
broader resource curse literature and relates civil violence to economic 
underperformance and state weakness resulting from dependence on resource 
extraction. Of particular interest to the present study is the potential contribution of 
economic dependence on natural resources to government unaccountability and 
public-sector corruption. There are several key characteristics of extractive industries 
that make them likely to promote such adverse institutional outcomes. By introducing 
new, high-profit sources of income into economies, the expansion of natural resource 
extraction may increase the supply of funds that companies can afford to pay as 
bribes, which may incentivize officials to request more of them (Knutsen et al. 2017); 
at the same time, the spatial concentration of natural resources and the geographic 
inflexibility of extractive industry may make it less prone than other sectors to 
relocate in response to costs associated with corruption (Vicente 2010; Humphreys 
2005). The resulting increased supply of and demand for payoffs from extractive 
industry may incentivize rent-seeking behavior in the public sector at the expense of 
responsiveness to citizens; such effects may make state governments less capable of 
responding to the activities of non-state actors or increase mobilization by 
exacerbating popular grievances (Minter 2012; Holden & Jacobson 2007; Slack 
2012). 
The second view that Le Billon recognizes is the conflict risk or ‘resource 
conflicts’ mechanism, which refers broadly to the set of theories by which resources 





creating social grievances related to relative deprivation or through a ‘greedy rebels’ 
effect. In the context of this mechanism, the unequal distribution of the costs and 
benefits of resource extraction is a critical consideration. Where the allocation of 
resource rents or the burden of externalities is perceived to be unfair, grievances may 
arise among those who see themselves as being on the losing side (Østby et al. 2009; 
Humphreys 2005; Ross 2004); concentration of resource wealth in the hands of the 
few may also increase the attractiveness of controlling those resources relative to the 
situation where benefits are widely shared, thus creating incentives for groups seeking 
to gain control of the state or to secede from it (Le Billon 2001b; Østby et al. 2009; 
Wegenast & Basedau 2014; Koubi et al. 2014).  
Where the vulnerability mechanism predicts an adverse effect of natural 
resources on the capacity of the state, the opportunity mechanism predicts that natural 
resources can increase the capacity of non-state actors. This ‘conflict resources’ 
mechanism emphasizes the role of resources in shaping opportunity structures for 
combatants by providing a potential source of stable financial support. The 
comparative immobility of extractive industry, the spatial dispersion of its constituent 
commodity chains, and the remoteness of many extractive sites relative to power 
centers all contribute to the unique susceptibility of the sector to exploitation by 
militias, insurgents, armed gangs, and terrorist organizations. Beyond the canonical 
example of ‘blood’ diamonds mined from alluvial deposits under the direct control of 
rebel warlords, many other instances have been documented in which non-state actors 
utilize natural resources to raise funds, including the kidnapping for ransom of oil 





the Philippines, the direct theft of oil by militants in Nigeria, and the smuggling of 
timber by revolutionaries in Cambodia, among many others. To the extent that the 
ability of non-state actors to purchase arms, pay recruits, and obtain food and supplies 
is typically much lower than that of the state, the availability of natural resources may 
be a critical limiting factor determining the onset, intensity, and duration of civil war, 
particularly in the absence of external support (Lujala 2010).  
2.1.2 Resource Sectors 
The validity of the vulnerability, risk, and opportunity mechanisms is likely to 
differ across the various sectors of natural resources, owing to their physical and 
economic characteristics. The analysis presented in this chapter specifically considers 
the effects of four broad categories of natural resources—petroleum, gemstones, 
timber, and minerals. Among these, petroleum has been the most widely studied with 
respect to its relationship to conflict, due in large part to its strategic value as an input 
for military activities (Ross 2004; Basedau & Lay 2009; Elbadawi & Soto 2015). The 
classical geopolitical interpretation emphasizes petroleum deposits as a ‘prize’ for 
state and non-state actors alike (Klare 2007; Ross 2003, 2012). Alternatively, the 
propensity for conflict in oil-producing countries may relate to the particularly 
uneven distribution of rents and impacts in the sector (Ikelegbe 2001, 2005; Isumonah 
2004); as Le Billon (2012) writes, “controlled by states, dominated by large 
companies and employing relatively few people, oil production is often characterized 
by a highly skewed distribution of financial, social, and environmental costs and 
benefits” (60) that can result in grievances leading to violence. Relative to other 





the perspective of non-state actors; a highly capital-intensive industry, scalable 
petroleum production requires large investments in extraction equipment, processing 
facilities, and transportation infrastructure that are typically beyond the capacity of 
non-state actors to independently develop. By the same token, however, the length of 
the petroleum production chain, the value of capital investments, and the profitability 
of the resource makes the sector vulnerable to attacks, extortion, and theft, as 
documented in Colombia, Nigeria, and elsewhere (Le Billon 2012). 
Alongside oil, gemstones represent the resource sector that has been most 
widely implicated as a causal factor in civil conflict. Existing research has focused 
predominantly on the case of diamonds in the context of the opportunity mechanism, 
for which abundant anecdotal and some quantitative evidence exists (Le Billon 2008; 
Ross 2015; Lujala et al. 2005). Although the relationship between other gemstones 
and conflict is less well known, owing in part to their rarity, emeralds and sapphires 
have been implicated in conflicts in Colombia and Cambodia, respectively (Lavaux 
2007; Le Billon 2005b). Compared with the petroleum sector, there is little 
quantitative evidence to suggest vulnerability or risk effects that can be directly 
attributed to gemstone extraction; Le Billon (2012) notes, however, that the 
traditional state-centered approach to examining the economic implications of these 
resources is limited insomuch as it fails to “disaggregate economic performances in 
light of processes of marginalisation (or peripheralisation) and uneven development” 
or “allow the historic contextualisation of conflicts over resources” (96). Grievances 
related to environmental impacts, working conditions, revenue sharing, and 





industrial-scale gemstone mining operations (Ross 2004; Le Billon 2012), while 
artisanal diamond mining areas have been sites of conflicts over competing claims 
that may interact and merge with broader patterns of political violence (Hayward 
1972). The tendency for national governments to support large-scale gemstone 
extraction and for local authorities to have established relationships with artisanal, 
informal, or illegal producers, may also exacerbate friction between these levels of 
government (Le Billon 2012). 
The relationship between timber resources and civil conflict is underspecified 
relative to both petroleum and gemstones. With respect to the resource curse, the 
forestry sector has been implicated as having contributed to local and state-level 
institutional weakness, especially related to the provision of logging concessions as a 
form of political patronage in timber-exporting countries, including Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia, Nigeria, and the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (Tacconi 2012; Ross 2001b; Laurance et al. 2012; Southgate et al. 2000). 
Because forests are often highly politicized landscapes, in which changing land use 
patterns stemming from timber extraction have the potential to exacerbate grievances 
related to forest-based livelihoods, a resource conflict effect in the timber sector is 
also plausible (Le Billon 2012). In terms of opportunities for non-state actors, 
although valuable timber is bulky and difficult to conceal, smuggling of logs does 
occur, particularly in borderlands and remote areas without strong state control (Vitug 
1993; Rustad et al. 2008). The remoteness of many logging areas also makes such 
projects vulnerable to extortion by rebel groups, who also often make use of forests as 





Like timber, the role of non-gemstone minerals in civil conflict has been 
relatively underexamined. There are, however, numerous documented examples of 
grievances stemming from land acquisition and degradation related to metals mining 
(Holden 2014; Holden & Jacobson 2007; Wayland & Kuniholm 2016; Filer 1990), as 
well as ample historical cases of belligerents in both interstate and intrastate conflicts 
targeting regions with reserves of metals required in military technology (Le Billon 
2012; Ross 2004). In addition, emerging empirical evidence exists of a relationship 
between minerals mining and economic inequality; Addison et al. (2017), for 
example, analyze nighttime lights and georeferenced mining data from Africa and 
find that metals mining increases spatial economic inequality in some contexts, while 
decreasing it in others. As in the case of petroleum, the capital intensity of metals 
mining may forestall direct production by non-state actors in all but the most stateless 
environments, but opportunities for extortion of mining companies by rebels 
abound—as documented in the Philippines (Holden & Jacobsen 2007), the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (Berman et al. 2015) and Colombia (Deheza & 
Ribet 2012)—enabled by the spatial concentration of ores and by the remoteness of 
the reserves. 
2.1.3 Hypotheses 
Drawing from the existing literature and, in particular, Le Billon’s 
conceptualization of the vulnerability, risk, and opportunity mechanisms, three 
hypotheses were developed to be tested in the empirical analysis set forth below. The 
first hypothesis corresponds to the vulnerability mechanism, emphasizing the 





conflict. It predicts that the opportunity to profit from resource extraction incentivizes 
rent-seeking in resource-dependent governments, leading to less democracy and 
poorer institutional outcomes. 
H1: Economic dependence on natural resources increases the incidence 
of conflict events by undermining state capacity and democratic 
governance. 
The second hypothesis predicts that resource wealth, as distinct from resource 
dependence, increases conflict risk by creating or exacerbating social inequalities. 
Historically, empirical studies of intrastate conflict have generally failed to 
demonstrate a statistically significant relationship between economic inequality, 
typically measured by the national-level Gini coefficient, and the outbreak, intensity, 
or longevity of civil wars (Fearon & Laitin 2003; Collier & Hoeffler 2004), a non-
finding that has been interpreted by some as evidence against grievances as a cause of 
civil violence (Buhaug et al. 2014). In recent years, however, there has been an 
increasing emphasis on horizontal inequalities—inequalities along economic, social 
or political dimensions between ethnically or culturally defined groups—as drivers of 
conflict owing to the importance of shared identity in facilitating collective action 
(Kuhn 2018; Stewart 2008; Wegenast & Basedau 2014). As Koubi & Böhmelt (2014) 
write: 
Mobilization depends not only on the existence of shared motivations, 
but also on the availability of collective identity and opportunities for 
collective action. Groups with shared identities, whether based on race, 
language or religion, have lower costs of rebellion, since they can more 





collective action problems due to suspicions/mistrust between group 
members, and can have/utilize cultural symbols and ideals to rally 
behind (22). 
Quantitative studies by those authors and others have found evidence that 
horizontal inequalities play a significant role in civil conflict generally, and in 
resource conflicts more specifically. Cederman et al. (2011), Cederman et al. (2013), 
Ezcurra & Palacios (2016), Deiwiks et al. (2012), and Østby (2017) present 
compelling empirical evidence that political and economic horizontal inequalities 
among ethnic groups affect the outset, duration, intensity, and results of conflict. At 
the subnational scale, Hoelsche et al. (2012) find that conflict events involving the 
Indian state and the Maoist insurgency are more likely to occur in districts where 
mining activities coincide with stronger grievances related to socio-economic 
exclusion of local groups. At the cross-country scale, Østby at al. (2009) report a 
greater probability of conflict where the presence of natural resources coincides with 
the experience of relative deprivation among the local population, while Morelli & 
Rohner (2015) find that the spatial extent of oil extraction in ethnic group territories is 
related to the onset of war. Drawing from these and similar studies, the second 
hypothesis proposes that natural resource extraction can increase conflict risk by 
contributing to horizontal economic inequalities: 
H2: Natural resource extraction increases the incidence of conflict 
events by exacerbating horizontal economic inequalities. 
The third hypothesis corresponds to the opportunity mechanism, whereby 





actors. Under this hypothesis, an intermediate effect of resources on the strength of 
non-state actors is predicted, such that, controlling for potential motivational factors 
and state capacity, conflict will be more likely to occur in countries where resources, 
particularly ‘lootable’ resources such as gemstones, are available for exploitation, 
broadly defined, by insurgent groups: 
H3: Natural resource availability increases the incidence of conflict 
events by increasing the strength of non-state actors. 
As described in the following section, each of these three hypotheses was 
interrogated using a two-stage regression approach, whereby potentially intervening 
variables—quantifying, respectively, state capacity, horizontal economic inequality, 
and the strength of non-state actors—were instrumented with respect to variables 
measuring the abundance of and economic dependence on natural resources. 
2.2 Methods 
2.2.1 Empirical Model 
The empirics of this study aim to assess the utility of the vulnerability, risk, 
and opportunity mechanisms for explaining interstate variability in conflict by testing 
the three hypotheses described above. In addition to testing for a direct correlation 
between conflict and resource wealth, resource availability, and resource dependence, 
therefore, the significance of intermediate relationships between the independent and 
dependent variables and intervening variables measuring state capacity, democracy, 





Although the study adopts the state as the unit of observation, it recognizes 
also that national borders are not unproblematic containers of civil conflict 
(Danneman & Ritter 2014; Bara 2017). Therefore, to control for the tendency of 
fighters, weapons, and violence to spread among neighboring countries (Weidman & 
Ward 2010; Basedau & Pierskalla 2014; Fearon & Laitin 2003), a spatial 
autoregressive model was estimated (Ward & Gleditsch, 2018). Temporal 
dependence in the conflict variable was accounted for by including a random effects 
parameter, the unbiasedness of which relative to fixed effects was confirmed using a 
Hausman specification test. Accordingly, the general equation to be estimated takes 
the form: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 +  𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 + µ𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  
Where yi,t represents the dependent variable in country i in year t; yj,t is the 
dependent variable in neighboring countries j; xi,t is the vector of explanatory 
variables; λi and μi,t represent the country-specific random effect and the country-year 
error, respectively; and β and ρ are fitted values. The term W represents the spatial 
weights matrix, a block diagonal matrix that defines the spatial structure of the model; 
in this study, a standard spatial weights matrix was used, such that, if each row in the 
matrix represents an observation i and each column represents an observation j, then 
each entry is defined as 1 divided by the number of observations neighboring 
observation i, if observation j is among the neighbors of observation i, and zero 
otherwise. Following Millo & Piras (2012), the equation was estimated by maximum 
likelihood. The use of a spatial regression approach poses some constraints on the 





dichotomous dependent variables in spatial panel models has not been widely 
validated. Thus, the analysis presented in this chapter diverges from many existing 
studies of civil conflict by relying on a linear spatial regression model and a 
continuous dependent variable. 
To implement the two-stage regression analysis, each of several intervening 
variables, corresponding to the causal pathways implied by the vulnerability, risk, and 
opportunity mechanisms, were instrumented with respect to independent variables 
measuring resource wealth, dependence, and availability. First, the intervening 
variables were regressed on the independent variables and several control variables, 
using the spatial random effects model. The predicted values of the intervening 
variables from those regressions were then used, along with the control variables, as 
predictors of the conflict variable. If the causal chain has been correctly specified, and 
if the assumption that the predicted value of the intervening variable is uncorrelated 
with either λ or μ is met, then the independent variable is expected to be a significant 
predictor of the intervening variable in the first stage regression and the predicted 
value of the intervening variable to be a significant predictor of the dependent 
variable in the second stage.  
2.2.2 Dependent Variable 
Most studies of conflict and natural resources rely on binary definitions, 
whereby a civil war is defined to exist if a given threshold of battle deaths have 
occurred in a conflict between two well-defined agents—typically a state and a non-
state group (e.g. Collier & Hoeffler 1998; Fearon 2005; De Soysa & Neumayer 2007; 





the onset and duration of conflict, but is limited in that it cannot be used as a measure 
of conflict intensity, and risks excluding low level conflicts that, by persisting for 
many years, may result in greater overall numbers of deaths than short but intense 
warfare (Lujala et al. 2005; Koubi et al. 2014). Given these limitations and the 
absence of established methods for estimating binary choice regressions in the spatial 
panel context, this study relies on the linear spatial panel model; that choice is made 
possible by the recent emergence of georeferenced events data, which present 
opportunities for constructing continuous conflict variables.  
The dependent variable for this study was derived from the UCDP/PRIO 
Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) and includes all events involving a recognized 
non-state actor that resulted in at least one casualty (Sundberg & Melander 2013). For 
each of the four panels, the dependent variable was constructed as the sum of all 
conflict events occurring within a given country over the five-year periods beginning, 
respectively, in 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010 (see Figure 2.1). To account for the 
dispersion of this variable, it was expressed in natural logarithmic form in the 
regression models. 
2.2.3 Independent Variables 
Previous studies of natural resources and civil conflict have used a variety of 
methods to quantify the abundance, distribution, exploitation, and economic 
importance of natural resources at the country level. The value of resource rents as a 
percentage of GDP is perhaps the most common construction (e.g. Collier & Hoeffler 
2004; Fearon 2005), although the total or per capita value of resource rents have also 





measures is an important consideration in the study of specific causal chains. Under 
the vulnerability mechanism and H1, economic dependence on natural resources in 
the economy is the critical variable because the institutional and political effects 
associated with those theories are likely to be most disruptive in countries in which 
resource extraction is the dominant industry. On the other hand, the monetary value 
of resource rents is of greater importance in the context of the opportunity mechanism 
under H3 because it captures the financial benefits that could potentially accrue to 
non-state actors. Similarly, to the extent that grievances related to the negative 
impacts of resource extraction are implicated as issues around which non-state actors 
mobilize, the extent of extractive industry, rather than its relative contribution to the 
broader economy, may be of greater relevance to the risk mechanism under H2. 
This study examines the effect of resource abundance and dependence 
independently, using data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
(WDIs). The variables of interest are oil rents, calculated as the difference between 
the value of oil production and the total costs of production; mineral rents, the value 
of production for tin, gold, lead, zinc, iron, copper, nickel, silver, bauxite, and 
phosphate minus the costs of production; and forest rents, or total roundwood harvest 
volume multiplied by average world prices and a region-specific rental rate (see 
World Bank 2018a). For the purposes of this study, resource rents were expressed as 
percentages of GDP in the empirical models testing for a conflict vulnerability effect 
(see Figure 2.2); for models interrogating the conflict risk and conflict opportunity 










Figure 2.2 Resource dependence by country. (a) Total resource rents as percentage of GDP by country in 2009. (b) Oil rents as a 
percentage of GDP by country in 2009. (c) Mineral rents as percentage of GDP by country in 2009. (d) Timber rents as percentage of 






Figure 2.3 Resource wealth by country. (a) Total resource rents per capita by country in 2009. (b) Oil rents per capita by country in 







For some categories of resources, the physical presence of a resource within a 
geographical area is the most salient feature; this is especially the case for high-value 
and easily extracted resources that can be exploited directly by non-state actors 
outside of the regulated economy, as predicted by the opportunity mechanism. To 
account for this potential effect, a final independent variable of interest was 
constructed using data on diamond and other gemstone deposits from Gilmore et al. 
(2005) and Lujala (2009), respectively (see also Lujala et al. 2005). The total number 
of gemstone deposits, including both primary and secondary diamond deposits, as 
well as other gemstone deposits, in each country-year was divided by the total land 
area to generate a variable measuring general gemstone availability. 
To partially account for potential issues of endogeneity in the regression 
analysis, all independent variables of interest described in this section were lagged by 
one year relative to the start of the five-year period over which the dependent variable 
was calculated. Thus, in the first panel, for example, the dependent variable was 
defined as the total number of conflict events that occurred in each country from 1995 
through 1999 and the resource dependence, resource wealth, and gemstone 
availability variables were calculated using 1994 data. 
2.2.4 Intervening Variables 
Two potential intervening variables were identified to interrogate the 
applicability of the vulnerability mechanism. The first of these is the World Bank’s 
World Governance Indicators (WGIs) score for corruption control, which measures 
the degree to which a state government restricts public sector corruption. The 




control, to 2.5, representing the most effective (see Figure 2.4) and is based on survey 
data. Because H1 predicts that economic dependence on natural resources 
incentivizes rent-seeking behavior within state governments, a negative and 
statistically significant relationship between the resource dependence and the 
corruption control index is expected under that hypothesis. More broadly, the index 
may serve as a proxy measure for general state capacity. Accordingly, extensive 
sensitivity analysis was conducted with other variables from the WGIs, including 
indices measuring voice and accountability, government effectiveness, and 
institutional quality. All of those variables are highly correlated with each other and 
with corruption control and exhibited similar relationships with natural resources and 
conflict. 
The second variable used to test the applicability of the resource curse 
argument seeks to quantify the level of democracy or autocracy in a given country; 
this is the widely-used Polity2 score from the Polity IV project (see Marshall & 
Jaggers 2002), which ranges from -10, representing a strongly autocratic government, 
to 10, representing a strongly democratic government (see Figure 2.5). Under H1, a 
negative relationship between the Polity2 score and economic dependence on natural 
resources is predicted, as dependence on extractive industry is expected to make state 




















To interrogate the role of grievances under the risk mechanism, this chapter 
follows Cederman et al. (2013) in developing an index of horizontal economic 
inequality based on the heterogeneity of per capita economic activity across ethnic 
groups in a country-year. Polygons representing ethnic group territories were 
obtained from the Geo-referencing of Ethnic Groups (GREG) dataset (see Weidmann 
et al. 2010); for each polygon, a measure of per capita economic activity was 
generated from remotely sensed nighttime lights and raster population data. 
Nighttime lights data were obtained from the DMSP-OLS time series in the form of 
annual composites of stable lights from human sources, aggregated to a one square 
kilometer resolution; light from gas flares, which are a stable light source, but may 
not be relevant components of economic productivity, were removed by the author 
using existing masks and by comparing the processed product with high resolution 
imagery. Similarly processed nighttime lights data have been used successfully 
elsewhere as a proxy measure of economic productivity and urbanization where 
alternative data are not available (see, for example, Keola & Andersson 2015, Wu et 
al. 2013, Zhou et al. 2015); aggregated to the country scale, the intensity of nighttime 
lights was indeed found to be strongly correlated (r = 0.934) with GDP estimates 
from the WDIs across the time period of interest for this study. 
Population data were obtained from the Gridded Population of the World 
dataset (CIESIN 2016), which estimates global population density at a one square 
kilometer resolution based on census information and remotely sensed satellite 
imagery. Because the nighttime lights and population data were collected 




estimate of per capita economic productivity in each ethnic group territory. The utility 
of various transformations of the population and nighttime lights variables for 
estimating per capita income were tested; among these, the best fit with country-level 
per capita GDP was found to be the total nighttime light intensity (sum of digital 
numbers within a polygon) divided by the natural log of total population (see Figure 
2.6). 
From the resulting estimate of per capita economic activity in each ethnic 
group territory, a country-level measure of horizontal spatial economic inequality was 
defined using Theil’s (1967) mean logarithmic deviation method, such that:  










Where xj,t is economic activity per capita in territory j of country i in year t; μi,t 
is average per capita economic activity across all territories country i in year t; and Ni 
is the number of territories in country i. The final index value Ti,t thus represents the 
heterogeneity in per capita incomes across ethnic groups within each country-year. 
Because it measures horizontal, rather than vertical, inequality, the Theil 
index calculated for each country is not highly correlated with available estimates of 
the more widely-used Gini coefficient (r = 0.51), which quantifies economic 
inequality between individuals, for the time period examined. As shown in Figure 2.7, 
however, it appears to be a reasonable predictor of conflict in many cases. In the first 
panel of the series, the countries with the highest Theil index values were, in order, 
Sudan, Afghanistan, Chad, and Liberia, all countries in which major civil conflicts 





Figure 2.6 Theil index of horizontal inequality calculation. (a) Population-adjusted nighttime lights by country in 2009. (b) 
Relationship between population-adjusted nighttime lights and GDP per capita by country-year. (c) Population-adjusted nighttime 











To test the applicability of the opportunity mechanism, the strength of non-state 
actors was instrumentalized using data from the Non-State Actor dataset (Cunningham et 
al. 2013), an extension of the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (see Gleditsch et al. 
2002; Themnér & Wallensteen 2012). In the main results presented below, the best 
available estimate of the active rebel population, summed across all active rebel groups in 
each country-year, was used as a general estimate of rebel capacity (see Figure 2.8). 
Extensive sensitivity analysis was conducted using alternative measures of rebel capacity 
obtained from the NSA dataset, including indices quantifying the ability of rebels to 
mobilize support, to procure arms, to fight, and to exert territorial control, as well as the 
NSA’s composite measure of the relative strength of rebel groups vis-à-vis the state, 
which combines these factors. Because NSA data is compiled at the conflict dyad scale, 
these measures were aggregated to the country level by averaging the values across all 
active rebel groups in each country-year and, alternatively, by using the highest score 
across all active rebel groups in each country-year. Neither of these approaches is without 
limitations; for instance, the presence of multiple non-state actors in one country may 
either enhance the relative strength of all groups by overtaxing state militaries—as in the 
case in the conflict between the state and various rebel factions during the 1990s in 
Burundi (Nilsson 2010)—or weaken those actors through intergroup conflict—such as 
clashes between the Mong Tai Army and the United Wa State Army in Myanmar (Fjelde 
& Nilsson 2012). The behavior of non-state actors is complex and beyond the scope of 
the present study to model comprehensively. For the purposes of examining the broad 
role of natural resources as a driver of rebel capacity, however, the results of the 












All of the intervening variables—the corruption control index, Polity2 index, 
Theil index of spatial horizontal economic inequality, and the rebel population variable—
were calculated using data for the years 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010, for the first, second, 
third, and fourth panels, respectively. Accordingly, by design, these variables overlap 
temporally with the dependent variable but not with the independent variables. 
2.2.5 Control Variables 
Although the main regression models are parsimonious, several control variables 
were included, based on the findings of the existing literature. Total population and 
average wealth have both consistently been shown to be important predictors of conflict 
onset and intensity, with the former consistently exhibiting a positive relationship with 
conflict and the latter a negative relationship. Therefore, total population and GDP per 
capita in constant (2010), PPP U.S. dollars, both obtained from the WDIs, were included 
as control variables in all models. As a general measure of environmental scarcity, which 
may, according to some theories of resource conflict, contribute to conflict by increasing 
competition for scarce resources, physiographic population density, or persons per unit 
area of arable land, was also included. However, because this variable never exhibited a 
statistically significant relationship with conflict or with the intervening variables, it was 
dropped from the two-stage regression analysis. Like the independent variables of 
interest, the control variables were lagged by one year relative to the dependent and 





Figure 2.9 Gemstone availability and control variables. (a) Gemstone deposits per land area by country in 2009. (b) Population 
density by country in 2009. (c) GDP per capita by country in 2009. (d) Total population by country in 2009. Source: Compiled from 






2.3 Results and Discussion 
2.3.1 Preliminary Regressions 
 The results of the preliminary regressions (Table 2.1) are consistent with previous 
studies in finding a strong and statistically significant correlation between conflict and oil 
wealth, such that each additional thousand dollars of oil rents per capita was associated, 
on average, with an approximately 8.7 percent increase in the number of conflict events 
experienced over five years (Model 1). Economic dependence on oil was also a 
statistically significant predictor of conflict; the estimated coefficient of 0.029 implies 
that each additional percent of GDP attributable to oil rents was associated with an almost 
three percent increase in the number of conflict events experienced (Model 2). However, 
both the oil wealth (Model 3) and the oil dependence (Model 4) variables were sensitive 
to alternative model specifications, becoming insignificant when the intervening variables 
were included in the regression equation. None of the other resource wealth or 
dependence variables were significant at traditionally accepted levels. 
 Among the control variables, population was consistently significant and positive, 
while physiographic population density was positive but insignificant. The former finding 
suggests that, consistent with the existing literature, the incidence of civil conflict 
increases with population; the latter constitutes evidence against an absolute scarcity 
mechanism unrelated to extractive industry. Although GDP was significant in Model 1 
and Model 2, it was insignificant when the corruption control, democracy, horizontal 
inequality, and non-state actor population variables were included in Model 3 and Model 
4; this suggests that, like oil wealth and dependence, income is collinear with one or more 




Table 2.1 Effect of natural resources on civil conflict. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 





















































































































* p < 0.10      ** p < 0.05      *** p < 0.01 Standard errors in parentheses 
2.3.2 Intervening Variable Analysis 
As discussed above, the vulnerability, risk, and opportunity mechanisms predict 
that natural resource wealth and dependence affect civil conflict through intervening 
effects on state capacity and democracy, horizontal economic inequality, and non-state 
actor population, respectively. The results of a second series of spatial random effects 




Consistent with H1, economic dependence on oil was found to be a significant and 
negative predictor of both corruption control (Model 5) and democracy (Model 6). Per 
capita rents from oil and minerals were both significant regressors of horizontal 
inequality (Model 7), as predicted by H2. And, controlling for horizontal inequality, 
democracy, and corruption control, the availability of gemstones was positively 
correlated with the size of the non-state actor population (Model 8), consistent with H3.  
Table 2.2 Effect of natural resources on intervening variables. 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
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Mineral rents per capita 
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Forest dependence 
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Minerals dependence 




(0.0612)   
Corruption control 








(Theil index)    
1.165*** 
(0.3570) 












To further interrogate the proposed causal mechanisms, each of the intervening 
variables was introduced to the model independently to assess its effect on the predictive 
power of the resource wealth and resource dependence variables (see Table 2.3). 
Table 2.3 Effect of intervening variables on civil conflict. 
 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 

















































Oil rents per capita 





Forest rents per capita 





Mineral rents per capita 
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Minerals dependence 




(0.0302)   
Corruption control 
(-2.5 to 2.5 index score) 
-0.5116*** 
















(natural logarithm)    
0.2977*** 
(0.0200) 








* p < 0.10      ** p < 0.05      *** p < 0.01 Standard errors in parentheses 
Although economic dependence on oil was a significant predictor of conflict in 
the preliminary regressions, it became insignificant when either the corruption control 




of a mediated relationship with those variables. Similarly, the explanatory power of oil 
wealth is attenuated by the inclusion of the Theil index in the model (Model 11), which 
may suggest that the effect of oil wealth on conflict is also mediated by an effect on 
inequalities across groups within each country. Finally, the availability of gemstone 
deposits, although significant when horizontal inequality, democracy, and corruption 
control are controlled for, is insignificant in the full model when the size of the non-state 
actor population is also included (Model 12), evidence of collinearity between the rebel 
population and gemstone availability variables. 
2.3.3 Two-Stage Regression Analysis 
Although suggestive of potential linkages between natural resources and conflict 
along several causal pathways, the results reported above should be treated with caution 
due to the potentially confounding effects of omitted variable bias and endogeneity, as 
well as the difficulty in interpreting the direction of causality. Use of the two-stage 
regression approach may help address some of these issues. As a starting point, the effect 
of oil resources on the intervening variables was interrogated using known oil reserves 
per capita as an instrumental variable for oil dependence. The oil reserves per capita 
variable is a reasonable instrument here because it is not thought to contribute to 
institutional and governance variables, other than through its effect on oil rents, and thus 
should not be correlated with the error term; it would be inappropriate, by comparison, to 
use oil reserves per capita as an instrument in the equations predicting conflict because it 
is conceivable that known oil reserves could affect belligerent motivations. Next, two 
two-stage regressions predicting conflict events were estimated, such that the corruption 




instrumented with respect to the oil dependence variable (see Table 2.4). To ensure 
parsimony, physiographic population density, which was never statistically significant in 
the preliminary regressions, was excluded from the two-stage analysis. 
Table 2.4 Two-stage regression of the vulnerability mechanism. 
 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
Dependent variable Corrupt. ctrl. Polity2 index Conflict events Conflict events 
Endogenous variable Oil depend. Oil depend. Corrupt. ctrl. Polity2 index 
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The results of the two-stage regressions are consistent with the interpretation of 
the preliminary regression results regarding the applicability of the vulnerability 
mechanism. That the instrumented oil dependence variable was a significant predictor of 
both corruption control (Model 13) and democracy (Model 14) suggests that the direction 
of causality with respect to those variables has been correctly construed. The predicted 
values of the corruption control variable (Model 15) and the Polity2 index (Model 16) 
were found to covary significantly with the conflict variable when oil dependence was 
used as an instrument, which is consistent with a vulnerability mechanism whereby 
economic dependence on oil contributes to conflict through an intermediate effect on 
state capacity and democracy. 
A second set of two-stage regressions was estimated to interrogate the conflict 
risk mechanism (see Table 2.5). Again, the basic assumption regarding the direction of 
causality from oil rents per capita to horizontal inequality was tested by using oil reserves 
per capita as an instrument for oil wealth. Oil wealth was then used as an instrument for 
corruption control and the Polity2 index, respectively, to test for an intervening 
relationship between those variables and the Theil index. Finally, the Theil index was 
instrumented with respect to oil rents per capita and mineral rents per capita in a model 









Table 2.5 Two-stage regression analysis of the risk mechanism. 
 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 
Dependent variable Theil index Theil index Theil index Conflict events 
Endogenous variable Oil rents p.c. Corrupt. ctrl. Polity2 index Theil index 
First stage regression     






















(per million hectares)    
-0.0831 
(0.1889) 
Oil reserves per capita 
(thousand barrels) 
0.2730*** 
(0.0278)    
Oil rents per capita 
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-0.0096** 
(0.0037) 







Second stage regression     





























Oil rents per capita 
(thousands USD) 
-0.0104 
(0.1663)    





















(Theil index)    
0.3060 
(1.484) 











Evidence for the conflict risk mechanism from this analysis, however, is less 
convincing than for the vulnerability mechanism. Although an effect of corruption 
control (Model 18) and democracy (Model 19) on horizontal inequality was observed, the 
predicted value of the Theil index was not found to be a significant predictor of conflict 
(Model 20), suggesting that the observed relationship between horizontal inequality and 
conflict is due to the portion of the variance in horizontal inequality that is unrelated to 
resource wealth. 
In a final series of two-stage regression models (see Table 2.6), a number of 
potential intervening relationships were examined, including the effect of corruption 
control, democracy, and horizontal inequality on the non-state actor population, as well 
as the effect of the non-state population on conflict incidence. Evidence of an indirect 
relationship between resources and rebel capacity was observed, such that both the 
corruption control index (Model 21) and the Polity2 index (Model 22) were found to be 
significant predictors of non-state actor population when instrumented with respect to 
dependence on oil rents, as predicted by the vulnerability mechanism. Consistent with the 
results above regarding the risk mechanism, the Theil index was not a significant 
regressor of the non-state actor population when instrumented with respect to oil and 
mineral rents per capita (Model 23). To directly interrogate the opportunity mechanism 
and H3, a full model of conflict incidence was estimated, in which gemstone availability 
and the Theil and Polity2 indices were used as instruments for non-state actor population 
(Model 24); although non-state actor population was highly significant and positive in the 
second stage, gemstone availability was insignificant in the first, a finding that constitutes 




Table 2.6 Two-stage regression analysis of the opportunity mechanism. 
 Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 
Dependent variable Rebel pop. Rebel pop. Rebel pop. Conflict events 
Endogenous variable Corrupt. ctrl. Polity2 index Theil index Rebel pop. 












































(0.0240)   
Oil rents per capita 
(thousands USD)   
0.0212*** 
(0.0064)  
Mineral rents per capita 
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(0.3512) 
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0.5022*** 
(0.1086) 












Taken together, therefore, the results of the two-stage regression analysis are 
supportive of the vulnerability mechanism predicted by H1. It appears that economic 
dependence on petroleum resources reduces the responsiveness of states to their citizens, 
resulting in less democratic governance and increased public-sector corruption. This 
resource curse effect, in turn, makes states more vulnerable to conflict by increasing 
mobilization efforts of non-state actors, undermining the capacity of states to respond to 
insurgent activity, and increasing public support for rebels. Evidence of a conflict risk 
mechanism mediated by a direct effect of resources on horizontal inequality or an 
opportunity mechanism mediated by non-state actor population is lacking; although both 
horizontal inequality and non-state actor population do appear to contribute to the number 
of conflict events in a given time period, the results of the two-stage regression analysis 
do not support the causal pathways implied by those mechanisms.   
2.3.4 Sensitivity Analysis and Limitations 
To test the robustness of the results reported above, the statistical models were 
repeated under a wide variety of alternative specifications, including the following: 
• Alternative dependent variable transformations: In addition to the natural logarithmic 
transformation of the conflict events variable, other transformations were also tested, 
including the square root function, the cube root function, and the untransformed 
dependent variable. Use of these transformations significantly decreased the 
predictive power of the regression equation and affected the apparent significance of 
the Theil index, which was generally significant only when the natural log and cube 
root transformations were used; the significance of the other independent variables 




• Spatial fixed effects model: The fixed effects model estimates the effect of 
explanatory variables on changes in the dependent variable within each country. The 
method effectively drops from the sample observations that do not vary over time in 
the dependent variable and cannot be used to compute accurate coefficients for 
independent variables that change little over time, an effect that is most pronounced 
in short panels, as is the case here. Under the fixed effects specification, only total 
population remained a statistically significant predictor of conflict in any of the 
models. 
• Additional control variables: The models were repeated with additional control 
variables, including the proportion of the country covered by mountainous or forested 
terrain; the value of exports and imports divided by GDP, as a measure of reliance on 
foreign trade unrelated to natural resources; the number of politically excluded 
minority groups, as reported in the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (see Vogt et al. 
2015); and change in the normalized difference vegetation index, as a measure of land 
cover and land use change. None of those variables were consistently statistically 
significant and their inclusion did not substantially affect the main results.  
• Nonlinear relationships: It has been proposed that the relationship between resource 
rents and civil conflict may take a polynomial form, such that the risk of conflict 
increases at low levels of economic dependence, through a resource curse or other 
effect, and decreases at very high levels of dependence, as a result of enhanced 
military capacity of the state enabled by collection of rents (Collier & Hoeffler 2004; 
Basedau & Lay 2009). To test for such an effect, all models were re-estimated with 




dependence variables were generally statistically insignificant; however, a 
polynomial relationship between per capita petroleum rents and conflict was 
observed, although the squared per capita oil rents variable was significant only at the 
ten percent level. 
There are several potential limitations in the analysis described above that should 
be noted, including the widely-recognized issue of endogeneity. It is possible, for 
example, that dependence on natural resource extraction may be a function of conflict, 
rather than vice versa, as a result of underinvestment in non-resource sectors in areas 
affected by conflict (Brunnschweiler & Bulte 2008, 2009); alternatively, both resource 
dependence and conflict may be influenced by an underlying state weakness mechanism 
(Lujala 2009). The strong correlation between oil rents and both the Polity2 score and the 
corruption control score, for instance, could potentially be explained not by a resource 
curse effect on state-level institutions, but rather by a preference among extractive 
industry for locating in more corrupt or less democratic countries. All three conditions—
economic dependence on oil, low democracy, and low corruption control—are also 
correlated with poverty, which is itself a well-established predictor of conflict. 
The empirical analysis utilizes several methods to minimize such sources of 
endogeneity. The use of lagged independent variables may somewhat address the issue of 
reverse causality, although, given that most civil conflicts span multiple years, this is 
likely insufficient in isolation to ensure that endogeneity is controlled for. Examining the 
steps in the causal chains linking resources and conflict independently and 
simultaneously through the use of the two-stage regression model should also lend 




of causality to be directly tested. That the direction has been correctly interpreted is also 
supported by the sign of the observed correlation between the independent and dependent 
variables—all else being equal, firms involved in natural resource extraction, especially 
those with capital-intensive operations, as is the case in the oil sector, should seek to 
avoid conflict areas due to threats to equipment, products, and personnel, including the 
threat of extortion by armed groups, which would result in a negative relationship 
between resource extraction and conflict, rather than the positive relationship observed.  
An additional limitation of this study is that the analysis does not account for the 
spatial distribution of resources within countries. Recent studies utilizing georeferenced 
data on natural resource extraction suggest that the location of extraction activities in 
relation to conflict zones, borders, or state capitals may have important implications for 
the onset, duration, and intensity of civil violence (Lujala 2009, 2010; Steinberg 2018; Le 
Billon 2008). Because the variables of interest to this study—especially democracy, 
corruption control, and horizontal economic inequality—are available in reliable form 
globally only at the country level, a disaggregated approach is untenable at this time; 
additional research is therefore recommended to examine the causal paths linking natural 
resources and civil conflict at higher degrees of spatial resolution using the expanding 
universe of conflict events data. 
2.4 Conclusion 
The empirical results presented above support many of the conclusions offered 
elsewhere in the quantitative literature on natural resources and civil conflict. The 
findings are clearest with respect to petroleum, for which there is compelling evidence of 




dependence on oil is correlated with both low levels of democracy and poor corruption 
control, conditions that are, in turn, associated with higher incidences of conflict events. 
These findings were robust to multiple specifications of the statistical model and are 
consistent with numerous studies of the potentially politically and socially disruptive 
implications of petroleum extraction (Ross 2004, 2015; Fearon 2005; Collier & Hoeffler 
2004; Lujala 2010). 
The uniquely, among resource sectors, robust relationship between oil and 
conflict is attributable to the experiences of a relatively small group of oil exporting 
countries—including Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, and Nigeria, among others—for which 
the sector represents a disproportionate economic driver and a preoccupation of 
government policy and investment. Owing to its status as a distinctively economically 
and militarily strategic resource, as well as the capital intensity of its extraction, the 
degree of state involvement in the petroleum industry is high in such states, with 
institutional and political implications that may contribute to conflict vulnerability and 
risk. As Le Billon (2012) observes, “the tight connections that arise between governments 
and the oil sector often reinforce the institutional weakness of the state vis-à-vis political 
responsiveness to its citizens” (70-71), thus potentially hindering processes of 
democratization. It is this close connection also that creates opportunities and incentives 
for state-level actors to accrue personal financial benefits and dispense political 
patronage, resulting in the observed relationship between oil dependence and corruption 
control. 
Evidence for a risk mechanism between resource wealth and conflict is less 




resources were associated with increased horizontal economic inequalities and although 
horizontal inequalities appeared to contribute to the number of conflict events 
experienced, the instrumented horizontal economic inequality variable was insignificant 
as a predictor of rebel population and of conflict event incidence in the two-stage 
regression models. While this result may call into question the findings of previous 
studies by potentially suggesting that horizontal inequality is predominantly an outcome, 
rather than a cause, of conflict, it is also possible that it is the consequence of resource 
wealth being a poor instrument for the Theil index, an interpretation that is supported by 
the significance of the corruption control and Polity2 indices as second-stage predictors 
of horizontal inequality. It seems consistent with both previous research and with the 
results presented above to conclude that resource wealth affects horizontal inequality 
only indirectly, through its effects on democracy and state capacity; when those variables 
are independently controlled for, no intervening relationship between resources, 
inequality, and conflict is therefore observable. I also do not find strong evidence for an 
opportunity mechanism linking resource wealth and conflict. Among resource categories, 
only gemstone availability was correlated with rebel population, and then only under a 
minority of specifications. Gemstone availability also proved to be a poor instrument for 
rebel population in the two-stage model. Forest resources, meanwhile, did not evince a 
statistically significant relationship with conflict or any of the intervening variables 
examined herein. 
Although the original analysis presented in this chapter offers some insights into 
how the specific causal mechanisms by which various categories of resources contribute 




empirical studies of natural resources and civil conflict, it does not interrogate the utility 
of policy interventions to interrupt or mitigate these effects. A future research agenda is 
therefore recommended to examine the effectiveness of efforts to reduce conflict 
vulnerability, risk, and opportunity in the context of resource wealth and dependence, 





3. Mining and Violence in the New People’s Army Rebellion: 
Subnational Analysis of Natural Resources and Civil Conflict 
 
In addition to the numerous cross-country regression analyses that have 
traditionally dominated the vast quantitative literature examining the relationship 
between natural resources and civil war (see Ross 2004, 2015; Le Billon 2012; Koubi et 
al. 2014), a growing number of scholars have leveraged the expanding universe of 
georeferenced conflict events data to interrogate that relationship at the subnational scale 
(Østby et al. 2009; Lujala 2009, 2010; Berman et al. 2017; Basedau & Pierskalla 2014). 
To date, however, few studies have sought to investigate how natural resource extraction 
shapes the use of violence by belligerents in specific conflicts; in particular, there has 
been a notable lack of engagement between the natural resource conflict literature and the 
study of terrorism (see, though, Dreher & Kreibaum 2016). As civil wars—such as those 
in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, as well as lower intensity conflicts in Colombia, 
Myanmar, the Philippines, and elsewhere—have increasingly come to be defined by 
terroristic violence, there is potential for greater synthesis between empirical analyses of 
terrorism and of civil war, including of the role of natural resources, especially at the 
subnational scale. 
Contributing to that effort, this chapter examines the relationship between surface 
mining in the Philippines and the incidence of terrorist attacks—including assassinations, 
kidnappings, and attacks on civilian government buildings and private businesses—
perpetrated by the NPA in its armed campaign against the Philippine state. A spatial 




Philippines to test for a statistical relationship between the presence of mining activity 
and the probability of experiencing an NPA-related terrorist attack during the years 2012 
through 2016. Data on mining activity were compiled from official tenement maps, land 
classification of multispectral Landsat data, and interpretation of high-resolution satellite 
imagery, allowing the effect of active and nonactive mining areas on conflict incidence to 
be independently examined. The applicability of causal chains proposed in the existing 
literature were specifically interrogated by testing for a tripartite relationship between 
mining, terrorism, and three intervening variables, including (1) an index of state capacity 
based on a comparison of remotely sensed nighttime lights data and official tax receipts, 
(2) an estimate of spatial economic inequality quantifying local heterogeneity in 
nighttime lights and population data, and (3) a measure of land use change based on the 
loss of forested area in each municipality or city. 
The empirical results suggest that the environmental and socioeconomic impacts 
of mining, and the inequitable distribution thereof, shapes NPA behavior. Two-stage 
regression analysis revealed that unpermitted mining activity was associated with 
increased forest loss and higher levels of economic inequality, variables that, in turn, 
tended to increase the probability of NPA violence. By contrast, although local state 
capacity was consistently found to be correlated with NPA-related violence, no impact of 
mining on state capacity was observed. Because the effect of mining on conflict was 
found to be driven by unpermitted mining located outside of official concessions, it is 
plausible that the permitting process may play a role in reducing the negative 
implications of natural resource extraction in the Philippines. Finally, strong evidence 




municipalities and cities, supporting the contention that civil conflict is ‘contagious’ at 
the subnational scale. 
3.1 Background 
3.1.1 Civil Conflict, Terrorism, and Natural Resources 
As discussed above, although there is substantial quantitative and anecdotal 
evidence that the availability and exploitation of natural resources can contribute to the 
outbreak, intensity, and duration of civil war, the precise causal paths by which this 
occurs remain underdefined (Van Der Ploeg & Poelhekke 2016; Ross 2015; Le Billon 
2012; Lujala 2010). For the sake of simplicity, the analysis presented in this chapter 
adopts, again, Le Billon’s (2012) terminology of vulnerability, risk, and opportunity to 
conceptualize the various interpretations of the resource-conflict linkage proposed in the 
existing literature. Thus, where the vulnerability mechanism refers to the theory that 
economic dependence on natural resources can undermine state capacity, the risk 
mechanism proposes that extractive industry directly affects the motivations of 
insurgents, including through its environmental and socioeconomic impacts; the 
opportunity mechanism, meanwhile, predicts that natural resources shape conflicts by 
serving as material sources of financing for conflict belligerents.  
Through the vulnerability, risk, and opportunity mechanisms, natural resources 
may not only facilitate the outbreak of conflict, but may also shape its development. Le 
Billon (2001b) proposes, for example, that different categories of resources are associated 
with different types of conflict, such that proximate (relative to power centers) point 




distant diffuse resources to warlordism, and proximate point resources to rioting and 
rebellion. Lujala (2009, 2010) concludes that the spatial distribution of resources with 
respect to active conflict zones has implications for the intensity and duration of conflict, 
observing that gemstone and oil deposits within a conflict zone are associated with longer 
and more severe conflicts; similarly, Buhaug (2002) finds that the presence of exploitable 
resources in a conflict zone tends to increase the spatial extent of the conflict. Although it 
seems likely that the distribution and exploitation of resources also has implications for 
the local manifestations of violence, such as the use of terrorism against either civilian or 
government targets, relatively few subnational studies have sought to test for such an 
effect. 
The drivers of terrorism in general, and in the context of civil war specifically, 
have nevertheless garnered increasing scholarly interest in recent years (Findley & 
Young 2012; Polo & Gleditsch 2016; Piazza 2007). With respect to the role of natural 
resources, Dreher & Kreibaum (2016) conclude that oil, while contributing significantly 
to the likelihood of broad-based insurgency, is not a strong predictor of the use of 
terrorism, which appears to be linked more strongly to political discrimination against 
ethnic minorities by the state; Lee (2016), however, finds evidence that oil wealth does 
contribute to terrorism, though this effect is mediated by social and political grievances. 
As a tactic, existing evidence suggests that terrorism is generally not a particularly 
effective means of accomplishing political aims (Fortna 2015), in part because resulting 
civilian casualties may cause the civilian population to abandon support for non-state 
actors engaging in it (Stanton 2013). However, because it requires fewer resources than 




state actors that lack local sources of funding or international support (Polo & Gleditsch 
2016); thus, Findley & Young (2012) suggest that the increase in terroristic activity in 
civil wars in recent decades may be related to the end of the Cold War practice of 
superpowers funding insurgencies that aligned with their political interests. It also 
appears that the use of terrorism in civil war varies according to the political ideology of 
insurgent groups (Stanton 2013, Enders et al. 2016, Polo & Gleditsch 2016). Both 
Stanton (2013) and Polo & Gleditsch (2016), for instance, find that insurgent groups that 
rely on broad-based civilian support, as opposed to groups with exclusionary 
constituencies based on ethnic or religious identity, are less likely to participate in 
terrorism, particularly against civilian targets; the latter paper finds evidence that socialist 
and Marxist groups, specifically, tended to attack ‘hard’ government and infrastructural 
targets, while religious fundamentalists were more likely to target civilians. 
Thus, the relationship between natural resources and terrorism in civil conflict is 
likely highly contingent on local circumstances, including the resource sector at issue, the 
ideological affiliation of the actors involved, and the relative strength of insurgents vis-à-
vis the state. As a result, subnational analysis of that relationship has the greatest 
potential for identifying the specific mechanisms at work in a given conflict. In the 
present study, the applicability of the vulnerability, risk, and opportunity mechanisms for 
explaining the use of terroristic violence is tested in the context of the ongoing conflict 
between the NPA and the Philippine state. 
3.1.2 Civil Violence in the Philippines 
The Philippines is home to two of the world’s longest-running insurgencies, both 




Japanese occupation. Advocating the succession of the traditional homeland of the Moro 
minority in areas of the island of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago in the southern part 
of the country, various related, though often competing, separatist groups have 
challenged colonial governments and, since independence, the Philippine state; in its 
current iteration, the Moro separatist insurgency is represented by the Bangsamoro 
Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFM), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and 
Abu Sayyaf, among other groups. At the same time, the NPA has waged an armed 
revolution along Maoist principles for decades, presenting itself as the heir to Communist 
guerilla resistance against the Japanese occupation during World War II (Quimpo 2014; 
Santos 2010). Because the NPA is active throughout the country, whereas the Moro 
separatist insurgency is regionally-based, the empirics of this chapter are focused on the 
former group, although the latter’s spatial distribution is also considered. 
The roots of the NPA insurgency in the anti-Japanese guerilla movement continue 
to play a role in guiding the group’s goals, tactics, and rhetoric today. Following the 
establishment of the Republic of the Philippines in 1946, the communist Hukbong Bayan 
Laban sa mga Hapones (the People’s Army against the Japanese), otherwise known as the 
Hukbalahap or Huk rebellion, continued to fight against the then-independent Philippine 
government. Although, by the mid-1950s, the Huks had been largely defeated by the 
administration of Ramon Magsaysay, remnant groups remained intact as criminal 
organizations involved in the extortion of gambling, prostitution, and other illegal and 
legal businesses (Caouette 2015; Mediansky 1986). The reconstitution of a formal 
communist insurgency as the NPA in 1969 was the immediate result of intra-party 




pitted orthodox leaders aligned with the Marxist-Leninist tradition against a cadre of 
younger members who identified with the Chinese and Cuban revolutionary experiences 
and Maoist principles of agrarian-led communism. Mirroring the contemporaneous 
schism between the Soviet and Chinese Communist Parties, the splinter faction of ‘self-
made Marxists’ was reorganized as the CPP in 1968, on the 75th birthday of Mao 
Zedong. Under the leadership of José Sison, then an English literature professor at the 
University of the Philippines, the CPP was explicitly Maoist in its aims and organization 
(Mediansky 1986; Goodwin 2001; Santos 2010). Practically, the rise of the CPP was 
marked by a change in emphasis from recruitment among the urban working class to the 
rural peasantry, following the Maoist model of protracted people’s war, whereby 
“revolution begins in the countryside, expands taking over the cities, and ultimately 
engulfs the entire country” (Holden 2013b, 30). 
Recognizing the value of the CPP’s revolutionary narrative and impressed by the 
new party’s political agenda, Bernade ‘Commander Dante’ Buscayno, leader of a 
vestigial Huk unit of 72 fighters joined forces with the CPP on March 29, 1969 as the 
party’s armed counterpart (Mediansky 1986; Santos 2010). The NPA’s membership grew 
steadily throughout the following decade, recruiting from among a peasantry increasingly 
dissatisfied with the regime of Ferdinand Marcos; the group remained, however, from the 
perspective of the national government, “no more than a nuisance” (Mediansky 1986: 1) 
until the 1980s, when membership peaked at between 20,000 and 25,000 armed cadets 
and a series of increasingly brazen attacks on government forces and infrastructure led 





Since Marcos’ ouster in 1986, the NPA has waned in strength to fewer than 4000 
fighters at present—far too few to directly challenge the Philippine state militarily—yet 
has persistently managed to avoid complete elimination (Fonbuena 2018). According to 
some observers, the group’s emphasis on local funding opportunities, including the 
extortion of mining companies and other businesses, at the expense of ideological purity 
has increased since international recognition of the group as a terrorist organization 
caused foreign supporters to distance themselves politically and financially (Lagsa 2015; 
Caouette 2015). A simultaneous change in tactical operations has also been noted, 
characterized by a growing emphasis in the NPA’s propaganda on natural resource 
extraction in general, and mining projects in particular, as illustrations of what the NPA 
perceives to be an unjust and violent international capitalist order (Holden et al. 2011; 
Caouette 2015). Various interpretations of the NPA’s attitude toward mining and the 
motivations behind the rise in NPA attacks on mine sites in recent years have been set 
forth by, among others, Myers (1989), Homer-Dixon (1999), Le Billon (2001b, 2005b), 
Kahl (2006), and Holden (2013b, 2014), exemplifying in microcosm the broader 
scholarly debate concerning the mechanisms linking natural resources and political 
violence. 
3.1.3 Natural Resource Conflict in the Philippines 
Natural resource extraction has a long history in the Philippines (Camba 2015). 
As early as the third century A.D., Chinese histories make mention of the islands as a 
source of gold, copper, and other metals (Tan 1987); the country later served as a source 
of timber, metals, and cash crops during more than three centuries of Spanish colonial 




Trade liberalization in the 1990s ushered in a new era of resource exploitation involving 
foreign corporations, including, especially, American, Australian, and, increasingly, 
South Korean, Taiwanese, Chinese, and Japanese firms (Holden 2005b; Broad & 
Cavanagh 1993; Tan 1987). The timber industry, which peaked in the early 1990s, has 
declined in importance with the loss of the majority of the archipelago’s native forests; 
today, following a country-wide mining ban instituted in 2011, the Philippines is a net 
importer of timber and the industry accounts for less than half a percent of GDP (World 
Bank 2018a). The mining industry, however, has continued to flourish, encouraged by 
incentives introduced by the Mining Act of 1995, which included a four-year income tax 
holiday; tariff and tax exemptions for capital equipment imports; a provision permitting 
income tax deductions to be taken by mining companies for operating losses; favorable 
changes to depreciation calculations for tax purposes; exemptions for mining operations 
for value-added taxes; and a guarantee of the repatriation of profits and freedom from 
expropriation (Holden 2005a, 2012a).  
As is the case in many developing countries, the mining sector in the Philippines 
is fraught with allegations of destructive environmental impacts, corruption, and abuses, 
including the targeting of anti-mining activists by government forces (Holden 2014; 
Camba 2015); Holden (2014), for instance, estimates that more than 1,330 people 
involved in anti-mining causes were assassinated between 2001 and 2012, often by 
“motorcycle-riding men wearing ski masks” (72) with the tacit or explicit approval of 
government officials. Despite some movement toward reform of the sector under the 




Philippines and one with which broader patterns of civil violence have often become 
entangled. 
In this context, the NPA insurgency and, to a lesser extent, the Moro separatist 
movement have long been cited by scholars as examples of their (often conflicting) 
theories of the relationship between natural resources and civil conflict. In an early 
application of econometric analysis to the study of civil war at the subnational scale, for 
example, Mitchell (1969) presents evidence that strategically important environmental 
features, such as mountains and swamps, which may serve as bases of operation for non-
state actors, as well as agricultural land tenure arrangements, interacted with variables 
measuring cultural affinity and historical legacies of conflict to influence the spread of 
rebel control in Central Luzon during the Huk rebellion (see also Averch & Koehler 
1970). Myers (1989) uses the expanding support among the Philippine peasantry for the 
NPA in the 1980s as evidence for a neo-Malthusian theory of conflict, whereby absolute 
scarcity of natural resources and ecological services, driven by population growth and 
resource overuse, pushed “impoverished throngs” into the arms of the militants. Homer-
Dixon (1999), by contrast, engaging with models of relative deprivation in the context of 
rebellion (see Gurr 1970), argues that the ecological marginalization of the Philippine 
peasantry related to agricultural modernization led to rising public support among this 
population for the insurgency. 
Supporting the vulnerability mechanism, Kahl (2006) links the military and 
political success of the NPA at its height to declining state capacity to ensure rule of law 
and provide basic services to marginalized communities, a situation which he attributes, 




and ecological services. Le Billon (2005b), on the other hand, cites the extortion of 
mining and logging companies by the NPA and Moro separatist groups through the 
levying of so-called ‘revolutionary taxes’ as an archetypical example of the conflict 
opportunity mechanism. Finally, Holden (2005a, 2005b, 2013a, 2013b, 2014) and Holden 
& Jacobson (2007), emphasizing the experiences of anti-mining movements, suggest that, 
insofar as mining can become, from the perspective of negatively affected communities, 
the grounded manifestation of hegemonic neoliberalism, of crony capitalism, or of 
corrupt and abusive government, especially in the context of militarized mining areas and 
the targeting of environmental activists by the state, the industry has created opportunities 
for the NPA to promote a revolutionary narrative justifying violent collective action (see 
also Le Billon 2005c). 
Much of the interest in the NPA’s relationship with natural resources stems from 
the group’s seemingly contradictory position as both an outspoken critic and beneficiary 
of extractive industry. On the one hand, the NPA publicly denounces mining companies, 
especially those with foreign investment, in harsh terms, as instruments of “imperialist 
plunder” that “sap the country’s natural resources while victimizing workers and 
peasants” (NPA 2018) and “leaving in their wake pitted grounds and ruined rivers and 
riverbanks” (Ang Bayan 2014, 5). The sincerity of such statements is somewhat belied, 
however, by the NPA’s financial dependence on the mining industry. Although the NPA 
has historically levied, under the threat of violence, revolutionary taxes on all manner of 
businesses, ranging from transportation companies, to hotels, to illegal gambling and 
prostitution rings, mining operations are particularly vulnerable to such extortion. As 




dollars, for a mining company to find, develop, and begin to mine a major mineral 
deposit. Once a mining project is developed it cannot be relocated and a mining company 
has a substantial incentive to pay funds to armed groups in exchange for being allowed to 
operate” (477). And pay they do, to the tune of millions of dollars per year; Holden 
(2014) estimates that the mining industry in northeastern Mindanao alone has paid 
between 340,000 and 450,000 U.S. dollars annually to the NPA, while Snell (2004) 
reports that a single gold mining project in the Compostela Valley paid more than 1.7 
million dollars over three years to various insurgent groups, including not only the NPA, 
but also Abu Sayyaf, and the MILF. For mining companies, such payments to non-state 
actors is considered a regular cost of doing business in the Philippines (Snell 2004; 
Mediansky 1986; Santos 2010). 
Despite their unforgiving rhetoric, the CPP and NPA have been somewhat 
equivocal regarding their official relationship with the mining industry. Demonstrating an 
apparent internal conflict within those organizations, Holden (2014) recounts: 
On January 7, 2011, the CPP declared that it will not levy revolutionary 
taxes upon mining companies because they “are beyond the pale of the 
revolutionary taxation being undertaken by the democratic organs of 
people’s governance.” Instead of collecting revolutionary taxes from them, 
the NPA would rather just see them “booted out” of the country. However, 
only two days later, on January 9, 2011, Jorge “Ka Oris” Madlos, the NDFP 
Mindanao spokesperson, admitted that if the NPA cannot drive them away, 
“they better pay taxes” (78). 
Such apparent contradictions leave the NPA’s use of violence open to 
empirical interrogation; in the following, therefore, the drivers of NPA activity, 




spatial regression model to subnational conflict events data and remotely sensed 
satellite imagery, with the objective of identifying the extent to which the group’s 
behavior aligns with its stated goals. 
3.1.4 Hypotheses 
The overarching aim of this study is to investigate the causal pathways linking 
mining and the use of terrorism by the NPA, using data on the operational and legal 
status of mining projects throughout the Philippines. As explained in detail below, the 
locations of three classes of mines were mapped by comparing available mining 
tenements maps with remotely sensed imagery. These are (1) proposed mines, which are 
those that have been permitted by the national government, but for which no evidence of 
operations can be observed; (2) permitted mines, which are operational mine sites located 
within delineated mining tenements; and (3) unpermitted mines, which are operational 
mine sites located outside of tenement boundaries. The relationship between each class of 
mine and the incidence of attacks perpetrated by the NPA in each of the municipalities 
and cities of the Philippines was then investigated using spatial probit regression analysis. 
The causal chains linking mining and conflict in the Philippines were further interrogated 
using spatial two-stage probit regression.  
Corresponding with the vulnerability, risk, and opportunity mechanisms, three 
broad hypotheses were tested in the empirical analysis. The first of these holds that the 
effect of mining is to undermine local government capacity and institutional 
effectiveness, thus making a community more vulnerable to targeting by the NPA, as 
proposed by Kahl (2006). Under this hypothesis, communities in which mining occurs 




of the distorting effects of resource wealth on local economies. Public sector corruption 
may increase as a growing supply of potential bribes effectively increases demand for 
more of them. Over time, local politicians may become incentivized to become 
responsive to mining companies rather than to citizens. The local government may begin 
targeting opponents of mining using the formal powers or extrajudicial violence. Lacking 
faith in official institutions, residents may seek redress or protection from the NPA. The 
NPA may use violence, in the form of assassinations of local government officials or 
attacks against government buildings or mine sites as a means of projecting power and 
legitimacy as an alternative governing authority. The local government may also find 
itself in direct competition with the NPA for the soliciting of bribes from and provision of 
protection to mining operations, creating the conditions for conflict.  
H1: Mining increases vulnerability to NPA violence by decreasing local state 
capacity. 
In the case of the NPA, this hypothesis would be most strongly supported by a 
statistically significant relationship between the presence of unpermitted and, especially, 
permitted mining activity and conflict; because the permitting process for mining activity 
is known to sometimes be tainted by corruption, a relationship between proposed mines 
and conflict is also possible. Most importantly, H1 predicts a two-stage relationship 
between mining, state capacity, and conflict, whereby mining is inversely correlated with 
state capacity and state capacity is inversely correlated with conflict, controlling for other 
factors.  
The second hypothesis predicts that mining engenders or exacerbates local 




Such grievances may, as per Myers (1989), be related to an absolute scarcity of resources 
or ecological services brought on or made worse by mining activity or may stem from the 
unequal distribution of the costs and benefits of resource extraction, as suggested by 
Homer-Dixon’s (1999) model of relative deprivation in natural resource conflicts. 
Accordingly, two variants of this hypothesis were tested, the first of which relates mining 
to scarcity. Under H2a, mining and associated activities displace agriculture and other 
traditional land uses, diminish the provision of ecological services, and drive subsistence 
farmers onto increasingly marginal lands, resulting in lower and less dependable 
incomes. The NPA recruits from among these marginalized populations and mobilizes 
action against police forces, government facilities, businesses, and other local targets. 
H2a: Mining increases the risk of NPA violence by increasing environmental 
scarcity in affected communities. 
Because only active mining is anticipated to result in environmental changes that 
could exacerbate scarcity, the presence of proposed mines would not be expected to 
contribute to conflict risk under this hypothesis. In addition, a statistically significant 
relationship between mining and a measure of land use change, and between land use 
change and conflict, would be expected under this hypothesis. 
A different set of predictions corresponds to H2b, which relates mining to social 
grievances related to inequality and thence to violence. This hypothesis predicts that the 
costs and benefits of mining are unequally distributed within affected communities, 
leading to a sense of relative deprivation. Employees of the mines, including those hired 
locally and migrant workers from elsewhere, may see increased incomes; government 




companies; and some land-owners may receive large sums in the form of compensation 
from mines. Other community members may see stagnant or decreasing incomes as a 
result of detrimental environmental impacts from mining. Tax revenues collected from 
mining may also be distributed unequally by local governments as a form of patronage. 
The NPA may target individuals and facilities in these communities to demonstrate 
affinity with marginalized groups, develop local alliances, and recruit new members.    
H2b: Mining increases the risk of NPA violence by exacerbating economic 
inequalities in affected communities. 
Active mining, rather than proposed mining, would be expected to exhibit a 
relationship with conflict under this hypothesis. To the extent that the permitting process, 
which in the Philippines requires a process of informed consent and revenue sharing with 
local governments, permitted mining may be less likely to contribute to conflict risk 
under this hypothesis than unpermitted mining, although, given the documented failures 
of the approvals process, permitted mines may also be implicated in contributing to 
conflict (see Bravante & Holden 2009). Mining would also be expected to covary with a 
measure of inequality, which would, in turn, be expected to correlate with the probability 
of NPA-related violence. 
To the extent that an observed relationship between mining and NPA violence in 
the Philippines is unexplained by either institutional weakness or social grievances, it 
may be the case that mining serves primarily as sources of financing for NPA activity, as 
documented by Le Billon (2005b), Holden (2013b, 2014), and others. 





The opportunity mechanism is operationalized in the Philippines through the 
extortion of revolutionary taxes from mining companies at various stages of operations. 
Backers of mining proposals may be asked to pay the NPA for permission to explore the 
mineral potential of any area, to begin extraction, or to continue existing operations 
(Holden & Jacobson 2007; Mediansky 1986). In addition, both large mining facilities and 
small unofficial operations are at risk for extortion by the NPA, the former because of 
their larger revenue and the latter because of their lack of security and constrained ability 
to seek police protection. Accordingly, H3 would be most strongly supported by a finding 
of a statistically significant relationship between mining of any legal status and the 
probability of conflict that is not convincingly explained by an intermediate effect on 
state capacity, environmental scarcity, or economic inequality. 
3.2 Methods 
3.2.1 Dependent Variable 
The events data used in the regression analysis were obtained from the Global 
Terrorism Database (GTD), which tracks terrorist attacks globally based on media reports 
(START 2017). To be included in the GTD, an incident must be intentional, must involve 
violence or the immediate threat of violence, and must be perpetrated by subnational 
actors. In addition, the incident must meet at least two of the three following conditions: 
(1) it must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal; (2) there 
must be evidence of intent to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to an 
audience beyond the immediate victims; and (3) the action must be outside the context of 




civil conflicts, including riots, violence perpetrated by the state against non-state actors or 
civilians, and pitched battles, the definition is broad enough to encompass most aspects of 
irregular warfare perpetrated by the NPA insurgency. The modis operandi of the NPA, as 
well as of Abu Sayyaf, the MILF, and other Moro separatist groups, all of which are 
considered to be terrorist organizations by the United States and Philippine governments, 
include assassinations of political leaders, attacks on businesses and government 
buildings, and kidnappings for ransom, activities that fit well within the GTD’s definition 
of terrorism. 
The GTD contains records for a total of 2848 terrorist events in the Philippines 
from 2012 through 2016, the most recent five-year period for which the dataset was 
available at the time of writing. Of these, 1085 were perpetrated by the NPA; Abu Sayyaf 
and BIFM were responsible for 250 and 320 attacks, respectively, while the instigators of 
1107 attacks were unknown. Although the GTD records most events with a very high 
level of spatial resolution, 27 NPA-related events were eliminated from the sample due to 
insufficient spatial specificity; for the purposes of this study, all events were included that 
had a GTD specificity value of 1,2, or 3, meaning that the municipality or city in which 
the event took place had been positively identified. The dependent variable was 
constructed as a binary indicator, such that a municipality or city in which at least one 
NPA-related terrorism event occurred during the time period examined was assigned a 
value of 1 and those that did not experience such an event were assigned a value of 0. A 
total of 352 municipalities and cities, about 22 percent of the total sample, experienced at 




3.2.2 Independent Variables 
Three independent variables of interest were generated using georeferenced and 
remotely sensed data. To establish the spatial distribution of officially permitted mine 
sites, maps of active mining concessions were obtained from the Philippines Mines and 
Geosciences Bureau (MGB) and were manually digitized by the author (MGS 2015). 
Mapped concessions include Mineral Production Permits (MPPs), Industrial Sand and 
Gravel Permits (IPs), Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSAs) and Financial or 
Technical Assistant Agreements (FTAAs), which differ in terms of the type of minerals 
being extracted and the degree of involvement by foreign investors. Under Philippine 
law, all mining projects require either an MPP, IP, MPSA, or FTAA, which are approved 
by the MGB following an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process that, in 
theory, includes informed consent procedures, extensive public outreach by mining 
companies, and a detailed analysis of potential environmental and socioeconomic impacts 
of a proposed project, although the effectiveness of this process in practice has been 
challenged (Bravante & Holden 2009; Ingelson et al. 2009; Broad 1995). 
Concessions data, however, while widely-used as proxy measures for natural 
resource extraction, do not represent the full universe of mining activity in the 
Philippines. Some concessions are never fully developed, while small-scale illegal and 
quasi-legal mining operations are not captured by official concessions data. To identify 
all active mining sites, therefore, a decision-tree land classification algorithm was applied 
to a cloud-free composite of multispectral Landsat imagery of the Philippines obtained 
from the Global Forest Change project (see Hansen et al. 2013) and based on imagery 




mine sites in north-western Mindanao and on the island of Samar, as well as several 
small-scale gravel and sand mines in Cagayan province that were visited by the author. 
Although the classification algorithm was effective at identifying areas of exposed soil 
and rock, it failed to effectively discriminate between mines and other categories of bare 
ground, such as river banks, beaches, and landslides. Therefore, the presence of mining 
activity in the areas identified by the algorithm was manually confirmed by reviewing 
high resolution satellite imagery. Historical imagery was reviewed to ensure that all 
active mine sites included in the sample were developed, at least in part, prior to 2012, to 
partially avoid issues of potential endogeneity in the regression analysis. 
The final map of active mine sites was overlain by the digitized concessions data 
to characterize all mining activity in the Philippines in terms of legal status. Mine sites 
located within officially designated MPP, IP, MPSA, or FTAA concessions were 
assumed to fall within the purview of the permit and were designated as permitted mines. 
Active mining sites located outside of any concession boundary were designated as 
unpermitted mines, a category that included many smaller-scale gravel and sand mines, 
as well as some surface mineral mines that appeared to be associated with permitted 
operations but were located outside of concession boundaries. Finally, concessions in 
which no active mining was observed were designated as proposed mines. The procedure 
identified mining areas in a total of 482 municipalities and cities; of these, 84 had at least 
one permitted operational mine, 256 had at least one proposed mine, and 273 had at least 
one unpermitted mine. Consistent with Holden & Jacobson (2007), mapping areas 
affected by mining alongside NPA activity is suggestive of a possible relationship 





Figure 3.1 Mining and NPA Violence in the Philippines. (a) Mining areas and NPA-related conflict events in the Philippines. (b) 
Mining areas and NPA-related terrorist events in Bicol. (c) Mining areas and NPA-related terrorist events in southern Mindanao. (d) 
Unpermitted mine site in Malilipot, Albay. (e) Permitted mine site in Carrascal, Surigao del Sur. Source: Compiled from MGB (2015); 




3.2.3 Intervening Variables 
To test the validity of the hypotheses defined above, three intervening variables 
were generated that correspond to intermediate steps in the proposed causal chains 
linking resource extraction and civil violence. The relationship between these intervening 
variables and the presence of mining activity, as well as between the intervening 
variables and conflict, was tested indirectly through a series of probit and linear 
regressions, as described below and directly through a two-stage probit regression 
approach. The first of these intervening variables, corresponding to the vulnerability 
mechanism, quantifies the level of state capacity at the subnational level. In the absence 
of comprehensive survey data measuring government effectiveness in the Philippines, a 
proxy measure was generated by estimating the relative size of the informal economy in 
each municipality or city, under the assumption that municipalities and cities with poor 
corruption control or limited ability to enforce tax collection should tend to underregulate 
and underreport economic activity. 
The size of the informal economy was estimated by comparing remotely sensed 
nighttime lights data—as a proxy for total economic activity—to tax receipts for each 
municipality and city. Following Keola & Andersson (2015), DMSP-OLS nighttime 
lights data were obtained in the form of a cloud-free composite raster dataset 
corresponding to the year 2012 at an approximately one square kilometer resolution; to 
exclude ephemeral sources of light, such as fires, the average stable light product was 
used. Although validation of these data at the municipal level was not possible, due to a 
lack of available comparison statistics, nighttime light intensity did, when aggregated to 




level income from the 2015 Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES) compiled by 
the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA 2016). Examined independently among the 
component cities of Metropolitan Manila, the most densely urbanized region of the 
Philippines, nighttime lights intensity was also highly correlated (r = 0.89) with total 
income, but exhibited a distinct slope relative to the rest of the country. 
Based on the observed linear relationships between nighttime light intensity and 
economic activity across provinces and within Metropolitan Manila, an estimate of local-
level economic activity was generated for each of the 1628 municipalities and cities of 
the Philippines. To the extent that this estimate captures all economic activity, a 
comparison of those estimates to official records should contain information regarding 
the relative scale of the informal economy and, therefore, of relative local government 
capacity. Using tax income reported to the national government and obtained from the 
Bureau of Local Government Finance, an index measuring unreported economic activity 
was defined as the ratio of tax revenue from local sources to estimated total economic 
activity (BLGF 2018). The utility of this variable relies on the assumption that 
municipalities and cities with low index values are those in which a large proportion of 
the economy is unregulated as result of the inability of the local government to enforce 
tax collection on businesses, the embezzlement of tax revenues by local government 
officials, or some combination thereof. To validate this assumption, the index was 
compared with the best available subnational measure of government effectiveness in the 
Philippines, the Good Governance Index (GGI), which is compiled by the Philippines 
National Statistics Office and is available for the years 2005 and 2008 for selected 







Figure 3.2 Unreported economy index calculation. (a) Good Government Index in 2008 by municipality/city. (b) Unreported 
economy index for 2012 by municipality/city. (c) Unreported economy index by city in Metropolitan Manila. (d) Linear relationship 




Although, when compared with the GGI for 2008, the state capacity index evinces 
only a weak, though statistically significant, positive relationship (r = 0.325), much of the 
discrepancy may be explained by known problems with the GGI related to data 
availability and manipulation of reported information. First, although the GGI purports to 
quantify government effectiveness, the measure is based, in part, on several factors, 
including voter turnout and educational attainment, that do not have a clear relationship 
with effectiveness. In addition, because some of the statistics used to compute the GGI 
are collected by local governments, the reported values may not be objectively compiled. 
Finally, data on certain government functions appear to be missing from the GGI 
calculations for many municipalities, resulting in inordinately high scores, a problem that 
is especially pronounced in rural and remote areas of the country. This is the case, for 
example, for many municipalities in the Cordillera Administrative Region, a relatively 
poor region that depends heavily on disbursements from the national government. 
The state capacity index described above, because it is based on a comparison of 
official records to remotely sensed imagery, is less subject to the issues affecting the GGI 
and may, in the absence of other reliable measures, be a useful proxy for local differences 
in government capacity. Anecdotally, the region with the lowest average state capacity 
index score—the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)—is well 
documented as having experienced rampant corruption and political violence; the 
component cities of Metropolitan Manila, on the other hand, show relatively high scores, 
consistent with observations that the capital region exhibits comparatively high 




The second intervening variable quantifies spatial economic inequality, as a 
measure of relative deprivation. To the extent that conflict is facilitated by grievances 
related to mining activity, these may stem from the unequal distribution of the costs and 
benefits of mining, and may thus be expressed by increased economic inequality; for 
example, a mine site that displaces smallholder agriculture in a rural municipality could 
enrich local backers of the mining project while reducing the incomes of farmers (see 
Homer-Dixon 1999). Because comprehensive survey data on local incomes is not 
available for all of the municipalities and cities included in the sample, an original 
method for estimating subnational inequality based on remotely sensed nighttime lights 
and land cover data was used. First, a high-resolution map of estimated per capita 
economic activity was generated by dividing the DMSP-OLS nighttime lights raster 
dataset by a raster dataset of population from the LandScan project (LandScan 2012). The 
resulting estimate was aggregated to the scale of the barangay, an administrative division 
in the Philippines that is approximately equivalent to the village (in rural areas) or 
neighborhood (in urban areas). A local-level measure of economic inequality was then 
defined using Theil’s (1967) mean logarithmic deviation method, such that: 










Where xj is income per capita in barangay j of municipality or city i, μi is the 
mean income per capita across all barangays of municipality or city i, and Ni is the 
number of barangays in municipality or city i. Calculated using 2012 data for the 
Philippines, the final Theil index ranges from 0, representing no inequality between 




It is important to note that the resulting metric is a measure of spatial inequality—
the variance in per capita income between barangays, rather than between individuals. 
Although the extent to which this index can be considered a proxy for individual 
inequality cannot be precisely validated in the absence of survey data, broader-scale 
measures of inequality do exist for a limited number of years, including the FIES, which 
reports the average income by decile for a sample of households in each of the 
Philippines’ 16 administrative regions for that year (PSA 2012). From the FIES, a decile 
ratio measure of income inequality was calculated as the mean income of the top decile in 
each region divided by the mean income of the lowest decile, which was then compared 
to the average Theil index value for each region. 
The regional Theil index and the decile ratio exhibited a weak, but statistically 
significant and positive correlation (r = 0.373). In addition to the small sample size of 
available comparison data, the weakness of the observed relationship may be partially 
explained by the assumption of spatial heterogeneity across economic classes on which 
the Theil index relies. In many areas, this assumption may be reasonable, insomuch as 
neighborhoods are often segregated along economic lines; elsewhere, however, the 
resolution of nighttime lights data may not be sufficient to capture spatial differences, 
especially in dense urban areas. Nevertheless, in the absence other potential data sources, 
the final measure offers a reasonable proxy for economic inequality. Moreover, the 
spatiality of inequality may have special relevance to its implications for civil conflict, 
owing to its role in facilitating collective action; where economic classes are separated 
spatially into distinct regions of wealth and poverty, mobilization may be easier to 




Figure 3.3 Theil index of spatial inequality calculation. (a) Region-level decile ratio of economic inequality based on survey data. (b) 
Theil index of spatial inequality based on local-level (municipality/city) variation in nighttime light intensity. (c) Theil index of spatial 
economic inequality in Metropolitan Manila. (d) Linear relationship between the decile ratio and Theil index measures of economic 




The third intervening variable is intended to measure the effect of environmental 
scarcity in each municipality or city, a second potential source of grievances among a 
community affected by mining under the conflict risk mechanism. The variable quantifies 
the extent of forest cover loss between 2000 and 2014 in each municipality or city, based 
on Global Forest Change Project data (see Hansen et al. 2013). Mining activity is 
hypothesized to potentially have affected forest coverage either directly, where 
construction of mines and associated infrastructure require the clearing of forests, or 
indirectly, by displacing other land uses, especially agriculture, thus increasing pressure 
on forested land. To the extent that mining activity is implicated in bringing about such 
changes in land use, a mediated relationship between the presence of mine sites, forest 
loss, and conflict may be observable. 
The applicability of each of these three intervening variables—measuring, 
respectively, local state capacity, spatial economic inequality, and environmental 
scarcity—for predicting conflict risk was independently evaluated using the spatial probit 
model described below. Because the three intervening variables are continuous, the 
extent to which mining activity contributes thereto was interrogated by estimating a series 
of linear spatial autoregressive models. In this framework, a finding of a statistically 
significant relationship between mining and conflict incidence that is mediated by local 
state capacity would constitute evidence in favor of the vulnerability mechanism under 
H1, while a mediated relationship with either environmental scarcity or spatial inequality 
would be evidence of the risk mechanism under H2a and H2b, respectively. In the 
absence of any feasible measure of local variations in rebel group income, it is not 




opportunity as predicted by H3. However, it may be possible to attribute any predictive 
power of mining activity unexplained by the intervening variables to the opportunity 
presented thereby for profiting from resource rents. 
3.2.4 Control Variables 
In addition to the independent and intervening variables described above, several 
municipal-level control variables were included in the regression models. Total 
population, based on the LandScan dataset, was expressed in terms of 100,000 
individuals. Economic productivity per capita was estimated as the sum of nighttime light 
intensity per 100 persons in each municipality or city. To account for potential 
differences in conflict risk between rural and urban areas, population density, was 
expressed in terms of hundreds of persons per hectare. And, to control for the presence of 
mountainous and forested areas, which may serve as bases of operation for the NPA, two 
variables were generated measuring, respectively, the proportion of the area of each city 
or municipality with a slope of greater than 30 percent based on a digital elevation model 
of Philippine topography and the proportion of the area covered by forest in 2000 based 
on the Global Forest Change dataset; because these variables were, unsurprisingly, highly 
correlated with each other, only the former is included in the main regressions reported 
below, although the latter was substituted in the sensitivity analysis, with similar results. 
A final covariate was included to control for the potential interaction between the 
NPA and other insurgent groups. In areas of Mindanao and nearby islands where Moro 
separatist groups are active, NPA recruitment and military actions may be hindered by 
competition with those organizations. Accordingly, a binary variable was constructed that 




separatist groups are most active, and zero otherwise. To partially avoid potential issues 
of endogeneity, all control variables were lagged by one year relative to the dependent 
and intervening variables. 
3.2.5 Empirical Model 
Although the spatial distribution of conflict at the subnational level is far from 
systematic—indeed, the apparent unpredictability of conflict events at this scale is a 
subject of intense academic interest—there is little doubt that countries, districts, and 
communities located near conflict areas are often at greater risk for experiencing violence 
themselves (Mitchell 1969; Danneman & Ritter 2014; Bara 2017; Basedau & Pierskalla 
2014). To account for potential dependence in the dependent variable, therefore, a cross-
sectional spatial autoregressive probit model was estimated, such that: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ =  𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 + 𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗 + µ 
Where yi* represents a latent dependent variable that is expressed as a binary 
outcome (i.e. either an NPA-related attack occurred during the time period examined or it 
did not) for municipality or city i; x is the vector of explanatory variables; μ is the 
residual error; and β and ρ are fitted parameters. The terms yj and W represent, 
respectively, the value of the binary outcome variable in neighboring municipalities or 
cities j and the spatial weights matrix defining the spatial structure of the model. As in the 
previous chapter, a standard spatial weights matrix was used, whereby, if each row in the 
matrix represents an observation i and each column represents an observation j, then each 
entry is defined as 1 divided by the number of observations neighboring observation i, if 




Gleditsch 2018; Wilhelm & de Matos 2013; LeSage 2000; Beron & Vijverberg 2004; 
McMillen 1992).  
A perennial issue that arises in the analysis of the resource-conflict nexus is the 
potential for endogeneity and reverse causality (Gleditsch 1998). To interrogate causal 
chains associated with the three hypotheses discussed above, a series of two-stage spatial 
probit regressions were estimated, in which the independent mining variables were used 
as instrumental variables for the proposed endogenous intervening variables measuring, 
respectively, state capacity, forest cover loss, and spatial inequality. 
3.3 Results and Discussion 
3.3.1 Mining and NPA Violence 
The results of a series of preliminary regressions (Table 3.1) indicate a 
statistically significant relationship between the presence of mining activity at the 
municipality/city scale and the probability of NPA-related violence (Model 1). This effect 
appears to be driven by the presence of unpermitted mines; operational permitted mines 
showed a negative, though statistically insignificant, relationship with NPA-related 
violence, while the presence of a proposed mine had a positive, but statistically 
insignificant, effect (Model 2). When the intervening variables are included in the 
regression equation, however, none of the mining indicator variables are significant 
predictors of NPA violence (Model 3). The apparent multicollinearity between the 
independent and intervening variables may suggest that mining contributes to violence 
indirectly, by an intermediate effect on one or more of the intervening variables, a 




Table 3.1 Relationship between mining and NPA violence. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Dependent variable NPA terrorist attack NPA terrorist attack NPA terrorist attack 
All mines 0.1640**        (0.0774)   
Unpermitted mines  0.2096**        (0.1030) 0.1889              (0.1209) 
Permitted mines  -0.2643            (0.1984) -0.1637            (0.2012) 
Proposed mines  0.1606              (0.1001) 0.0932              (0.1033) 
Nighttime lights -0.1952***    (0.0611) -0.1805***    (0.0591) -0.1374**       (0.0606) 
Population 0.2215***      (0.0508) 0.2044***      (0.0491) 0.2639***      (0.0592)  
Population density -0.6756**       (0.2634) -0.6094**       (0.2647) -0.4751            (0.2940) 
High slope area 0.2385*           (0.1312) 0.2524*           (0.1385) 0.3059              (0.1436) 
Manila indicator 0.3715              (0.7594) 0.3058              (0.7530) 0.5762              (0.8357) 
Moro indicator -0.2388**       (0.1040) -0.2321**       (0.0999) -0.2322***    (0.1032) 
State capacity   -0.5586**       (0.2553) 
Spatial inequality   0.0845**        (0.0417) 
Forest cover loss   0.0244**        (0.0100) 
Spatial lag 0.7660***      (0.0237) 0.7640***      (0.0234) 0.7511***      (0.0261) 
Constant -0.3310***    (0.0696) -0.3370***    (0.0683) -0.5440***    (0.0975) 
* p < 0.10    ** p < 0.05     *** p < 0.01 Standard errors in parentheses 
Among the covariates, total population was highly significant and positive, 
consistent with findings in the cross-country literature that larger populations are more 
likely to experience civil violence (Ross 2004). Population density, however, was 
significant and negative, suggesting that, controlling for total population, urban areas 
were less likely to experience an NPA-related attack than rural areas. The nighttime lights 
variable, included as a proxy measure of income per capita, was significant and negative, 
suggesting that NPA activity was most likely in poorer communities. These findings are 
consistent with past studies of NPA behavior and the NPA’s ideological position, which 
emphasizes rural-based insurgency as the primary agent of political change. The Moro 
territory indicator was negative, suggesting that the presence of Moro separatists in this 




insignificant and the extent of high slope area, although positive, was significant only at 
the ten percent level or below. 
To assess the multicollinearity between the independent and intervening variables, 
sensitivity analysis was conducted by introducing each intervening variable 
independently (Table 3.2). The inclusion of the state capacity index did not affect the 
significance of the unpermitted mining variable (Model 4); however, including either 
spatial inequality (Model 5) or forest cover loss (Model 6) substantially attenuated the 
explanatory power of unpermitted mining as a predictor of NPA-related violence, which 
may suggest that unpermitted mining affects NPA behavior through an intermediate 
effect on one or both of those latter variables. 
Table 3.2 Relationship between intervening variables and NPA violence. 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Dependent variable NPA terrorist attack NPA terrorist attack NPA terrorist attack 
Unpermitted mines 0.2210**        (0.1077) 0.1890*           (0.1043) 0.2078*           (0.1104) 
Permitted mines -0.2037            (0.2018) -0.2370            (0.2017) -0.2531            (0.2055) 
Proposed mines 0.1394              (0.1100) 0.1317              (0.1026) 0.1196              (0.1087) 
Nighttime lights -0.1661***    (0.0590) -0.1645***    (0.0603) -0.1673***    (0.0628) 
Population 0.2464***      (0.0548) 0.2133***      (0.0524) 0.2130***      (0.0513) 
Population density -0.5082*         (0.2654) -0.7206**       (0.2811) -0.6184**       (0.2653) 
High slope area 0.2630*           (0.1363) 0.2789**        (0.1351) 0.2749**        (0.1341) 
Manila indicator 0.6473              (0.8138) 0.5394              (0.7908) 0.3723              (0.7922) 
Moro indicator -0.2294**       (0.0958) -0.2261**       (0.1070) -0.2300**       (0.1024) 
State capacity -0.4519**       (0.2186)   
Spatial inequality  0.1004**        (0.0422)  
Forest cover loss   0.0252**        (0.0104) 
Spatial lag 0.7648***      (0.0231) 0.7657***      (0.0237) 0.7613***      (0.0243) 
Constant -0.3500***    (0.0726) -0.4571***    (0.0900) -0.4190***    (0.0774) 
* p < 0.10    ** p < 0.05     *** p < 0.01 Standard errors in parentheses 
To investigate the potential endogeneity of the intervening variables, a series of 




spatial inequality are the dependent variables (Table 3.3). Unpermitted mining was found 
to be a significant regressor of both spatial inequality (Model 8) and forest cover loss 
(Model 9). State capacity, however, was uncorrelated with any of the mining variables 
(Model 7).  
Table 3.3 Effect of mining on intervening variables. 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Dependent variable State capacity Spatial inequality Forest cover loss 
Unpermitted mines 0.0116              (0.0116) 0.1672***      (0.0592) 0.9073**        (0.3716) 
Permitted mines -0.0241            (0.0274) -0.0883            (0.1037) -0.2483            (0.6505) 
Proposed mines -0.0086            (0.0164) 0.0972              (0.0619) 0.4522              (0.3884) 
Nighttime lights 0.0152*           (0.0092) -0.1032***    (0.0343) 0.0139              (0.2150) 
Population 0.0812***      (0.0055) 0.0725***      (0.0207) 0.1860              (0.1301) 
Population density 0.1689***      (0.0348) 0.2959**        (0.1243) -0.2766            (0.7784) 
High slope area 0.0025              (0.0230) -0.1135            (0.0871) -3.850***       (0.5596) 
Manila indicator -0.0207            (0.1013) -1.075***       (0.3819) -1.387                 (2.397) 
Moro indicator -0.0002            (0.0178) -0.1136*         (0.0675) -0.7473*         (0.4238) 
Spatial lag 0.4688***      (0.0280) 0.4154***      (0.0350) 0.6877***      (0.0223) 
Constant -0.0318***    (0.0116) 0.6472***      (0.0590) 2.698***        (0.3206) 
* p < 0.10    ** p < 0.05     *** p < 0.01 Standard errors in parentheses 
These results may be suggestive of a risk mechanism as predicted by H2a and 
H2b, whereby unpermitted mining increases environmental degradation and spatial 
inequality, which, in turn, increase the probability of experiencing NPA-related violence. 
Due to the potential for omitted variable bias, endogeneity, and multicollinearity in these 
regression models, however, definitive conclusions regarding the validity of the proposed 
causal chains cannot be drawn therefrom. As an alternative approach, a two-stage spatial 
probit regression analysis was conducted, whereby each intervening variable was 
instrumented with respect to the presence of the three classes of mining activity (Table 
3.4). A Wald test of exogeneity was conducted for each of the two-stage models to assess 





Table 3.4 Two-stage regression analysis of mining and NPA violence 
 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Dependent variables NPA terrorist attack NPA terrorist attack NPA terrorist attack 
Endogenous variable State capacity Spatial inequality Forest cover loss 
First stage regression    
Intercept -0.0380**    (0.0161) 0.6389***    (0.0673) 2.827***      (0.3875) 
Unpermitted mines 0.0091          (0.0157) 0.1712***    (0.0594) 0.8839**      (0.3718) 
Permitted mines -0.0222          (0.0274) -0.0899          (0.1037) -0.2510          (0.6490) 
Proposed mines -0.0094          (0.0164) 0.0952            (0.0621) 0.4794            (0.3886) 
Nighttime lights 0.0132            (0.0093) -0.0957***  (0.0349) -0.0634          (0.2194) 
Population 0.0812***    (0.0055) 0.0791***    (0.0220) 0.0610            (0.1375) 
Population density 0.1667***    (0.0351) 0.3419***    (0.1293) -0.9040          (0.8100) 
High slope area 0.0155            (0.0237) -0.1195          (0.0899) -3.866***    (0.5584) 
Moro indicator -0.0005          (0.0185) -0.1053          (0.0699) -0.7692*       (0.4371) 
Manila indicator 0.0350            (0.1015) -1.061***    (0.3839) -1.964               (2.405) 
State capacity  -0.0915          (0.0866) 1.623***      (0.5410) 
Spatial inequality -0.0034          (0.0062)  -0.0344          (0.1481) 
Forest cover loss 0.0020**      (0.0008) -0.0010          (0.0031)  
Spatial lag -0.0172          (0.0207) 0.0523            (0.0783) -0.1514          (0.4900) 
Second stage regression    
Intercept -0.5721***  (0.1038) -2.131***    (0.4360) -0.9900***  (0.2633) 
Nighttime lights -0.1025          (0.0661) 0.0121            (0.0733) -0.1525***  (0.0569) 
Population 0.3701***    (0.0953) 0.0956            (0.0695) 0.2587***    (0.0578) 
Population density -0.2565          (0.3478) -1.154***    (0.3280) -0.5206*       (0.2995) 
High slope area 0.3706**      (0.1452) 0.5858***    (0.1614) 0.8617***    (0.2884) 
Moro indicator -0.2232**    (0.1073) 0.0316            (0.1241) -0.0982          (0.1135) 
Manila indicator 1.027              (0.8233) 2.537***      (0.9361) 0.9181            (0.8622) 
State capacity -1.517**       (0.7366) -0.3558          (0.2381) -0.6698**    (0.2651) 
Spatial inequality 0.0824**      (0.0419) 1.493***      (0.3673) 0.1058**      (0.0430) 
Forest cover loss 0.0138**      (0.0056) 0.0089*         (0.0049) 0.0638**      (0.0305) 
Spatial lag 0.7568***    (0.0256) 0.7392***    (0.0267) 0.7627***    (0.0240) 
Chi statistic 0.780 5.16** 5.04** 
* p < 0.10    ** p < 0.05     *** p < 0.01 Standard errors in parentheses 
Results of this analysis were again supportive of the risk mechanism. Among the 
three intervening variables, only the spatial inequality and the forest loss variables were 
found to be endogenous to the equation, based on the results of the Wald test. 




and forest cover loss (Model 12) in the first stage of the two-stage regressions, while the 
predicted values of spatial inequality and forest cover loss variables were significant in 
the second stage. Interestingly, proposed mining was also a significant predictor of forest 
cover loss in the first stage regression, which may indicate that the process of opening an 
area for mining can contribute to environmental scarcity even before mining activities 
begin, through, for example, the construction of access roads or other infrastructure. 
Taken together, the empirical results most strongly support a conflict risk 
mechanism linking natural resources and civil conflict. Consistent with H2a, the results 
of the two-stage regression analysis suggest that the presence of unpermitted and 
proposed mines contribute to environmental scarcity, which, in turn, increases the 
probability of experiencing NPA violence. As predicted by H2b, unpermitted mining is 
strongly correlated with both spatial economic inequality, a proxy for relative 
deprivation, and the probability of experiencing an NPA-related terrorist attack. There is 
also strong evidence that spatial inequality is endogenous with respect to unpermitted 
mining as a predictor of NPA violence. By contrast, no evidence was found for a conflict 
vulnerability mechanism related to localized manifestations of the resource curse as 
predicted by H1. Although the state capacity index was consistently found to be a 
significant predictor of the probability of NPA-related violence, the presence of mining in 
a municipality or city does not appear to correlate with that measure. The two-stage 
regression corresponding to H1 was also not found to offer additional explanatory power 





3.3.3 Linking Mining and Conflict in the Philippines 
The results of this study constitute empirical evidence of the widely observed but 
empirically underspecified relationship between natural resource extraction and civil 
violence in the Philippines. They also lend insight into the causal mechanisms linking 
mining and conflict and the role of regulatory context and of material conditions for 
determining the extent to which extractive industry contributes to civil violence and the 
paths by which it does so. In terms of the hypotheses specified above, the weight of the 
evidence is in favor of H2a and H2b, which correspond to the scarcity and relative 
deprivation interpretations of the conflict risk mechanism, respectively. H1 is 
unsupported by the results, although this does not preclude a resource curse effect at 
scales unobservable by the methods applied herein. Similarly, although the results are not 
supportive of H3, the lack of any ancillary contribution of mining to conflict risk beyond 
its effects on spatial economic inequality and environmental scarcity does not necessarily 
disprove the role of the opportunity mechanism in the Philippines. In fact, the lack of a 
statistically significant relationship between permitted mines and terrorist attacks may 
actually be an artifact of mining companies habitually buying off NPA aggression in the 
form of revolutionary taxes. What is clear, however, is that opportunity alone is not 
sufficient to explain the spatial relationship between violence and extractive industry in 
the ongoing conflict between the NPA and the Philippine state. 
The apparent paradox of the NPA’s vocal opposition to mining—which the 
results suggest is also a driving factor of NPA actions—and its exploitation of mining 
rents can perhaps be best understood by considering the constraints facing insurgent 




armed groups must raise funds to purchase weapons, vehicles, and food and supplies for 
fighters. The second involves the level of support among the populace for the group’s 
activities; to remain active, a non-state actor must develop a message that resonates with 
the population of the territory in which it operates. This is essential not only to maintain a 
continuing supply of recruits, but also to ensure that locals provide support in the form of 
material contributions or information, as well as withhold information about rebel 
activities from the national government and its allies. In some circumstances, a group 
may become powerful enough within a territory that it can rely on force to ensure the 
cooperation of civilians; until and unless it can reach this stage of control, however, it 
must continue to align its messaging and activities with the grievances of the population 
with whom it interacts (Kalyvas 2000). 
With regard to both sets of constraints, the NPA today differs notably from the 
Moro separatist insurgency and from its own previous incarnations. Whereas groups like 
Abu Sayyaf and the BILF receive financial support from external actors—namely 
international Islamic extremist organizations—the support received by the NPA from 
international groups has diminished in recent decades, leaving the NPA increasingly 
reliant on its extortion activities to fund its operations. The Moro separatist groups also 
exert more complete political control over the areas in which they operate, relative to the 
NPA; in those regions, the separatists can rely upon a shared ethnic heritage with the 
Moros of Mindanao that distinguishes them and the local population from the Philippines 
more generally. By contrast, the NPA is active throughout the country and is made up of 
members of many distinct ethnic groups; their appeal is ideological, rather than cultural, 




(Santos 2010). The NPA’s longevity can be largely explained, therefore, by its ability to 
remain politically relevant—although its core ideology has remained generally constant 
with respect to antipathy toward capitalism, corrupt governance, and foreign 
‘imperialists’ and ‘neocolonialists,’ the shifting focus in the NPA’s propaganda from the 
hacienda system to extractive industry mirrors the evolving concerns of many Filipinos. 
For the NPA, the controversy surrounding mining provides an important means 
for addressing both material and political constraints. Mines represent not only a ready 
source of extortion money, but also an opportunity to signal to local communities 
affected negatively by extractive industry that the NPA is willing and able to protect their 
interests. The importance of civilian support suggests, however, that not all mine sites are 
equally politically valuable targets from the NPA’s perspective. Where mining is 
conducted in a context of environmental marginalization and the inequitable distribution 
of costs and benefits, it is most likely to exacerbate social grievances and it is in such 
communities that the NPA’s revolutionary narrative, emphasizing resistance of the 
politically and economically disenfranchised against an entrenched system of crony 
capitalism and foreign ‘plunderers,’ is most likely to resonate and that its targeted 
application of violence against politicians and businesses is most likely to find support. 
As Holden & Jacobson (2007) observe, “the NPA use the rhetoric of ideology 
(communism) to galvanize their members, and the MILF use the rhetoric of theology 
(Islam) to galvanize their members, but in both cases, it is ultimately the poverty and 





As Kalyvas (2000) writes, “whereas conventional wars neatly divide space into 
two well defined and clearly demarcated spaces, irregular wars show up as messy 
patchworks; the more detailed the map, the messier it looks” (98). Explaining local 
variation in intensity of violence is an essential step in understanding the dynamics of 
civil conflicts—how they develop, spread, and persist—and for identifying potential 
interventions to mitigate them; contributing to that effort, the analysis presented above 
offers some insights into the dynamics of the NPA insurgency in the Philippines. 
Supporting a conflict risk mechanism, whereby environmental scarcity and relative 
deprivation related to the effects of mining creates opportunities for the NPA to engage 
with civilians around local grievances, the findings are broadly consistent with the 
observations of Mediansky (1986), Caouette (2015), Holden (2013b, 2014), Holden & 
Jacobson (2007), and other observers of the NPA insurgency who have noted the 
organization’s ability to adapt to changing circumstances and public attitudes in order to 
remain politically relevant in Philippine society. Although the effect of mining on NPA 
violence appears to be adequately explained by this risk mechanism—that is, there is no 
additional impact of mining activity on conflict when the intervening variables of spatial 
economic inequality and forest cover loss are controlled for—the dynamics of the NPA’s 
funding stream is such that no definitive conclusions regarding the conflict resources 
mechanism can be drawn from this finding. It is reasonable to conclude, however, that 
the role of mining as a source of financing alone does not fully explain local variations in 
NPA activity; also important is the role of mining as a source of grievances among 




survivability of the NPA relies in large part on its ability to maintain a sustainable base of 
support among the civilian population, on whom the group is dependent for recruits, 
funding, information, and cooperation in the form of nonreporting of NPA activities to 
government forces (see Weinstein 2007, Kalyvas 2000, Caouette 2015). 
The potential policy implications of these findings are twofold. First, they suggest 
that dismissing the NPA, as the Philippine government has repeatedly done, as ‘bandits’ 
and ‘criminals’ who have abandoned ideology in favor of racketeering and other 
moneymaking schemes (Lagsa 2015) is to overlook the environmental and 
socioeconomic implications of resource extraction to which the NPA has established 
itself as a focal point of opposition. By responding to threats against mines with increased 
militarization and the targeting of anti-mining activists, mining companies and the 
government run the risk of further alienating negatively affected populations and thereby 
validating the NPA’s framing narrative in the eyes of local people. Secondly, the results 
provide some evidence that the process by which mining in the Philippines is 
implemented is important in shaping its relationship with civil conflict. That only 
unpermitted mines exhibited a consistently significant relationship with NPA terrorism 
may indicate that the permitting process itself can play a role in alleviating grievances 
and preventing resource-related violence. Although such is the implied objective of the 
informed consent, public engagement, and revenue-sharing requirements of the project 
review and approvals process in the Philippines and elsewhere, the role of those policies 
in the context of the relationship between extractive industry and civil violence has been 




To the extent that the set of objectives, constraints, and opportunities faced by the 
NPA are not guaranteed to translate to other conflicts, these conclusions regarding the 
role of natural resources may not be readily generalizable. The approach adopted in this 
study, however, of leveraging the expanding universe of subnational events data and of 
methods for quantifying socioeconomic variables at previously unavailable levels of 
spatial precision does lend itself to replication in other contexts. A future research agenda 
is therefore recommended to examine the role of natural resources in civil conflicts at 





4. Black Sand and the Red Court: ‘Local’ Analysis of Natural 
Resources and Civil Conflict 
 
On the morning of April 21, 2014, the municipal employees of Gonzaga, a rural 
town in the northern Philippines, gathered for the weekly address of Mayor Carlito 
Pentecostes, Jr. on the steps in front of the newly remodeled municipal hall. As he 
prepared to begin his speech, several men dressed in military uniforms approached the 
mayor, greeted him cordially, and shot him fatally in the head and chest. In the days that 
followed, the NPA claimed responsibility for the killing, announcing via press releases 
that Pentecostes had been sentenced under Article IV of the CPP’s Guide to the People’s 
Court, which imposes the death penalty for “espionage, betrayal and infidelity, killings, 
arson, rape, embezzlement, violence, and theft of buffalo or other animals.” The mayor’s 
crime, according to the NPA, lay in his support of and profiting from magnetite mining in 
coastal areas of Gonzaga, an activity that, the insurgents alleged, benefited wealthy 
businesspeople and foreign investors at the expense of the natural environment and the 
wellbeing of the local community (De Jesus 2014; Gascon 2014). 
The Pentecostes assassination, marking the culmination of a debate over mining 
in Gonzaga that had been evolving and intensifying for years, is one of numerous 
incidents of civil violence in the Philippines, and throughout the developing world, in 
which access to, control over, and extraction of natural resources have been implicated as 
facilitating factors. Although, as discussed in the preceding chapters, the apparent 
relationship between resources and armed conflict has been widely studied (see Ross 




communities affected by resource conflict have often been overlooked (Barter 2014; 
Sorens 2011); at the same time, the broad literature examining resistance movements in 
opposition to extractive industry has insufficiently engaged with theories of violence (but 
see Conde 2017; Peluso & Watts 2001; Conde & Le Billon 2017). Emphasizing the 
development of alliances between militants and civilians, therefore, this chapter presents 
a case study of mining in Gonzaga, with the objective of mapping the inter-scalar 
processes by which local disputes over natural resources can become entangled with 
broader patterns of civil conflict. 
4.1 Background 
Unlike the preceding chapters, the current study relies on analysis of qualitative 
data, analyzed through the broad lens of political ecology, within which framework 
stakeholders are understood not solely in terms of economic rationality, but as social 
actors who “interpret and reflect on what happens around them and use their knowledge 
and capabilities to respond to and navigate the conditions of war” (Van Leeuwen & Van 
der Haar 2016, 95). In the case of magnetite—known locally as ‘black sand’—mining in 
Gonzaga, this approach reveals connections between natural resources and civil violence 
along multiple dimensions. By examining those linkages in the context of the scalar 
relationships in which they are embedded, generalizable lessons regarding the role of 
extractive industry in civil conflict are apparent; in particular, I will argue that, owing to 
its position as a node of overlapping scalar relationships, natural resource exploitation 
creates potentially unique opportunities for political actors to renegotiate scalar 




In addition to examining the applicability of the vulnerability, risk, and 
opportunity mechanisms in the conflict over black sand mining in Gonzaga, therefore, the 
present chapter also engages directly with the political ecology of scale literature 
summarized in Chapter 1. As Green (2016) writes, “scale is recognised as potentially 
making an important contribution to political ecology by contributing to analyses that 
weave together socio-ecological processes and by placing power at the centre of the 
dynamics shaping access to and control over environmental resources and space” (89). 
Political ecology, in turn, offers important lessons for understanding scalar relations in 
resource-related conflicts, among the foremost of which is the recognition that, although 
the scales at which natural resources are politically and economically relevant can be 
discursively reshaped, the scales of the biophysical processes that produce resources are 
not infinitely malleable (Bakker & Bridge 2006; Görg 2007; Bolin et al. 2008; Bulkeley 
2005). 
Of particular relevance to the present chapter is Smith’s (1992) concept of ‘scale 
jumping,’ described by Green (2016) as the “transformation of scalar formations through 
actors being able to use their social power to position themselves within another scale, 
thus resisting hegemonic structures” (94). More broadly, scale jumping can be thought of 
as a form of scale production whereby the relationship between actors and processes is 
intentionally reconfigured to achieve political aims; as Sayre (2005) writes, therefore, 
“what is ‘jumped,’ then is not scales but levels, with the result that a process is rescaled” 
(285, italics in original). For example, Haarstad & Fløysand (2007) describe how anti-
mining activists in Peru rescaled their oppositional narrative by networking with 




how neighborhood-based water committees in Cochabamba, Bolivia used relationships 
with government agencies and NGOs to articulate a community-centered alternative to 
large-scale state-driven water supply. In the case of black sand mining in Gonzaga, 
various actors, including politicians, anti-mining activists, and the NPA, attempted, with 
varying degrees of success, to rescale political processes to achieve their desired ends. 
Supporters of the projects were effective, through the distribution of bribes and political 
patronage, in coopting the hierarchical regulatory structure governing resource extraction; 
opponents, by contrast, largely failed to reframe black sand mining as an issue of 
supralocal relevance. While the concept of scale jumping has most often been discussed 
in the context of ‘upscaling’, whereby local actors attempt to bypass the extant scalar 
hierarchy by forming relationships with national or global networks (Marston 2014; 
Green 2016; Hoogesteger & Verzijl 2015; Vela-Almeida et al. 2018), the present case 
study also demonstrates that, in the case of Gonzaga, the NPA engaged in a deliberate 
process of ‘downscaling’ in order to insinuate itself as a locally relevant actor. 
4.2 Methods 
4.2.1 Data Sources 
The main data source for this study was a series of twelve in-depth, semi-
structured interviews with stakeholders having firsthand knowledge of the mining 
industry in Gonzaga and the ensuing conflict. Participants included activists, 
businesspeople, government employees, elected officials, religious leaders, and 
academics; some had supported mining projects in Gonzaga, while others had been active 




some informants have had association with the group in the past. To protect participant 
confidentiality, given the politically sensitive nature of the research topic, all quotations 
from interview participants in this chapter have been translated by the author and 
redacted to remove any information that could be used to identify the source. Having 
spent several years living and working in Gonzaga, I am well known in the community; it 
should be noted, therefore, that I had preexisting personal or professional relationships 
with some participants. In general, those individuals with whom I had established 
relationships were more likely to disclose detailed information about the processes and 
micro-politics that created the conditions for conflict. 
In addition to key informant interviews, I rely also on the results of an interview 
survey of more than 300 farmers and fisherfolk conducted in 2009 by the local 
government of Gonzaga, as well as posts on social media by activists and agencies, media 
reports, speeches by government officials, and propaganda published by the NPA and the 
CPP, especially the NPA newsletter Ang Bayan. Although the main fieldwork for this 
project took place from June to August 2016, my understanding of the events preceding 
and during the mining conflict is also informed by my own experience living in Gonzaga 
from 2008 through 2011, and during visits to the town in 2014, 2015, 2017, and 2018. 
4.2.2 Study Site 
Gonzaga is a first-class municipality located in northeastern Luzon in the 
Province of Cagayan, and is approximately 56,743 hectares in area, the majority of which 
is undeveloped upland forest (see Figure 4.1). The municipality has a population of 
approximately 38,900 individuals, roughly one-third of whom reside in the urbanized 




town center or Poblacion. A predominantly agricultural community, Gonzaga is heavily 
reliant on irrigated rice farming, although marine fishing is also an important industry in 
the coastal villages. Residential and business development is generally confined to the 
lowland plain between the Sierra Madre mountain range to the southeast and the Babuyan 
Channel to the northwest and is most heavily concentrated along the national highway 
that bisects the municipality. Approximately 95 percent of the population are native 
speakers of Iluko (or Ilocano), and trace their descent to migrants who arrived from the 
Ilocos region in the nineteenth century; those settlers replaced the native Aeta (or Agta) 
tribespeople, a remnant of whom continue to practice a traditional hunter-gatherer and 
swidden agriculturist lifestyle in the mountains (Municipality of Gonzaga 2013). 
Resource extraction has been a source of conflict in Gonzaga for at least several 
decades. In the 1980s, logging in the uplands became a controversial local issue in which 
the NPA was known to be involved (see Vitug 1993). The more recent dispute over 
mining dates to 2008, when a Taiwanese-owned mining firm sought and obtained a 
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) permit to quarry sand and 
gravel from the Wangag River, which traces the boundary of the Poblacion. The permit’s 
issuance instigated a campaign of activism in opposition, involving lawsuits, rallies, 
petitions, and demonstrations. In response to litigation filed by the activist group Save the 
Wangag River Movement (SAWAREM), the DENR’s Mines and Geosciences Bureau 
(MGB) issued a ‘status quo’ order in 2010 to halt the implementation of the quarry, but 
development reportedly continued regardless. The conflict came to a head on the night of 




and drove it into the quarry site, where they proceeded to hogtie two security guards, 
commandeer their firearms, and set fire to mining equipment (Nueva 2010). 
The 2010 mayoral election in Gonzaga was seen by many locals as a referendum 
on the issue of mining in the municipality. The incumbent mayor, Rosendo Abad, had 
been an opponent of the Wangag River quarry, while his opponents, Pentecostes and 
former-mayor Epifanio Gaspar, were both vocal supporters of mining. Following his 
eventual victory, Pentecostes fast-tracked the approval of black sand mining projects in 
coastal barangays; by the end of 2010, permits had been issued for at least four Chinese- 
and Taiwanese-backed companies to mine magnetite, a number that would continue to 
grow over the next three years (Panelo 2016). Site visits and a review of satellite imagery 
confirmed the presence of mines at various times between 2010 and 2014 in eight coastal 
barangays, several of which were clearly located outside of the boundaries of any 
permitted mining area, in violation of Philippine environmental and mining laws.  
Tax revenue from the local mining industry was widely credited for bringing 
about positive changes in Gonzaga, including the remodeling of the municipal hall, the 
expansion of the public market, and the construction of new farm-to-market roads, 
projects for which the municipality received national news coverage (Lagasca 2013). By 
2013, the Pentecostes administration estimated that the town had earned some 300 
million pesos (around USD 6.5 million) in taxes from mining, more than triple the 
revenue from other local sources. Despite the good press, however, many community 
members, citing impacts to farmland and coastal ecosystems, remained critical of the 
projects and mobilized in opposition. One prominent activist leader, Esperlita “Perling” 




threaten activists; in response, Pentecostes sued Garcia for libel, leading to her arrest and 
detention in October 2012 (Rodriquez 2012). Running on a largely anti-mining platform, 
Garcia would go on to unsuccessfully challenge Pentecostes in his 2013 reelection 
campaign. 
The assassination of Pentecostes early in his second term was apparently well 
planned and precisely timed; the mayors’ private bodyguards were reportedly elsewhere 
when the gunfire erupted and the four policemen on the scene were quickly disarmed and 
restrained. Witnesses stated that the assailants, who may have numbered as many as 30, 
reassured onlookers, saying, in Iluko, “Awan ti rumamraman; ni mayor lang ti 
kasapulanmi [No one should intervene; we only want the mayor].” After the murder, they 
ransacked the municipal hall, making off with cell phones and computers, before 
commandeering several vehicles and fleeing into the mountains. Handfuls of leaflets 
were found scattered at the scene, that read, “Hustisya para iti kaaduan, dusaen dagiti 
utek ti dayuhan a minas iti Cagayan [Justice for all. Punish the brains of illegal mining 
by foreigners in Cagayan]” (De Jesus 2014); several days later, the NPA officially 
declared its involvement. In the aftermath, the black sand mining operations were 
discontinued, although proposals for several new projects, including off-shore magnetite 




Figure 4.1 Case study site. (a) Location of Gonzaga in the Philippines. (b) Land use in Gonzaga. (c) Location of black sand mining 
sites in Gonzaga. (d) Location of Wangag River gravel quarry in Gonzaga. Source: Compiled from Municipality of Gonzaga (2013).
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It is at this point that the narrative of the conflict over mining in Gonzaga, insofar 
as it can be gleaned from official and media reports, comes to an end; below, I examine 
the events as related to me by participants and witnesses. First, I discuss how the local 
manifestation of the resource curse in Gonzaga increased vulnerability to civil violence; 
next, I interrogate the role of grievances over the environmental and socioeconomic 
impacts of mining in exacerbating conflict risk; and, finally, I explain how the black sand 
mining issue in Gonzaga created opportunities for the NPA in the form of potential 
alliances with civilian networks. Throughout, I apply the concepts of scale and scale 
jumping to contextualize the agendas and actions of the political actors involved. 
4.3 Results and Discussion 
4.3.1 “Here in the Philippines, there is a price for everything” 
The conflict vulnerability mechanism links natural resources and civil conflict 
through extractive industry’s systemic effects on economies and institutions; engaging 
with the broader resource curse literature, it suggests that economic dependence on 
natural resources may lead to conflict by exposing an economy to price shocks and 
‘Dutch disease’ or by undermining state capacity by incentivizing rentierism and 
corruption (Le Billon 2012; Ross 2015). Although resource curse scholarship has 
traditionally focused on its implications at the state level, there has been increasing 
interest in its localized manifestations (see Kirsch 2014; Horowitz 2009; Knutsen et al. 
2017); contributing to that effort, this section contextualizes resource-related corruption 
in Gonzaga as an exercise in scale jumping, whereby resource governance was rescaled 




The issue of corruption is a constant theme of political discussions in Gonzaga 
and was by far the most commonly-cited grievance related to the mining issue; this is 
consistent with previous studies of Philippine political economy, which routinely identify 
corruption as a major constraint on development (Bello et al. 2005; Broad & Cavanagh 
1993). One of its most insidious forms, according to those interviewed, is the process of 
vote buying in local elections. Asked why Pentecostes won his 2013 reelection so 
decisively, despite vocal opposition to mining projects, for example, one informant 
claimed succinctly that he had “bought the people.” The same source, a former campaign 
worker, described the process by which votes are purchased: candidates allocate budgets, 
based on population, to barangay level committees, who then approach heads of 
households and offer cash “gifts,” which have reportedly ranged up to 5000 pesos 
(around USD 108) in recent mayoral elections. Refusing to accept money can be risky for 
voters because it signals that one does not support a certain candidate, but accepting it 
carries its own price; as one interview participant explained, “they [elected officials] have 
already paid you, so now you cannot make a claim on them for services.” Failure to 
deliver votes that have been purchased can, meanwhile, result in the withholding of 
budgetary funds from a barangay or other forms of retribution. Nor is vote buying the 
only means by which an election can be purchased; another informant described a 
meeting in which campaign staffers discussed whether it would be a better “investment” 
to purchase votes or to bribe election officials to disqualify their opponents. 
Through such means, politicians can rescale democratic processes by neutralizing 
both the political power of voters and the regulatory authority of national level election 




in part because public office is viewed as holding opportunities for future enrichment. 
Informants were universally agreed, for instance, that Pentecostes personally profited 
from black sand mining, through direct payoffs from the companies involved, by 
skimming from tax revenues, or some combination thereof. Pentecostes also allegedly 
adopted the role of “fixer” or go-between in the relationship between mining companies 
and regulators at all levels; in that position, he was purportedly well placed to extract 
substantial financial benefits for himself and his associates. Comparing Pentecostes’ 
embezzlement to the mining revenue spent on local development projects, one barangay 
official declared that “he was very good in making propaganda. Without anyone knowing 
it, the projects that you see are really a very small amount compared to the bigger amount 
that somebody could have already obtained from that black sand mining.” 
Informants were similarly in consensus that the approval process for black sand 
mining in Gonzaga was also tainted by bribery, orchestrated by the mayoral 
administration, of public officials, especially those responsible for overseeing 
environmental review of the projects. Under Presidential Decree No. 1151 and related 
environmental laws, mines in the Philippines are automatically subject to an EIA process 
that involves actors at multiple levels (see Bravante & Holden 2009), including the 
DENR’s Environmental Management Bureau (EMB), which reviews and approves EIA 
documentation and the MGB, which licenses and monitors mining operations. Provincial 
governors also exert substantial political influence on the mining industry through their 
economic regulatory authority, while municipal governments oversee development and 
natural resource management planning, as well as business permitting and tax collection. 




level government, requires that members of a community affected by mining projects be 
consulted at all stages of planning and implementation. In Gonzaga, however, there is 
substantial evidence that this EIA process was repeatedly ignored. Numerous interview 
participants informed me that no meaningful environmental review was conducted for 
either the Wangag River quarry or the black sand mining projects and, despite a thorough 
review of records at the municipal hall and at the EMB headquarters in Quezon City, I 
was unable to locate any EIA documentation related to those projects or individuals with 
knowledge of their existence.  
Nevertheless, clearances were issued by the DENR to several mining firms in 
Gonzaga during the early days of the Pentecostes administration, certifying compliance 
with EIA procedures; asked about this discrepancy, one local government employee told 
me, “our assumption was that it was because of money. They [the DENR] were bribed. 
They were paid.” Although the institutional failings of the EIA system in the Philippines 
have been documented elsewhere (see Bravante & Holden 2009; Ingelson et al. 2009), 
the contribution of corruption has not been widely investigated; interview participants, 
however, expressed little surprise that this process would be tainted by the same issue as 
most other interactions with the government, from tax collection to the issuance of 
drivers’ licenses. As another local government employee explained: 
It is all coordinated. Coordinated with the DENR, with the barangay 
officials, with provincial officers. Even if it’s illegal, if there is money 
involved, you can do it in the Philippines. That is how it is here. Look at the 
director [of the provincial DENR]. He has a beautiful car. How much did 
that cost? It’s the same for all of the positions. Even in the local government, 
even in the DENR. Because the politicians are directing it. Who appoints 




influence all the agencies in the Philippines…That is how politics works 
here. 
Summarizing the view of many participants, another informant stated simply, 
“Here in the Philippines, there is a price for everything.” 
Ideally, public outreach by mining companies under informed consent provides a 
forum in which affected individuals can raise concerns and air grievances. By creating 
incentives for extractive industry to seek community input and approval, EIA policies can 
lead to productive outcomes in which locals are engaged in planning, implementation, 
monitoring, and remediation (see Kirsch 2014; Bravante & Holden 2009). The effect of 
corruption is to short-circuit these incentive structures, leading companies to focus on 
supplying bribes at the expense of hearing and addressing community concerns. One 
foreign businessperson interviewed for this study, for example, described meetings of 
mining company representatives in which the payment of bribes in exchange for 
approvals was discussed in the context of regular business costs, with the understanding 
that the purchased officials would be responsible for dealing with community relations. 
These implications were not lost upon anti-mining activists, one of whom explained, “at 
first, I thought I really didn’t like the Chinese because they are destroying the 
environment. But what I’ve learned is that it is the politicians who are destroying it.” 
Another admitted, “I wanted to kill people during those times—the people who initiated 
[the project] and who helped those Chinese people to acquire permits to quarry.” 
The targeted application of bribes, payoffs, and patronage during the black sand 
mining controversy can be interpreted as an exercise in scale jumping that resulted in the 
reconfiguration of scalar relations in the regulatory sphere. By buying off provincial and 




subverted, such that political control of mining projects became rescaled to center on the 
municipal level, with the mayor widely seen as the foremost actor. Through such 
maneuverings, local politicians, who often hold simultaneous roles as businessmen and 
land owners, can become, in Allen’s (2017) words, ‘masters of scale,’ whose 
“simultaneous nesting at multiple scales…makes them critical agents in the brokering of 
the ‘scalar fixes’ that are required, alongside territorial fixes, for large-scale resource 
extraction to occur” (86). In Gonzaga, in addition to the upscaling of mayoral power, 
downscaling was also implemented through the distribution of patronage to barangay 
officials in coastal areas. Because it is at this level that the processes of public 
consultation within the EIA framework are implemented, the supersession of the 
authority of the barangays restricted the political voice of households and individuals 
and, as discussed in the following section, undermined efforts at mobilization against 
mining projects by their opponents. 
4.3.2 Grievances and Mobilization 
Through the conflict risk mechanism, grievances related to the control of 
resources or the impacts of their extraction provide a rationale for engaging in violent 
action and become focal points around which belligerents rally (Le Billon 2012); 
especially where control over and use of resources are contested between ‘locals’ and 
‘outsiders,’ such grievances can “burrow into the seams of social identity, power 
networks, belief systems and other tightly woven and partly submerged realms of social 
life” (Suryanata & Umemoto 2005, 751) to produce or exacerbate social cleavages that 
define broader patterns of conflict (Le Billon 2001b). In Gonzaga, the lack of meaningful 




projected their own understandings of mining’s environmental impacts, socio-economic 
implications, and interactions with Gonzaganian identity, often accompanied by calls, 
explicit or implied, to action. For its part, the NPA denounced mining companies in 
unforgiving terms, accusing them of “slowly killing entire peasant and fisherfolk 
communities because of the destruction wrought by the mining activities on the uplands, 
farms and fishing grounds from which the masses derive their livelihoods” and having 
“unbridledly stolen the province’s mineral wealth to the detriment of the environment” 
(Ang Bayan 2014, 5). Supporters, by contrast, described mining as an environmentally 
benign path to economic development. Pentecostes, in a 2013 interview, claimed that 
“We see to it that there is a balance between sustainable utilization of our resources and 
economic prosperity…From a sleepy town, Gonzaga…is now one of the fastest 
economically growing municipalities in the province. This is because we are utilizing our 
natural resources wisely for the benefit of our constituents” (qtd. in Lagasca 2013). 
Most community members consulted for this study adopted positions between 
those extremes. While recognizing the positive implications of mining rents for local 
development, interview and survey participants raised such potential environmental 
concerns as land subsidence, soil erosion, intrusion of salt water into rice paddies, 
sedimentation of coral reefs, and potential interactions with existing natural hazards. One 
informant, a local business owner, for example, complained, “Before, this was a very 
natural place, but now you can see, mostly in parts of the seashore, it’s no good already. 
In the place they are mining, no plants can survive...and what if we have some natural 
problem, like a typhoon or something? Maybe this town will be easily damaged. Maybe, 




will easily collapse.” There is emerging evidence that these fears were well founded. 
Recent remote sensing analysis by Chaussard & Kerosky (2016) concluded that 
magnetite mining in northern Luzon is indeed linked to greater risk of land subsidence; in 
an extreme case, residents of Barangay Caroan, which is located largely on a sandbar, 
have publicly blamed black sand mining for exacerbating subsidence and erosion that 
have resulted in the submergence of large areas of the village (Panelo 2016). 
Many of the grievances related to mining in Gonzaga stem from what interview 
participants and survey respondents felt to be an incompatibility between a rural, agrarian 
lifestyle and an extractive economy represented by the mining industry. Gonzaganians 
largely identify as farmers and fisherfolk, exhibiting pride in a cultural heritage that 
emphasizes stewardship of the natural environment. Exemplifying this theme, the official 
town hymn, which is sung at all major public gatherings, reads, in part, “Nabaknang a 
kataltalonan, nalitnaw a karkarayan, nalangto a kabakiran. Mangpabaknang ti 
dulang....Ilokano nga appomi ita sidongmo naitukit kannawidanmi napateg [Fertile 
farms, our pristine river, lush wilderness. These are our wealth...Our Ilocano 
grandchildren instinctively know to defend our precious heritage].” A barangay official 
explained to me that mining was a particularly contentious issue in Gonzaga because “in 
other municipalities, they don’t have the natural beauty that we have here in Gonzaga. 




Figure 4.2 Black sand mining in Gonzaga, Cagayan. (a) Shoreline in Barangay Batangan prior to start of black sand mining 
operations. (b) Shorelie in Barangay Batangan during black sand mining operations. (c) Black sand mine site in Barangay 








Many participants also expressed a sense of relative deprivation related to the 
perceived inequitable distribution of the observed costs and benefits of mining in 
Gonzaga. Opponents dismissed many of the projects funded by mining revenues as 
cosmetic and questioned why public moneys were applied toward the beautification of 
the town center, rather than investing in livelihood and infrastructure projects in remote 
barangays. Many also alleged that the mayor had enriched himself and his cronies at the 
expense of those farmers and fisherfolk whose property and incomes were negatively 
affected by mining. There is no doubt that, by the time of his killing, Pentecostes had 
become a wealthy man, constructing a massive new house in the Poblacion, purchasing 
several new private vehicles, and funding other extravagances that, in a community 
where many families lack safe drinking water and other necessities, were commented on 
derisively by interview participants.  
Inequality was expressed spatially in the creation of landscapes of exclusion; 
early in Pentecostes’ tenure, for example, a municipality-owned park on the Wangag 
River, which had long served as an open recreational site, was redeveloped using mining 
tax revenue as a luxury resort beyond the financial means of most residents to visit. The 
mines themselves, both at the Wangag River and at black sand deposits, also underwent 
landscaping processes of conspicuous militarization—barbed wire fences and guard 
houses were constructed around the sites, which were patrolled by armed guards 
imported from outside of the municipality (see Figure 4.3). Insomuch as “landscape and 
landscaping are an expression of power, of material and symbolic capital” (Gold & Revill 
2000, 11), such developments express, through the transformation of social space, the 




The responses of activists to these grievances can be understood as an attempt to 
renegotiate scalar relations to challenge the rising hegemony of the pro-mining camp by 
framing the localized mining issue as one of municipality-wide importance. During the 
Wangag River quarry controversy, leaders of SAWAREM capitalized on the symbolic 
value of the river to organize resistance efforts involving disparate groups from 
throughout the municipality. One organizer explained: 
What we did from the beginning—so that the farmers could really 
appreciate what they were doing—is build bahay kubo [nepa huts] along the 
river. Each farmers’ organization had its own kubo…They made a schedule 
to guard the river. So, they really learned to value and love the river. That’s 
the main purpose. That’s why we asked them to put their own kubo. 
The activists eventually established a near permanent presence along the quarry’s 
access road, which became lined with signage emblazoned with environmentalist slogans. 
The space would become the stage for several tense standoffs between SAWAREM 
activists and quarry personnel that, in turn, served to further unite the broader community 
in opposition to the project. The Wangag River, already materially important as a source 
of domestic and irrigation water, increasingly became a symbol of Gonzaganian identity 
and of resistance to exploitation of the municipality’s resources by outsiders. By the time 
of its eventual abandonment, the quarry enjoyed negligible local support and, amid 
growing public outcry, was ultimately halted by orders issued by government agencies at 





Figure 4.3 Wangag River quarry in Gonzaga, Cagayan. (a) Wangag River resort prior to redevelopment. (b) Wangag 
River resort following redevelopment. (c) Wangag River quarry site. (d) Signage and bahay kubo erected by 








The rescaling of power dynamics by opponents of black sand mining was far less 
successful. Despite efforts of activists to frame the magnetite mining issue as one of 
municipality-wide significance, opposition remained largely confined to the affected 
coastal barangays, where it was still far from universal, and among those in the Poblacion 
who owned land in affected areas. One informant, a government official, opined that “the 
difference was that the people experienced the product of the [black sand] mining 
operation, like the [remodeled] municipal hall and others. Many, many projects and 
programs were initiated, established, or constructed because of that, as a product of the 
mining. If there hadn’t been those projects, maybe people would have shown their 
opposition.”  
The mayor’s influence at the barangay level, through the distribution of 
patronage, coupled with his ability to exert political power at the municipal and 
provincial levels, also contributed to the organizational failure. According to several 
informants, barangay captains and council members were cajoled or bribed by the mayor 
into abandoning their support of activists, who over time became less willing to openly 
oppose the projects. Describing the effect of these developments on the anti-mining 
movement, a former environmental organizer stated, “Maybe some of the leaders lacked 
some charisma, or something like that, or dedication. I’m not blaming them, but I think 
they became less passionate because the barangay captains were being bribed by the 
mayor. He gave them everything. That’s why the black sand mining was not much harder 
[to accomplish].”  
With the supporters of mining holding political power following Pentecostes’ 




proliferated. One informant claimed that “some companies operating in the municipality 
hired goons to intimidate those people. So, there was also the element of threat. Not only 
[against] those who were part of an organized group, but anyone who was against it.” 
Others described protest marches being forcibly dispersed by police, frivolous lawsuits 
targeted at prominent activists, and other acts of retaliation against opponents. After her 
unsuccessful mayoral run, Perling Garcia’s business permit was, according to several 
interview participants, revoked by the administration as punishment. Another activist 
leader, who was also a municipal employee at the time, was reportedly suspended from 
work by Pentecostes, repeatedly threatened with violence, and challenged personally by 
the mayor to a gun duel. 
At the beginning of Pentecostes’ second term, therefore, anti-mining activists 
faced a difficult path forward. Lacking a resonant collective action frame, mobilization 
within the broader community had stalled, in spite of mounting grievances within 
immediately affected areas; meanwhile, the apparatuses of political control having been 
effectively co-opted by supporters of mining, they found themselves the targets of both 
legal and physical attacks by the mayor’s administration. Supporting Horowitz’s (2009) 
contention that “a government’s lack of political legitimacy can lead its citizens to look to 
another group for leadership in the face of a threat stemming from resource exploitation” 
(249), the atmosphere of corruption, intimidation, and violence that characterized 





4.3.3 Beyond the Material Conditions of Opportunity 
The role of natural resources in creating opportunities for non-state actors has 
been of scholarly and public interest for several decades (Le Billon 2012). The 
archetypical example of “blood” diamonds represents only one narrow way in which 
rebel groups can leverage natural resources for their military or political advantage, 
however; as Le Billon (2012) writes, “a broader definition is that of the control, 
exploitation, trade, taxation, or protection of natural resources, which contributes to, or 
benefits from, the context of armed conflict” (27). The NPA, for instance, while not 
operating mines directly, does participate in the extractive value chain through the 
extortion of protection money from mining companies, as well as other businesses 
(Quimpo 2014; Holden & Jacobson 2007; Rodell 2004). It has been suggested, especially 
by supporters of black sand mining, that Pentecostes’ nonpayment of the NPA’s 
‘revolutionary taxes’ lay behind the group’s involvement in the controversy. As one 
municipal government employee explained, “When our former mayor was killed in front 
of our municipal hall, they claimed that the ones who did that were the people in the 
forest, the leftists. But, there were rumors also that they killed the mayor because he did 
not pay the progressive tax to them. But, according to the leaflets they left behind, it was 
because of mining.” For their parts, the Philippine government and military have been 
skeptical of any but the most venal explanations of the NPA’s motivations; officials have 
publicly decried the group as criminals and terrorists who have “lost their ideology 
because they shifted to banditry” (Major General Oscar Lactao, qtd. in Lagsa 2015). 
Belying such assertions, however, most informants for this study held surprisingly 




revolutionary taxes, one informant explained, “You know, they [the NPA] are operating 
with a very limited budget. How can they operate without a budget? Who will have their 
back? How can they get food for their members? How can they get money for arms? 
They need money. So maybe they have two objectives—the real principles of protecting 
the poor and they also need a share to have a budget for their operations.” Reconciling 
those two objectives is possible by expanding the concept of opportunity in civil war 
beyond the material conditions of natural resources, to include the opportunities 
presented in communities affected by controversial extractive industry for insurgent 
groups to downscale their political influence by developing alliances with local networks. 
Here, the concomitance of vulnerability, risk, and opportunity mechanisms can be most 
directly observed—it is the context of intense local grievances and institutional failings 
surrounding extractive industry that creates opportunities for non-state actor involvement. 
Throughout the Philippines, the NPA forms alliances with local organizations and 
movements by providing specific services—namely, the provision of violent force. 
Rutten (2000), for instance, describes the development of alliances between the NPA and 
agricultural labor unions on the island of Masbate: 
Backed by the coercive powers of the NPA, and operating through local 
union networks, laborers of Milagros were successful in gaining from the 
planter wage increases and the free use of a small part of hacienda-land for 
subsistence agriculture. As some workers put it, ‘the NPA will defend us 
when we have problems with the planter,’ and ‘without the NPA, we will 
lose our gains and the planter will become despotic again’ (233). 
Informants in Gonzaga described a similar relationship between activists and 




threatening mining companies that operated illegally, and hearing complaints from 
community members who felt as though local and provincial officials were ignoring their 
grievances. As one informant related of a prominent environmental activist, “Pentecostes 
and his supporters sued him in court and he had to spend all his money. They wanted to 
kill him too, but the NPA protected him.”  
Although the development of alliances between local movements and national and 
transnational NGOs has been documented in many resistance movements to extractive 
industry elsewhere (Kirsch 2014; Kuecker 2007; Brown & Spielgel 2017; Horowitz 
2012; Vela-Almeida 2018; Holden & Jacobson 2008), building and maintaining 
supralocal activist coalitions has proved challenging in the Philippines. Singh & Camba 
(2016) describe the functional weakness of the two most prominent national 
organizations—Alyansa Tigil Mina (ATM) and Kalikasan—stemming from those 
groups’ ideologically diverse and spatially disparate memberships, concluding that 
“ATM and Kalikasan are, at best, networks of loose social groups and political 
movements bearing within themselves competing objectives, strategies and 
organizational interests” (63). The targeting of activists by the government at multiple 
levels has also exerted a toll on the ability of broader coalitions to maintain a unified 
front (Holden 2009, 2011). One activist in Gonzaga, the recipient of lawsuits and other 
forms of pressure by Pentecostes, explained that his was “a typical case in the 
Philippines. Whenever somebody will stand against the will of the person in power, they 
resort to filing a case against them to pressure them to stop them from joining or leading 
that particular group.” In stark contrast to the activist networks, however, the NPA 




objectives rooted in Maoist principles. A modular command structure allows for some 
degree of autonomy for small units of fighters operating under the direction of local 
committees, which report, in turn, to front, district, provincial, and regional commands 
and thence to the CPP Central Committee. So-called ‘armed propaganda units’ and 
smaller, specialized ‘sparrow units’ have historically comprised the basic unit of 
organization in rural and urban areas, respectively, but major activities carried out by 
these units are directed and approved by a formal chain of command designed to mirror a 
state-based administration; notably, for instance, targets of NPA assassinations, including 
Pentecostes, are typically ‘tried,’ in absentia, in revolutionary peoples’ courts composed 
of high-ranking members who operate within a formalized framework of procedures 
(Mediansky 1986, Human Rights Watch 2011). 
The formation of alliances with the NPA may offer local activists the opportunity 
to take advantage of the organized scalar structure of the insurgents and their 
corresponding ability to project political power at multiple levels, through the targeted 
application of violence and the threat thereof (Holden 2009). Indeed, in the absence of 
coordinated activist movements or a united coalition of leftist parties, the CPP and the 
NPA have been successful at presenting themselves as an umbrella organization for 
resistance to neoliberalism in general (Caouette 2015) and the exploitation of natural 
resources in particular (Holden et al. 2011). From the perspective of anti-mining activists, 
an alliance with the NPA is a practical maneuver, necessitated by violence perpetrated 
against them by mining companies and their supporters; for its part, the NPA utilizes the 
relationship to ingratiate itself with community members, present itself as a legitimate 




explains resource extraction in the context of the group’s broader political agenda. In the 
words of one activist interviewed for this study, the NPA “wanted to show support, so 
they could also get support in return…because that [mining] is a social problem, so it is a 
very good chance to penetrate the masses.” This sentiment closely echoes Kalyvas’ 
(2000) observation that alliances in civil war involve “a process of convergence of 
interests via a transaction between supralocal and local actors, whereby the former supply 
the latter with external muscle, thus allowing them to win decisive advantage over local 
rivals; in exchange, supralocal actors are able to tap into local networks and generate 
mobilization” (383-384). 
In Gonzaga, the framing process was enabled by the atmosphere of secrecy, 
misinformation, and mistrust that surrounded the mining projects, illustrated by the 
proliferation of rumors throughout the municipality on issues ranging from the 
environmental impacts of mining, to the involvement of Chinese businessmen in the 
illegal drug trade, to the identity and motivations of Pentecostes’ assassins. Indeed, 
despite the NPA’s claim of responsibility, some have speculated openly about the 
possibility of a conspiracy and cover-up (Catindig & Lagasca 2014). One alternative 
version of events holds that Pentecostes fell afoul of provincial level politicians, who 
contracted the killing. A source with personal relationships to the NPA claimed that the 
motivation for the assassination lay ultimately in a private dispute between Pentecostes 
and a high-ranking member of the insurgency. Although interview participants described 
the conflict over mining as a local one, involving familial connections and personal 
feuds, however, statements by the NPA present mining as part of a larger structure of 




monopoly capitalists” (see Holden 2014; Tangi 2015). Through its emphasis on the role 
of transnational corporations and capital, the NPA discursively rescaled the black sand 
mining conflict both spatially, by relating it to the NPA’s goal of reshaping national 
policies, and temporally, by linking the extraction of natural resources to historical 
legacies of colonialism. As the CPP itself has explained, “we expose to the masses the 
root causes of their problems, we show them who their real enemies are.” (qtd. in Tangi 
2015, 89). 
The NPA presents the violence in which it engages as both justified as a response 
to the underlying causes of social ills and as evidence of the organization’s continued 
relevance in Philippine society. A major aim of the insurgency is, as Mediansky (1986) 
observes, “to establish the authority of the NPA as the (often only) source of justice to the 
local people” (8). In taking responsibility for the assassination of Pentecostes, for 
example, an NPA spokesman stated, “this is a testament to everyone that no one is above 
revolutionary justice. No matter how near or far, or how easy or difficult, the Red court 
empowered by the people will punish the guilty” (qtd. in Visaya 2014). The expression of 
power inherent in the assassination was not lost on the community. A post on an 
anonymous Facebook page in support of Garcia’s mayoral campaign, for instance, reads, 
in Tagalog, “Nakakalunkot kailangan pang makiaalam ang mga NPA para lang masagip 
ang Sierra Madre laban sa mapanirang kasakiman at kuraptsyon habang walang 
magawa ang ating pamahalaan para mapatigil at maipatupad ang pangangalaga sa 
Cagayan laban sa black sand mining [It is very sad that the NPA has to rescue the Sierra 
Madre from destructive greed and corruption while our government is helpless to protect 




The close attention that the CPP and the NPA pay to their public image evinces 
their reliance on civilians, who provide the former with political support and the latter 
with donations of supplies and with information regarding activities of the Philippine 
military forces (while also withholding information about NPA activity from the 
government). Most importantly, the civilian population provides the pool from which 
new NPA cadets are recruited. In rural communities like Gonzaga, a lack of industry and 
the modernization of agriculture has created a growing class of young people with few 
local employment opportunities, with whom the explanations and proposed solutions of 
the rebels are most likely to resonate (Holden & Jacobson 2007). The NPA paints a 
picture in which the natural wealth of the Philippines has been plundered by “ruling class 
dynasties” and their “neocolonial” paymasters, where “the Filipino people are denied the 
right to make use of the country’s mineral resources for domestic industrialization and 
manufacturing as these are extracted and taken away by foreign mining companies,” and 
where “drawing inspiration from the anticolonial resistance of their forebearers, the 
Filipino people are determined to achieve national liberation or complete freedom to 
determine the country’s destiny independent of U.S. imperialist dictates and toward 
socialism” (Ang Bayan 2017, 4) through violent revolution. 
The remarkable longevity of the conflict between the NPA and the Philippine 
state, which has continued, at varying levels of intensity, for more than half a century, 
speaks not only to the ability of the former to consistently provide a meaningful and 
resonant narrative frame, but also to systemic institutional and governance failings on the 
part of the latter. Holden et al. (2011), Simbulan (2016), and others have identified the 




among indigenous populations in the Philippines, but the story does not end there. The 
broader context of corruption, inadequate public consultation, and silencing of opposition 
creates the conditions under which engagement with the violent collective action of the 
NPA becomes a rational and practical option; as one activist leader told me, “In fact, I 
heard that some of the people [involved in the anti-mining movement] even joined them. 
That’s how desperate they were before. They even joined the New People’s Army.” 
4.4 Conclusions 
By the summer of 2016, mining in Gonzaga appeared to have all but ceased, to 
the delight of anti-mining activists. Those interviewed for this study also expressed 
optimism that the election of Rodrigo Duterte as president of the Philippines would bring 
about permanent reforms in the mining industry and a possible end to hostilities with the 
NPA. Especially praised was the appointment of environmental advocate Regina Lopez 
as DENR secretary, who, by March 2017, had ordered the closure or suspension of 28 
mining operations across the country (Gamil 2017). Following pushback from industry, 
however, Lopez was removed from her post later that year and many of her initial efforts 
to reform the mining sector have since been rolled back (Dela Cruz 2017); meanwhile, a 
2016 ceasefire with the NPA, underpinned by, among other areas of agreement, similar 
attitudes toward extractive industry, ultimately failed and active hostilities resumed 
(Romero 2017). Unfortunately, there appears to be little incentive for either of the 
belligerents in what Holden (2013) calls the “never-ending war” between the NPA and 
the Philippine state to seek a lasting peaceful solution; for the latter, the conflict provides 
a ready-made justification for the militarization of mines and the targeting of activists, 




people’s organizations, which bolsters its image as the defender of the poor and facilitates 
the formation of alliances with local networks (Holden 2009, 2011, 2014). 
As Kalyvas (2000) writes, “it is the convergence of local motives and supralocal 
imperatives that endow civil war with its particular character and leads to joint violence 
that straddles the divide between the political and the private, the collective and the 
individual” (487); the results of this study suggest that natural resources provide a space 
in which such interactions between the personal and the political occur. Characterized by 
overlapping, competing, and interrelating political, economic, sociocultural, and 
biophysical scales, sites of resource extraction are important nodes of scalar renegotiation 
(Allen 2017), where “actors, organizations and movements ‘jump,’ ‘bend,’ and 
‘reconfigure’ scales to undermine and challenge existing arrangements and power 
relations” (Hoogestegar & Verzijl 2015, 15). From the perspective of grassroots activists, 
extractive enclaves become grounded manifestations of an exploitative neoliberal 
economic system; for states and non-state belligerents, they offer a means by which to 
extract value from that system through tax payments, partnerships, or extortive 
arrangements; and, for politically savvy actors that, like the NPA, rely on maintaining 
alliances with civilian networks, they present opportunities to promulgate narratives that 
incorporate local grievances into a ‘master’ cleavage justifying mobilization. It is 
increasingly recognized that, in addition to the material conditions of natural resources, 
“the pattern of social relations as well as the quality and democracy or legitimacy of 
institutions determine the risk of conflict and deployment of violence” (Le Billon 2001b, 
568) in extractive processes. This study highlights the additional importance of those 




rescaling of localized resource-related conflicts, leading potentially to the prolongation 
and intensification of civil war; in the words of one informant, “The NPA, what they 
want is that many people will be against mining, so they can get their sympathy. That’s 
how they survive. It’s so that people will come to see the NPA as good. So that people 
will get on their side. So that people will see that they are good for the people. So that 





5. Toward a Political Ecology of Scale in Natural Resource 
Conflicts 
 
The preceding three chapters have examined the multifaceted relationship 
between natural resources and civil conflict at the cross-country, subnational, and local 
analytical scales, respectively, using quantitative and qualitative methods typically 
applied at each scale. As anticipated, the conclusions that can be drawn from the three 
studies regarding the validity of the vulnerability, risk, and opportunity mechanisms, as 
delineated by Le Billon (2012) are quite distinct. Whereas the cross-country analysis 
presented in Chapter 2 supports a conflict vulnerability mechanism, whereby resource 
dependence undermines state capacity and democracy through a resource curse effect, the 
subnational analysis in Chapter 3 suggests that resource extraction increases conflict risk 
through an intermediate effect on inequality. The local case study of Chapter 4, 
meanwhile, concludes that, although both the vulnerability and risk mechanisms played a 
role in the black sand mining conflict in Gonzaga, the involvement of the NPA is most 
convincingly explained by an expanded understanding of the opportunity mechanism, in 
which the opportunities created by resource extraction for the development of alliances 
between non-state actors and civilian networks is explicitly considered. Were these 
analyses conducted in isolation, very different understandings of the resource-conflict 
nexus would be supported; the use of a multi-scalar and mixed methods approach, 
however, allows these differences to become the object of reflective interrogation. 
Based on a comparison of the results of the three analyses presented above, this 




Following Sayre (2005), I first discuss the epistemological and methodological 
implications of the results as they pertain to the scale at which empirical analyses are 
conducted. I then interrogate the ontological status of scale in natural resource conflicts, 
emphasizing the recursive production and reproduction of intersecting scales of resource 
extraction, governance, and resistance. Building upon the conclusions of Chapter 4, this 
analysis is then extended to argue for a reconceptualization of extractive enclaves as 
nodes of overlapping scalar configurations of political, economic, cultural, and ecological 
processes at which state and non-state actors renegotiate their relational positions in order 
to further their objectives. Some implications of this view for assessing the effectiveness 
of policy interventions and for potential future research initiatives are also discussed. 
5.1 The Epistemological Moment of Scale 
The first broad set of conclusions that can be drawn from a comparison of the 
results in the preceding chapters involves the apparently disparate interpretations 
regarding the relationship between natural resources and civil conflict that has been 
drawn from the quantitative literature on the one hand and qualitative research on the 
other. It engages, therefore, with what Sayre (2005) terms the ‘epistemological moment’ 
of scale, which is concerned with the observer, rather than the observed. As Sayre 
explains: 
Scale is an attribute of how one observes something rather than of the thing 
observed. Cartographic scale is an instance of this, and the point is still more 
clear on the temporal axis: a study conducted at one point in time cannot 
yield robust information about processes of long duration or low frequency. 
Methodologically, then, the emphasis shifts to the spatial and temporal scale 




observed. Scale is inherent in observation (both scientific and otherwise), 
and the scientific observer must consciously choose a scale (or scales) suited 
to his or her question, in full recognition of the methodological and 
epistemological significance of the decision (281).  
The multi-scalar analysis adopted in this dissertation offers an opportunity to 
explore this epistemological significance in the context of natural resources and conflict. 
The three analyses presented above represent different solutions to the inevitable trade-
off between, to adopt Sayre’s terms, grain and extent, where the former refers to the level 
of aggregation of data to a particular resolution and the latter to the spatial and temporal 
coverage of the analysis. Whereas the cross-country analysis of Chapter 2 maximizes 
extent at the expense of grain by aggregating conflict and socioeconomic data to the scale 
of the state, the case study in Chapter 4 maximizes grain but is limited in extent. These 
choices do appear to influence the apparent validity of the vulnerability, risk, and 
opportunity mechanisms, a finding from which some potentially provocative inferences 
can be drawn regarding the respective operative scales of the vulnerability, risk, and 
opportunity mechanisms. I propose that, although all three mechanisms play a role in 
explaining the relationship between natural resources and civil conflict, each exhibits a 
‘natural’ scale at which it can be most clearly observed.  
In the case of vulnerability, the spatial scale of the natural resource curse effect 
appears to correspond most closely to that of the state. This is supported by the strong 
evidence presented in Chapter 2 of a causal chain linking resource dependence in the 
petroleum sector to decreased democracy and lower institutional quality and, thence, to 
the incidence of conflict events across countries. This finding is broadly consistent with 




conflict, and time periods. By contrast, the analysis of Chapter 3, while concluding that 
subnational variation in state capacity does partially explain the use of violence by the 
NPA, finds no evidence of a resource curse effect undermining state capacity. I submit 
that these divergent findings stem from the preeminence of the state as the central 
organizational entity through which the resource curse is manifest.  
The scalar properties of the vulnerability mechanism emerge from the tendency of 
natural resource governance regimes to be highly centralized by states, including in terms 
of regulating the entry of foreign firms, the collection and allocation of resource rents, 
and environmental and socioeconomic impact assessment and mitigation processes. It 
may also reflect the role of states as containers of institutional culture that pervades 
government at all levels. In the Philippines, for example, a widespread culture of 
corruption in the public sector has been widely commented upon by critics of the state 
and by academic observers (Bello et al. 2005; Broad & Cavanagh 1993). In conducting 
the local case study discussed in Chapter 4, I was struck by the fact that, although 
informants universally identified bribery and abuses of power in the permitting and 
regulation of mines, they were also quick to assure me that, concerning the issue of 
corruption specifically, the local experience was not unique, but rather emblematic of the 
broader Philippine political economy. Interview participants described local politicians’ 
use of power to intimidate anti-mining activists as “typical” for the country, the bribery 
of public officials as “how it works,” and the nonenforcement of environmental laws as 
“Filipino style.” Table 5.1 provides a sample of some such responses, categorized by the 





Table 5.1 Descriptions of institutional failure in Gonzaga, Cagayan 
Theme Response 
Abuse of power 
“It is a typical case in the Philippines. Whenever somebody 
will stand against the will of the person in power, the will 
resort to filing a case against them to pressure them.” 
 
“As usual, unfortunately, in the Philippines, there’s no real 
enforcement. If the people at high levels jump the system, 
then the people at the low levels are going to jump the 
system too.” 
 
“You know, the politicians are controlling everything here in 
the Philippines.” 
 
“It’s not just the mayor. It goes all the way up to the national 
level.” 
Bribery of officials “That is how it works here in the Philippines.” 
 “They can influence all the agencies in the Philippines.” 
 “Here in the Philippines, there is a price for everything.” 
 
“Even if it’s illegal, if there’s money involved, in the 
Philippines, you can do it.” 
 
“Most government agencies in the Philippines, if not all of 
them, are really geared up for revenue, not for service.” 
 
“If it involves large sums of money, people are thinking 
there is illegal corruption going on. From the lowest level to 
the national level, Filipinos are good at that.” 
Failure of EIA system 
“As usual, unfortunately, in the Philippines, there’s no real 
enforcement [of EIA processes].” 
 
“Most government agencies in the Philippines, if not all of 
them, are really geared up for revenue, not for service.” 
 






I believe there is also a strong case to be made that the scale of conflict 
opportunity is much more localized relative to that of conflict vulnerability, affecting the 
contours of violence within active conflict zones or between individual communities. 
Little evidence for an opportunity mechanism was observed in either the cross-country 
analysis in Chapter 2 or the subnational analysis in Chapter 3; however, using the 
expanded definition of opportunity explained in Chapter 4 revealed this mechanism to 
have been instrumental in explaining militant involvement in a local dispute over 
resource extraction. Compared with vulnerability, opportunity in civil conflict varies 
widely by context and may involve different sectors of resources, or different aspect of 
the commodity chain, under different circumstances. Armed insurgents exhibit 
remarkable flexibility and ingenuity in identifying and utilizing potential sources of 
income, whether these be alluvial diamonds (Angola, Sierra Leone, Congo), stolen oil 
(Nigeria), rare earth minerals (Congo), timber (Cambodia, the Philippines), narcotics 
(Colombia, Afghanistan), trafficked antiquities (Syria), extortions of legal and illegal 
businesses (the Philippines, Colombia), kidnappings for ransom (Colombia, Nigeria), or 
funds raised from state and non-state supporters abroad (the Philippines, Ireland, Syria). 
Even during the course of a single conflict, militants may shift the focus of their 
fundraising activities as circumstances change, as the NPA in the Philippines did 
following the loss of external support from the Chinese Communist Party in the 1960s. 
Although the evidence is clear that non-state actors do exploit natural resources directly 
and indirectly for financial gain, and that resources can and do affect the course of civil 
conflicts, it is unlikely that the mere availability of exploitable resources is sufficient to 




industry commodity chain broadly defined, seems to shape the contours of violence 
locally, explaining, in part, why militants choose to utilize violence at particular sites and 
times. It is not the broad oil, timber, or mineral economy, therefore, that creates 
opportunity, but the specific well, forest, or mine. 
The scale of conflict risk can be placed conceptually somewhere between those of 
vulnerability and opportunity. Comparison of the results of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 
suggest that the motivational linkages between resources and conflict better explain 
subnational variation in the use of violence than differences in the occurrence of conflict 
across countries. Although inequality was a significant predictor of conflict at both of 
those analyses, evidence of a complete causal chain was observed only at the subnational 
level, where, at least in the case of the NPA rebellion in the Philippines, it appears to be 
mediated by an effect of resource extraction on relative deprivation and environmental 
scarcity. That a similar effect was not observed between countries may stem from the 
strong intervening effect of the state on the extent of inter-group inequality. States with 
high quality institutions are capable, it appears, of redistributing resource rents in such a 
way as to not exacerbate inequalities, while those with low capacity or poor institutional 
quality do the opposite. Thus, the dominant linkage between natural resources and 
inequality at the state scale is by way of a resource curse effect; at a given level of state 
capacity, however, a direct causal effect of resources on inequality becomes observable. 
The scalability of social inequality as a driver of conflict is also an important 
consideration. As discussed in Chapter 3, inequality in the distribution of costs and 
benefits of black sand mining in Gonzaga was identified as a major contributor to the 




the conflict. Participants discussed inequality in terms of differences between individuals, 
families, or, in some cases, between barangays or neighborhoods—such as the grievances 
related to the allocation of tax revenue from mining in coastal areas to the beautification 
of the Poblacion. In the subnational study, inter-barangay inequality was instrumented, in 
the absence of feasible measures of individual inequality, as an explanatory variable 
mediating the relationship between mining and the application of NPA violence, and was 
found to have significant predictive power. At the interstate scale, while vertical 
inequality does not appear to contribute to the incidence or severity of civil conflict, there 
is mounting evidence, including the results presented in Chapter 2, that inequality 
contributes to conflict when it corresponds with pre-existing social cleavages, although 
the effect of resource extraction on horizontal inequality is unobservable at that scale. 
This explains the consuming objective of the NPA to reframe experiences of relative 
deprivation along the lines of class-based struggle at a national or international scale, a 
concern that is shared by non-state actors in conflicts throughout history and around the 
world. 
The picture that emerges, then, is one in which the vulnerability, risk, and 
opportunity mechanisms operate simultaneously and interconnectedly at distinct, but 
overlapping and intersecting scales. The resource curse effect shapes conflict 
vulnerability at the state level, contributing, alongside other socioeconomic factors, to 
cross-country patterns in the occurrence and intensity of civil war. Within countries 
affected by conflict, broad patterns of violence are explained, in part, by the regional 
implications of extractive industry on the experience of relative deprivation between 




broader conflicts are largely a function of opportunity, including opportunities to exploit 
natural resources for financial gain or to garner civilian support by developing alliances 
in aggrieved communities.  
These scalar patterns may explain not only the differences in results presented in 
the preceding chapters, but also the broader disciplinal disparities noted at the outset of 
this dissertation. Cross-country economic studies of the relationship between natural 
resources and civil conflict tend not to support grievance-based theories not because 
grievances are an unimportant component of the relationship, but because the analytical 
scale at which they are conducted aligns with the vulnerability scale. Similarly, local case 
studies tend to overlook vulnerability effects because the scale at which they are 
conducted correspond most closely with the scales of conflict risk and opportunity. 
Failing to take into account the scalar properties of the mechanisms linking resources and 
conflict can thus lead to misleading and potentially contradictory conclusions. Research 
that makes an effort to explicitly acknowledge the role of scale may help explain and 
address these gaps in the existing literature. 
5.2 The Ontological Moment of Scale 
The second moment of scale, the ontological moment, presents a thornier 
challenge than does its epistemological counterpart. Here, the emphasis is not on 
matching the scales of analysis to ‘natural’ scales of phenomena, but on interrogating and 
mapping the processes of scale production itself. With very few exceptions—Taylor 
(1981) and (according to some critics) Marston et al. (2005) among them—scale theorists 
explicitly recognize that scales are not naturally occurring or deterministically shaped by 




Kantian idealists referenced in Chapter 1, it remained nearly universally acknowledged 
that scales of human activity and organization are socially constructed. What was at 
issue, rather, was how to treat scale empirically, given its cultural, socio-economic, and 
political conditionality.  
In recent years, a general consensus has emerged in the geographical literature, 
whereby scales are conceptualized as existing in a recursive relationship with the 
processes they describe; in much the same way as, in the political ecology framework, 
human action simultaneously shapes and is shaped by the physical environment, human 
actors both create and are constrained by scalar discourses. They understand themselves 
to be existing and operating within a scaled environment, and this understanding guides 
their behavior. The most obvious example of this is the imposition of scalar hierarchies 
by states as part of the organization of their territories into, for example, to take the case 
of the Philippines, provinces, municipalities, and barangays. The discursive deployment 
of scale is not limited, however, to states. As Moore (2008) writes: 
While state classification practices are important, ‘lay’ actors also play a 
significant role in sociospatial categorization, frequently subverting or 
altering official classifications for their own purposes. They utilize 
narratives to ‘interiorize’ and ‘exteriorize’ sociospatial relations and emplot 
themselves in particular scalar configurations…Narratives, then, are not 
merely representational forms. They ‘place’ people and occurrences in 
space and time, thereby giving spatial and temporal meaning to events and 
relations (215). 
In other words, as I proposed in Chapter 1, scale has meaning because people 
believe it does and act accordingly; importantly, however, actors also recognize the social 




ends, but also to reconfigure those arrangements incrementally or paradigmatically to 
achieve political objectives. Thus, as discussed in Chapter 4, activists in Gonzaga sought 
first to seek redress of grievances through the hierarchical and formalized apparatus of 
the state and through the attempted organization at vertically ‘higher’ levels; only when 
those efforts failed did they begin to adopt the alternative scaling produced and 
promulgated by the NPA. 
The local case study also supports the conclusions of Moore (2008), Allen (2017), 
and others that the use of scalar politics is the exclusive domain of neither states nor of 
other powerful political entities, but are, rather, “deployed strategically by a range of 
actors in political power struggles” (Allen 2017, 84). As Hoogestegar & Verzijl (2015) 
observe, “political projects of dominant groups, as well as the strategies of grassroots 
organizations that aim to challenge or transform the outcomes of these projects have 
scalar practices that are embedded and sustained in particularly scaled legal, institutional 
and political contexts and power relations” (15). In this section, I discuss three major 
scales that shape the political context in which resource-related civil conflict arises and 
show how their intersection creates spaces where scalar discourses can be deployed and 
contested. 
The first set of scales that is relevant to natural resource conflict comprises scales 
of extraction. The economic entities involved in extractive industry are organized into 
explicitly hierarchical units of parent companies and subsidiaries; regional, national, and 
local offices; and ‘levels’ of management along which power is intended to flow 




customers, and suppliers are also essential in the global economy. Thus, scales of 
extraction are hybrid networks comprising both vertical and horizontal relationships.  
Scales of extraction are strongly influenced, though not determined, by the 
material conditions of natural resources and global economic conditions, with important 
implications for the political economy of civil conflict. Le Billon (2008, 2012) describes 
the classic distinction between alluvial and primary, or kimberlite, diamond deposits, 
such that the latter requires larger and deeper mines with significantly more expansive 
spatial footprints than do the latter. As a result, whereas alluvial diamonds can be 
extracted by individual miners or small syndicates, primary deposits involve large 
corporations with substantial capital resources and support from the state. The spatiality 
of extractive industry goes well beyond the site of extraction, however, as the case of 
petroleum most clearly demonstrates. Although the ecological footprint of an individual 
oil well is spatially small, the functional size of petroleum extraction is much broader; in 
order to be economically viable, an integrated petroleum economy requires massive 
transportation and processing infrastructure, including pipelines, railroads, specialized 
ports, and refineries. These capital investments incentivize and require large levels of 
state involvement in the petroleum industry, with potentially major implications for the 
manifestation of the resource curse in that sector. 
At the opposite extreme, extraction of alluvial diamonds does not require large 
capital investments or economies of scale for profitability. The functional size of the 
diamond industry at the point of extraction is spatially limited, potentially resulting in 
highly localized impacts, but affecting little change to national or regional economies. 




opportunity and may partially explain heterogeneity in non-state behavior conditioned 
upon a given level of vulnerability and risk. 
 The extraction of other mineral resources, including primary gemstone deposits, 
precious and non-precious metals, and stone, occupy scales between the two boundaries 
represented by petroleum and secondary diamonds; some, including, for example, the 
largest copper and aluminum mining operations, as well as large kimberlite diamond 
deposits, have functional footprints large enough to overlap with scales of vulnerability, 
while others, such as alluvial gold mining, may intersect primarily with scales of risk or 
of opportunity. This may explain the findings in Chapter 3 that unpermitted mining 
operations in the Philippines are associated with NPA violence, while permitted 
operations are not. A possible interpretation is that large extraction projects in the 
Philippines intersect with scales of vulnerability and affect conflict through a national-
level resource curse effect, while smaller, unpermitted mines correspond to scales of risk, 
and therefore can be observed as contributing to subnational heterogeneity in civil 
violence. The extractive scale of timber resources, similarly, would be expected to 
intersect scales of risk and opportunity rather than the of vulnerability. Although the 
material footprints of timber concessions are spatially large, often encompassing 
thousands of hectares, the physical and economic infrastructure associated with timber is 
relatively small. Thus, the potential for a resource curse effect related to timber is limited, 
particularly at the national level. But, conflict risk and conflict opportunity effects related 
to timber extraction are very plausible and subnational analyses of timber’s contribution 




The second set of scales relevant to the political ecology of resource conflicts are 
scales of governance and regulation. The trade of natural resources is generally governed 
at multiple scales through a variety of mechanisms, overlapping at key points with scales 
of extraction. Like economic processes, regulatory structures “are deeply related to 
scales, through both hierarchical relations between scales—‘(inter)national’ regulation of 
‘localised’ processes—and the regulatory specificities of various scales” (Le Billon 2007: 
203). The most important of these scales, and undoubtedly the most intensively 
interrogated, is the scale of the nation-state, and it is well established that the production 
of the national scale is strongly influenced by the geographic distribution of natural 
resources and the extractive scales that emerge through their exploitation (Smith 1981; 
Herod 2010). The clearest examples of this can be seen in the former colonial empires, 
where borders were drawn to facilitate control and extraction of resources. Subnational 
administrative units reflect not only the influence of history but also the intentional 
production of scalar hierarchies by the state. The relationship between extractive scales 
and governance scales is far from unidirectional, however; as the unique power of the 
state over access to natural resources within its borders simultaneously shapes the scalar 
configurations of extractive industry. In addition to controlling access directly, states may 
also coerce international companies to engage local affiliates, work through local 
intermediaries, or to partner directly with the state itself; especially in the case of 
petroleum, many states own or control extractive industry outright. To facilitate such 
interactions with state-level bureaucracies, therefore, many of the largest transnational 




Of increasing interest over the past several decades have been the potential for 
and design of supranational governance structures to regulate global trade in natural 
resources. These may take the form of voluntary certifications programs, such as the 
Forest Stewardship Council’s sustainable timber harvesting accreditation, the Kimberly 
Process for the certification of diamonds, and Fair Trade labelling for agricultural 
commodities, which have all been cited as models for a self-governing international 
extractive industry, overseen by global civil society. An alternative approach would 
leverage trading rules implemented through the World Trade Organization or bilateral 
and multilateral trade deals to establish enforceable rules for the extraction and trade in 
natural resources. Lacking the coercive powers of the state, however, such mechanisms 
are fundamentally weak relative to both states and, arguably, the transnational 
corporations they seek to regulate. 
Serious problems may arise where scales of governance are misaligned with 
scales of resource use. For example, Zimmerer (2000b) describes the mismatch between 
the scale at which environmental conditions in Latin America generate irrigation water 
and the scale at which irrigation systems are organized and regulated as a major cause of 
social conflict. Allen (2017) discusses how grievances related to mining in Melanesia 
went unaddressed as a result of a vertical separation of affected communities from the 
decision-making processes of resource governance. This closely resembles the conflict 
over mining in Gonzaga presented in Chapter 4, where activists, having failed to obtain 
redress through the hierarchical regulatory scale, ultimately formed alliances with non-
state actors to achieve their goals. Elsewhere, where the spatiality of state monopoly over 




opportunities to fill and profit from the role of a mediating entity between extractive 
industry and the global economy, as exemplified by the control of the narcotics industries 
in Colombia and Afghanistan by militant non-state actors operating in remote regions 
beyond the reach of the national government. 
A third broad category of scales implicated in conflicts involving natural 
resources comprises those at which resistance movements operate. These scales are 
produced, often explicitly, during the process of mobilization, which requires the 
deployment of inherently scaled narratives and frames, as well as in the process of 
forming alliances between networks. Because oppositional collective action requires the 
careful articulation of that which is being contested, including its spatial and temporal 
scalar characteristics, scales of resistance often form in antithesis to scales of extraction 
and governance. To quote Moore (2008) again: 
Framing processes, like narratives, provide meaning to events and relations, 
and in doing so function to both organize experience and guide action. More 
specifically, ‘collective action frames’ mobilize support for action by 
identifying grievances and assigning blame, presenting alternative solutions 
and strategies, and articulating rationales for ameliorative collective 
action…framing the spatial and temporal context is central the ultimate 
success of any political project. (218). 
Just as the scales of extraction and governance are shaped, in part, by the 
geographical distribution of natural resources, scales of resistance are shaped by the 
distribution of socioeconomic and environmental impacts—including both positive and 
negative effects—of natural resource extraction. The specific distribution of impacts can 




team preparing an Environmental Impact Statement for the now-defunct Tongue River 
Railroad, which would have transported coal from the Powder River Basin in 
southeastern Montana to markets throughout the U.S. Among the opponents to that 
project was a coalition of Native American tribes, ranchers, and environmentalists—
organizations not typically known for their mutual amicability—united by a shared sense 
of concern about potential impacts to the environment at multiple scales. The 
Bougainville rebellion in Papua New Guinea similarly involved a convergence of 
interests across traditionally rival tribal groups opposed to minerals mining (Filer 1990). 
The most effective mobilization efforts, however, are those that coalesce around 
established shared identities (Kuhn 2018; Stewart 2008; Wegenast & Basedau 2014; 
Koubi & Böhmelt 2014). One of the most recent examples in the U.S. is provided by the 
case of the Keystone Pipeline, in which members of the several Lakota tribes garnered 
support from Native American and other indigenous groups by appealing to a shared 
cultural heritage and historical legacy of disenfranchisement, leading, ultimately, to some 
of the largest and broadest-based environmental demonstrations in the U.S. in recent 
years. Aspinall’s (2007) examination of the Acehnese independence movement concludes 
that grievances related to the inequitable allocation of natural gas rents were framed by 
political leaders to align with a sense of shared ethnic identity in order to facilitate 
collective action. Likewise, in a 2016 paper, my coauthor Matthew Kuniholm and I 
present empirical evidence, based on a series of spatial autoregressive probit models, that 
communities that were disproportionally targeted by the national government during the 




effect that appears to have been amplified in those where the distinct Mayan identity was 
predominant (Wayland & Kuniholm 2016; see also Baird & Le Billon 2012). 
As discussed in Chapter 4, in the same way that the scalar configurations of 
extraction can provide militant non-state actors with opportunities to reposition 
themselves to take advantage of flows of global capital, so too do the scalar 
configurations of resistance create opportunities for such actors to form alliances with 
local networks. This development of alliances between militants and civilian networks is 
an essential, if often overlooked, component of civil conflict (Barter 2014). As Sorens 
(2011) notes, while states can generally have sustainable sources of support on which to 
depend, “rebel movements typically have to rely on voluntary compliance or ‘passive 
coercion’ from the population” (573). Similarly, Kalyvas (2000) writes that:  
There is a tendency to see violence as being externally imposed on 
unsuspecting and, therefore, innocent civilians—a perspective reinforced 
by the discourse of human rights and echoed in instrumentalist theories of 
ethnic conflict according to which individuals are perpetually manipulated 
by politicians…However, individuals cannot be treated simply as passive, 
manipulated, or invisible actors; instead, they often manipulate central 
actors into helping them fight their own conflicts. (390). 
From the perspective of non-state actors, therefore, opportunity in civil conflict is 
not defined as access to financing; potentially even more important to the revolutionary 
project are opportunities for accessing civilian networks to promulgate political 
narratives, mobilize public support, and recruit members. The production of scale is 
critical to this effort and seeking and capitalizing on such opportunities should, 




5.3 Extractive Industry as a ‘Natural Habitat’ of Scalar Reconfiguration 
Although the renegotiation of scalar configurations of power is a perpetual 
exercise, as actors seek, through “processes of scalar struggle to reconfigure power in 
their own interest” (Green 2016, 95), paradigmatic realignments are observed only 
periodically; because wholesale rescaling is not uncostly, social actors having, to greater 
or lesser extents, some degree of investment in any extant frame of reality, such shifts are 
most likely to occur in response to a crisis point or other stimuli. The primary argument 
with which I wish to close this chapter is that the exploitation of natural resources 
provides just such a stimulus, by engendering spaces where upscaling and downscaling of 
political and economic power occur. Although the role of mines and other sites of natural 
resource extraction as contested spaces of human-environment interactions has been 
widely discussed, the importance of these places as nodes of intersecting relational scalar 
configurations remains insufficiently articulated. 
The starting point for this argument is Harvey’s observation that a fundamental 
discontinuity exists between the operative scales of accumulative and political processes, 
one which is amplified by the increasingly ephemeral nature of global capital. As Harvey 
(2006) writes, “The capitalist operates more in continuous (relative and relational) space 
and time whereas the politician is more grounded in an absolute territorial space. On the 
other hand, capitalist firms come and go, shift locations, merge or go out of business, but 
states are long-lived entities confined within fixed territorial boundaries” (107). The 
geographic flexibility of corporations is an important source of power for transnational 
private industry relative to states and territorially-based non-state actors, as it allows 




position of transnational corporations is dramatically different, however, in the context of 
extractive industry. Harvey’s (1981) concept of ‘spatial fixes’ as physical locations in 
which global capital becomes grounded is starkly manifest in the case of extractive 
industry, as Allen (2016), observes. Here, the physical extraction of raw materials 
necessitates interaction with geological and biophysical processes with distinct scalar 
properties. Ultimately, in short, natural resources must be sought where they occur 
naturally. 
The material conditions of resources also, as discussed above, shape the scales of 
accumulation, by necessitating a certain spatial extent of extraction, transportation, and 
processing infrastructure. This is not to say that those scales are deterministic. Economic 
demand for resources is, to greater or lesser degree, socially constructed. At the extreme, 
diamonds are often cited as an example of a resource whose value has been shaped not by 
physical scarcity or by intrinsic demand, but by a cultural context of consumption in the 
developed world in which the gemstone has become a symbol of romantic love, and by 
the economic dominance of monopolistic producers. In all but a few edge cases, however, 
of which diamonds may be an example, biophysical and geological realities do impose 
meaningful limits on the mailability of most commodity chains. It is difficult to imagine, 
for example, an advanced economy that did not require a supply of ferrous metals for the 
purposes of heavy construction. Oil, similarly, has an economic importance that, although 
amplified by factors like ‘car culture,’ can be traced to its chemical properties. 
This groundedness of extractive industry creates opportunities for other actors 
engage with global resource commodity chains. Governments at multiple levels do so 




informally through accepting bribes. Under conditions of state weakness, insurgent 
groups find opportunities to extract value through theft of resources or extortion of 
mining and logging companies; at the extreme, some rebel groups exert sufficient control 
over resource-rich territories to act as a de facto state and to tax or otherwise control 
resource production directly. Simultaneously, discontinuities between scales of extraction 
and of regulation create or foster grievances related to unaddressed environmental and 
socioeconomic impacts. Even where direct adverse impacts are minor or negligible, 
mines and other sites of resource extraction can become symbols of broader patterns of 
oppression, exploitation, or structural violence around which political leaders mobilize 
collective action. As Le Billon (2012) writes: 
Typically, resource conflicts are articulated through ‘scale-specific’ actors 
and issues, for example local communities versus national governments and 
international corporations, and price differentials between farm-gate and 
international market prices. Although all actors and issues are both ‘local’ 
and ‘global,’ some are more ‘global’ than others, with related hierarchical 
processes of domination and resistance constituting an additional ‘layer’ in 
often pre-existing conflicts. In the case of ‘conflict commodities,’ the 
prolongation of conflict is also facilitated by the disconnection between 
local violences and global markets, with the knowledge of violence-tainted 
commodities having been (voluntarily) limited to particular ‘circles’ of 
industry experts whose knowledge may be ‘global’ but whose interests are 
often far from ‘universalistic’ (202) 
Extractive enclaves thus become nodes in which scales of extraction, governance, 
and resistance overlap and interact. Figure 5.1 illustrates this scalar convergence in the 
case of small-scale mining in the Philippines. In that schematic, most of the levels are 




within scales. Several key points of horizontal interaction between scales also exist, such 
as between transnational mining corporations and the national Philippine government. In 
the absence of a well-organized anti-mining movement in the Philippines, there is little 
direct interaction between the numerous community-based people’s organizations and a 
global civil society; the scales of resistance corresponding to the provincial and national 
levels are, therefore, dominated by the hierarchical scales of the NPA, organized into 
front, district, provincial, and regional commands. 
Activists in Gonzaga found themselves unable to effectuate change not because 
vertically ‘lower’ scales are inherently less important or influential, but because the 
specific configuration of inter-scalar relationships facilitates interaction between scales 
only at particular levels, among which the ‘local’ is not included. It is possible to imagine 
any number of alternative configurations in which grassroots people’s organizations are 
empowered to directly engage with the scales of extraction; this, indeed is the purpose of 
informed consent provisions of the EIA process. As discussed in Chapter 4, however, 
these provisions were subverted by a rescaling of the governance process by the 
Pentecostes administration, through the application of bribes and patronage, leaving 
‘local’ activists with little opportunity to seek redress of their grievances directly. 
For its part, the NPA is largely preoccupied not with producing scales to interact 
with national or provincial government, but with developing and maintaining alliances at 
local levels. Interaction with grassroots civilian networks constitutes the major project for 
the insurgent group, as it is from civilians that the NPA garners political and material 
support. The NPA relies on civilians to provide the NPA information regarding the 




NPA activities, both of which are essential to the NPA’s use of targeted political 
violence. It is through civilian networks that the NPA gains access to potential recruits 
and supplies of funds, food, and arms. Thus, it was the concomitance of a need of the part 
of activists to access regulatory scales at ‘higher’ levels and of the NPA to access civilian 
networks ‘on the ground’ that created the conditions for interactions between these 
groups and the resulting resource conflict. Although other conflicts involve different 
scalar configurations that become similarly challenged by state and non-state actors, I 
propose that the spatiotemporal convergence of scales within extractive economies is a 
constant across the cases that helps explain the correlation between natural resources and 
violence.   
As Le Billon (2007) writes, “Arguably, the production of scale is itself part of the 
production of violence, as it is precisely the (dis)connections between scales that 
participate in engendering or prolonging conflicts” (202). By this, he means that the 
distances—spatially, temporally, and conceptually—between the scales of extraction, 
governance, and resistance are implicated in creating spaces for violent action to occur. 
The inverse, I propose, is equally true, insomuch as the use of violence in civil conflict is 
itself a form of scale-making whereby, through the targeted application of force, state and 
non-state actors attempt to project power at different levels, thus rescaling resource-
related processes; in Smith’s (1993) words, therefore, “the scale of struggle and the 








5.4 Policy Implications 
Ultimately, the overarching objective of research on the resource-conflict nexus 
should be the development and evaluation of policy interventions for preventing, 
mitigating, and ending resource-related violence. Although there has been some research 
on this topic, there is a pressing need for inquiries that directly engage with the broader 
resource conflict literature and the lessons that can be gleaned therefrom. The political 
ecology of scale in natural resource conflicts can provide a useful starting point for such 
research, by informing the appropriate observation scales for study and generating 
hypotheses regarding the likely utility of interventions. 
Among the potential policies for addressing resource conflicts, sanctions are the 
most widely applied and studied. In addition to generalized sanctions, which are imposed 
as a means of exerting economic pressure on the state, targeted sanctions can be used to 
influence particular companies or sectors. As Le Billon (2012) notes, sanctions, whether 
generalized or targeted, are intended to influence conflict through the opportunity 
mechanism. The Kimberly Process Certification Scheme, for example, was developed to 
restrict market access for warlords trafficking in conflict diamonds, thus reducing their 
supply of funds and constraining their ability to purchase weapons, hire recruits, and 
conduct operations; through that process, diamond-producing states voluntarily commit 
to monitor their domestic diamond industry and companies in the industry agree to 
adhere to principles of transparency and to self-regulate their supply chains. The 
effectiveness of resource-related sanctions, and the Kimberly Process in particular, has, 
however, been questioned. Enforcement of sanctions policies, particularly in countries 




needed, has repeatedly been shown to be lacking. In extreme cases, restricting trade in 
certain resource sectors may create new opportunities by increasing the profitability of 
actors willing to engage in the illegal marketplace, as most clearly demonstrated in the 
examples of narcotics trafficking in Colombia, Mexico, Afghanistan, and elsewhere (Le 
Billon & Nicholls 2007; Le Billon 2013)   
The shortcomings of resource sanctions policies can be explained in terms of a 
mismatch between the state or regional scales at which sanctions are typically 
implemented and the highly localized scale at which the opportunity mechanism tends to 
manifest. Because those policies do not address issues of conflict vulnerability and 
conflict risk, the implementation of resource-related sanctions may alter the opportunity 
structures available to non-state actors but is unlikely to eliminate opportunity altogether. 
A 2017 report by the NGO Global Witness, for example, details the failure of the 
Kimberly Process to stem the trade in diamonds by rebel groups in the Central African 
Republic, where entrepreneurial smugglers utilize social media to forge connections 
between international dealers and warlords well outside the regulatory reach of 
government monitors (Global Witness 2017). From the perspective of dealers and rebels, 
while the availability of diamonds creates opportunities, it is the weakness of the state in 
conflict zones that allows these opportunities to be acted upon. In the words of one trader 
quoted in the report, the Central African Republic “is a country at war, and where there is 
war everything is possible” (10). This is analogous to the situation in the Philippines, 
where the inability or unwillingness of the government to police public sector corruption 
is instrumental in creating the conditions for opportunistic exploitation, through the 




seeking to minimize conflict opportunity must be highly targeted and designed in the 
context of specific conflicts. 
For resources whose extraction has the potential to result in broader 
socioeconomic and environmental impacts, especially those that could interact with 
identity politics, interventions implemented at the scales of risk have the greatest 
potential for success. These could include revenue sharing, which has been successfully 
applied to address a number of resource-related conflicts. A majority of implementing 
countries, including Angola, Bolivia, Cameroon, Chad, China, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
India, Madagascar, Mexico, Papua New Guinea, and the Philippines, among many others, 
use a derivation-based scheme, whereby revenues from the oil, natural gas, and mineral 
sectors are collected by the national government and subsequently allocated to the 
regions in which production occurs. Others, including Ecuador, Mongolia, Mexico, and 
Uganda, apply an indicator-based system, in which resource revenues are disbursed on 
the basis of need—measured in terms of population, poverty, and other factors—
irrespective of where the resources are extracted (NRGI & UNDP 2016). 
Revenue sharing has had some documented successes in the mitigation of 
resource-related conflicts. In Indonesia, for example, resource revenue sharing has been 
credited with contributing to the successful resolution of conflict in Aceh and West 
Papua. Mismanagement of revenue sharing initiatives may, however, result in such 
programs exacerbating, rather than mitigating, the contribution of resource extraction to 
conflict vulnerability (Le Billon 2012; Le Billon & Nicholls 2007). As the case of black 
sand mining in Gonzaga demonstrates, revenue sharing has the potential to become a 




sharing regime in Brazil disproportionately benefits Rio de Janeiro, one of the country’s 
wealthiest states; elsewhere, income and public services, including access to piped water, 
trash collection, and connection to sewage networks have deteriorated even as oil revenue 
allocations to local governments have increased. Similar schemes in Colombia and Peru 
have also failed to exhibit measurable positive outcomes, with intense and occasionally 
violent protests occurring as a result; in the latter country, the derivation-based allocation 
system led some local political leaders to aggressively seek control of municipalities in 
which mines were located (NRGI & UNDP 2016). 
Accordingly, the effectiveness of sanctions policies and revenue sharing to reduce 
conflict opportunity and conflict risk, respectively, requires that conflict vulnerability 
also be addressed. The evidence presented above suggests that the operative scale of the 
resource curse effect on conflict corresponds most closely to that of the state. There is 
strong evidence that quality institutions and sufficient wealth can allow an economy to 
overcome the effects of the resource curse (Mehlum et al. 2006; Le Billon 2012). It is 
also clear that a country’s experience of the resource curse is highly historically 
contingent, such that resource-dependent countries, such as Norway, Australia, and 
Canada, that developed resilient and accountably economic and political institutions prior 
to discovery and large-scale exploitation of their natural resource base do not suffer the 
deleterious effects of the resource curse to the same extent as those whose institutions 
arose in an extractive context, as is the case in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Saudi Arabia, and the Philippines. Such observations, however, do little in the way of 




Developed countries and international agencies have sought to incentivize 
capacity-building and reformation of political culture in the developing world by making 
foreign aid and loans conditional upon changes at the national scale that sometimes 
include progress along the dimensions of transparency and accountability, but such 
efforts have been controversial and of debated utility (Ross 2015). Efforts like the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and the Natural Resource Charter have 
aimed to encourage governments to commit to increasing transparency and 
accountability, but have been widely criticized (Le Billon 2012). In general, however, 
aside from broad calls to reduce dependence on natural resources by investing in new 
industries or to increase overall government responsiveness, both of which approaches 
are made more difficult in an extractive economy, little has been proposed in the way of a 
permanent cure for the resource curse. 
Although solving the state-scale vulnerability mechanism is a daunting 
proposition, there may be potential for progress by adopting a more incremental 
approach. The results of Chapter 4, in particular, suggest that localized manifestations of 
the resource curse are instrumental in shaping the opportunity space for alliance 
formation between non-state actors and civilian networks; in Gonzaga, ineffectiveness 
and corruption in the environmental assessment and permitting processes were identified 
as especially important sources of social grievances. This suggests that voluntary efforts 
on the part of multinational companies involved in resource extraction could have 
opportunities to fill in the gaps left by government failures. Such has been the goal of 
NGOs like Global Witness and Revenue Watch Institute that bring to bear public opinion 




extending such projects to include standards for community engagement and informed 
consent could represent a path forward. 
5.5 Concluding Remarks 
From oil wars to blood diamonds, the relationship between natural resources and 
civil conflict has captured scholarly and public attention for decades. Although the 
existence of that relationship is in little doubt, the causal chains by which it is manifest 
remain underspecified and open to interrogation. This dissertation has sought to find 
common ground among the divergent conclusions offered in the existing qualitative and 
quantitative literature by reframing the resource conflict problem as one of scale. By 
applying a multi-scalar and mixed methods research design, I demonstrate that the 
conflict vulnerability, conflict risk, and conflict opportunity mechanisms, as they pertain 
to natural resources, can operate concurrently at distinct but potentially overlapping and 
intersecting scales. At the state scale, the resource curse undermines the resilience of 
economies, the responsiveness of governments, and the quality of institutions, making 
resource-dependent countries vulnerable to outbreaks of armed conflict. Within 
vulnerable states, the broad spatial patterns of conflict risk are shaped, in part, by the 
experience of relative deprivation, including grievances related to the unequal 
distribution of the costs and benefits of natural resource extraction. At ‘local’ scales, the 
nature and timing of specific instances of violence are functions of the opportunities, 
broadly defined, available to state and non-state belligerents, including opportunities for 
extracting value from resource commodity chains and for expanding and maintaining 




Further, the observed correlation between natural resources and civil conflict at 
multiple scales can, I argue, be partially attributed to extractive industry’s role as a 
natural habitat for the production, contestation, and renegotiation of scalar configurations 
of power. Where natural resources are extracted, variously scaled economic, political, 
sociocultural, and biophysical processes intersect, creating nodes of scalar interaction at 
which actors can discursively rescale their own and others’ relative positions. Although, 
as Howitt (1998) observes, the relationship of a mine or other extractive project to 
various entities and phenomena changes across scales, its ubiquity in every scale creates 
potential bridges between them. Thus, extractive projects become, on the one hand, entry 
points to the global economy for states and non-state actors and rallying cries around 
which activists and some insurgent groups mobilize support on the other. These findings 
suggest that future research on the resource-conflict nexus should recognize both the 
epistemological implications of the analytical scales implied by their methodological 
approaches—and thus avoid becoming trapped by the choice of scale—and the explicit 
and implicit production of scale by belligerents and other actors in the context of 
resource-related violence. Implementation and evaluation of policy interventions 
intended to mitigate conflict vulnerability, risk, and opportunity should, similarly, be 
cognizant of the operative scales relevant to the mechanism or mechanisms being 
addressed. 
Natural resources provide the basic materials from which the technologies 
underpinning modern life are produced. As development continues its march forward, 
moving the world’s population out of poverty and toward a globalized consumerist 




foreseeable future. Resources’ role in civil conflicts will, therefore, continue to be an 
important subject of academic, political, and public interest in the years to come. As my 
friend and I concluded in the conversation summarized at the outset of this dissertation, 
resource-related conflicts are complex problems, but they are not irreducibly so. By 
allowing the multiple and interrelated linkages between resources and conflict to be 
disentangled, mapped, and understood, a political ecology of scale framework can and 
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